



Class E.457 -

Book 91  
1905a  
2001?





**Complete Works of  
Abraham Lincoln**

BIOGRAPHICAL EDITION

*Being the Second Printing from the Plates  
of the Celebrated*

GETTYSBURG EDITION

*Francis & Gandy Co.*





## Abraham Lincoln

After the Original Etching by Thomas Johnson.

*This Study was Based on the Beautiful Photograph  
taken by Alexander Hesler in 1861, and En-  
graved for the Republican Club of New York.*



# Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln

*Edited by*

JOHN G. NICOLAY *and* JOHN HAY

With a General Introduction *by*  
RICHARD WATSON GILDER, and Special Articles  
*by* OTHER EMINENT PERSONS

*New and Enlarged Edition*

VOLUME VII

*New York*

FRANCIS D. TANDY COMPANY

1905  
Copy 2.

E457  
91  
1905  
copy 2

*Copyright, 1894, by*  
JOHN G. NICOLAY and JOHN HAY

*Copyright, 1905, by*  
FRANCIS D. TANDY

# The Influence of Abraham Lincoln<sup>1</sup>

**O**N THE 12th of February, 1809, two babes were born—one in the woods of Kentucky, amid the hardships and poverty of pioneers; one in England, surrounded by wealth and culture. One was educated in the University of Nature, the other at Cambridge. One associated his name with the enfranchisement of labor, with the emancipation of millions, with the salvation of the Republic. He is known to us as Abraham Lincoln. The other broke the chains of superstition and filled the world with intellectual light, and he is known as Charles Darwin.

Nothing is grander than to break chains from the bodies of men—nothing nobler than to destroy the phantoms of the soul. Because of these two men the nineteenth century is illustrious.

A few men and women make a nation glorious—Shakespeare made England immortal, Vol-

<sup>1</sup> Copyright 1894 by R. G. Ingersoll. Printed from The Dresden Edition of "The Complete Works of Robert Ingersoll" by special permission.

taire civilized and humanized France; Goethe, Schiller and Humboldt lifted Germany into the light. Angelo, Raphael, Galileo and Bruno crowned with fadeless laurel the Italian brow, and now the most precious treasure of the Great Republic is the memory of Abraham Lincoln.

Every generation has its heroes, its iconoclasts, its pioneers, its ideals. The people always have been and still are divided, at least into classes—the many, who with their backs to the sunrise worship the past, and the few, who keep their faces toward the dawn—the many, who are satisfied with the world as it is; the few, who labor and suffer for the future, for those to be, and who seek to rescue the oppressed, to destroy the cruel distinctions of caste, and to civilize mankind.

Yet it sometimes happens that the liberator of one age becomes the oppressor of the next. His reputation becomes so great—he is so revered and worshipped—that his followers, in his name, attack the hero who endeavors to take another step in advance.

The heroes of the Revolution, forgetting the justice for which they fought, put chains upon the limbs of others, and in their names the lovers of liberty were denounced as ingrates and traitors.

During the Revolution our fathers to justify their rebellion dug down to the bed-rock of human rights and planted their standard there. They declared that all men were entitled to liberty and that government derived its power from the consent of the governed. But when victory came, the great principles were forgotten and chains were put upon the limbs of men. Both of the great political parties were controlled by greed and selfishness. Both were the defenders and protectors of slavery. For nearly three-quarters of a century these parties had control of the Republic. The principal object of both parties was the protection of the infamous institution. Both were eager to secure the Southern vote and both sacrificed principle and honor upon the altar of success.

At last the Whig party died and the Republican was born. This party was opposed to the further extension of slavery. The Democratic party of the South wished to make the "divine institution" national—while the Democrats of the North wanted the question decided by each territory for itself.

Each of these parties had conservatives and extremists. The extremists of the Democratic party were in the rear and wished to go back; the extremists of the Republican party were in the front, and wished to go forward. The ex-

extreme Democrat was willing to destroy the Union for the sake of slavery, and the extreme Republican was willing to destroy the Union for the sake of liberty.

Neither party could succeed without the votes of its extremists.

This was the condition in 1858-60.

When Lincoln was a child his parents removed from Kentucky to Indiana. A few trees were felled—a log hut open to the south, no floor, no window, was built—a little land plowed and here the Lincolns lived. Here the patient, thoughtful, silent, loving mother died—died in the wide forest as a leaf dies, leaving nothing to her son but the memory of her love.

In a few years the family moved to Illinois. Lincoln then almost grown, clad in skins, with no woven stitch upon his body—walking and driving the cattle. Another farm was opened—a few acres subdued and enough raised to keep the wolf from the door. Lincoln quit the farm—went down the Ohio and Mississippi as a hand on a flat-boat—afterward clerked in a country store—then in partnership with another bought the store—failed. Nothing left but a few debts—learned the art of surveying—made about half a living and paid something on the debts—read law—admitted to the bar—tried a few small cases—nomi-

nated for the Legislature and made a speech.

This speech was in favor of a tariff, not only for revenue, but to encourage American manufacturers and to protect American workingmen. Lincoln knew then as well as we do now, that everything, to the limits of the possible, that Americans use should be produced by the energy, skill and ingenuity of Americans. He knew that the more industries we had, the greater variety of things we made, the greater would be the development of the American brain. And he knew that great men and great women are the best things that a nation can produce,—the finest crop a country can possibly raise.

He knew that a nation that sells raw material will grow ignorant and poor, while the people who manufacture will grow intelligent and rich. To dig, to chop, to plow, requires more muscle than mind, more strength than thought.

To invent, to manufacture, to take advantage of the forces of nature—this requires thought, talent, genius. This develops the brain and gives wings to the imagination.

It is better for Americans to purchase from Americans, even if the things purchased cost more.

If we purchase a ton of steel rails from England for twenty dollars, then we have the rails

and England the money. But if we buy a ton of steel rails from an American for twenty-five dollars, then America has both the rails and the money.

Judging from the present universal depression and the recent elections, Lincoln, in his first speech, stood on solid rock and was absolutely right. Lincoln was educated in the University of Nature—educated by cloud and star—by field and winding stream—by billowed plains and solemn forests—by morning's birth and death of day—by storm and night—by the ever eager Spring—by Summer's wealth of leaf and vine and flower—the sad and transient glories of the Autumn woods—and Winter, builder of home and fireside, and whose storms without, create the social warmth within.

He was perfectly acquainted with the political questions of the day—heard them discussed at taverns and country stores, at voting places and courts and on the stump. He knew all the arguments for and against, and no man of his time was better equipped for intellectual conflict. He knew the average mind—the thoughts of the people, the hopes and prejudices of his fellow-men. He had the power of accurate statement. He was logical, candid and sincere. In addition, he had the "touch of nature that makes the whole world kin."

In 1858 he was a candidate for the Senate against Stephen A. Douglas.

The extreme Democrats would not vote for Douglas, but the extreme Republicans did vote for Lincoln. Lincoln occupied the middle ground, and was the compromise candidate of his own party. He lived for many years in the intellectual territory of compromise—in a part of our country settled by Northern and Southern men—where Northern and Southern ideas met, and the ideas of the two sections were brought together and compared.

The sympathies of Lincoln, his ties of kindred, were with the South. His convictions, his sense of justice, and his ideals, were with the North. He knew the horrors of slavery, and he felt the unspeakable ecstasies and glories of freedom. He had the kindness, the gentleness, of true greatness, and he could not have been a master; he had the manhood and independence of true greatness, and he could not have been a slave. He was just, and was incapable of putting a burden upon others that he himself would not willingly bear.

He was merciful and profound, and it was not necessary for him to read the history of the world to know that liberty and slavery could not live in the same nation, or in the same brain. Lincoln was a statesman. And there is this dif-

From the heights of philosophy—standing above the contending hosts, above the prejudices, the sentimentalities of the day—Lincoln was great enough and brave enough and wise enough to utter these prophetic words:

“A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot permanently endure half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all the one thing or the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it further until it becomes alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.”

This declaration was the standard around which gathered the grandest political party the world has ever seen, and this declaration made Lincoln the leader of that vast host.

In this, the first great crisis, Lincoln uttered the victorious truth that made him the foremost man in the Republic.

The Republican party nominated him for the presidency and the people decided at the polls that a house divided against itself could not stand, and that slavery had cursed soul and soil enough.

It is not a common thing to elect a really great man to fill the highest official position. I do not say that the great Presidents have been chosen by accident. Probably it would be better to say that they were the favorites of a happy chance.

The average man is afraid of genius. He feels as an awkward man feels in the presence of a sleight-of-hand performer. He admires and suspects. Genius appears to carry too much sail—to lack prudence, has too much courage. The ballast of dullness inspires confidence.

By a happy chance Lincoln was nominated and elected in spite of his fitness—and the patient, gentle, just and loving man was called upon to bear as great a burden as man has ever borne.

Then came another crisis—the crisis of Secession and Civil war.

Again Lincoln spoke the deepest feeling and the highest thought of the Nation. In his first message he said:

“The central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy.”

He also showed conclusively that the North and South, in spite of secession, must remain face to face—that physically they could not separate—that they must have more or less com-

merce, and that this commerce must be carried on either between the two sections as friends, or as aliens.

This situation and its consequences he pointed out to absolute perfection in these words:

“Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between allies than laws among friends?”

After having stated fully and fairly the philosophy of the conflict, after having said enough to satisfy any calm and thoughtful mind, he addressed himself to the hearts of America. Probably there are few finer passages in literature than the close of Lincoln's inaugural address:

“I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break, our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory stretching from every battlefield and patriotic grave to every loving heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.”

These noble, these touching, these pathetic words, were delivered in the presence of rebellion, in the midst of spies and conspirators—sur-

rounded by but few friends, most of whom were unknown, and some of whom were wavering in their fidelity—at a time when secession was arrogant and organized, when patriotism was silent, and when, to quote the expressive words of Lincoln himself, “Sinners were calling the righteous to repentance.”

When Lincoln became President, he was held in contempt by the South—underrated by the North and East—not appreciated even by his cabinet—and yet he was not only one of the wisest, but one of the shrewdest of mankind. Knowing that he had the right to enforce the laws of the Union in all parts of the United States and Territories—knowing, as he did, that the secessionists were in the wrong, he also knew that they had sympathizers not only in the North, but in other lands.

Consequently, he felt that it was of the utmost importance that the South should fire the first shot, should do some act that would solidify the North, and gain for us the justification of the civilized world.

He proposed to give food to the soldiers at Sumter. He asked the advice of all his cabinet on this question, and all, with the exception of Montgomery Blair, answered in the negative, giving their reasons in writing. In spite of this, Lincoln took his own course—endeavored

to send the supplies, and while thus engaged, doing his simple duty, the South commenced actual hostilities and fired on the fort. The course pursued by Lincoln was absolutely right, and the act of the South to a great extent solidified the North, and gained for the Republic the justification of a great number of people in other lands.

At that time Lincoln appreciated the scope and consequences of the impending conflict. Above all other thoughts in his mind was this:

“This conflict will settle the question, at least for centuries to come, whether man is capable of governing himself, and consequently is of greater importance to the free than to the enslaved.”

He knew what depended on the issue and said:

“We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth.”

Then came a crisis in the North. It became clearer and clearer to Lincoln's mind, day by day, that the Rebellion was slavery, and that it was necessary to keep the border States on the side of the Union. For this purpose he proposed a scheme of emancipation and colonization—a scheme by which the owners of slaves should be paid the full value of what they called their “property.”

He knew that if the border States agreed to gradual emancipation, and received compensation for their slaves, they would be forever lost to the Confederacy, whether secession succeeded or not. It was objected at the time, by some, that the scheme was far too expensive; but Lincoln, wiser than his advisers—far wiser than his enemies—demonstrated that from an economical point of view, his course was best.

He proposed that \$400 be paid for slaves, including men, women and children. This was a large price, and yet he showed how much cheaper it was to purchase than to carry on the war.

At that time, at the price mentioned, there were about \$750,000 worth of slaves in Delaware. The cost of carrying on the war was at least two millions of dollars a day, and for one-third of one day's expenses, all the slaves in Delaware could be purchased. He also showed that all the slaves in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri could be bought, at the same price, for less than the expense of carrying on the war for eighty-seven days.

This was the wisest thing that could have been proposed, and yet such was the madness of the South, such the indignation of the North, that the advice was unheeded.

Again, in July, 1862, he urged on the Repre-

representatives of the border States a scheme of gradual compensated emancipation; but the Representatives were too deaf to hear, too blind to see.

Lincoln always hated slavery, and yet he felt the obligations and duties of his position. In his first message he assured the South that the laws, including the most odious of all—the law for the return of fugitive slaves—would be enforced. The South would not hear. Afterward he proposed to purchase the slaves of the border States, but the proposition was hardly discussed—hardly heard. Events came thick and fast; theories gave way to facts, and everything was left to force.

The extreme Democrat of the North was fearful that slavery might be destroyed, that the Constitution might be broken, and that Lincoln, after all, could not be trusted; and at the same time the radical Republican feared that Lincoln loved the Union more than he did liberty.

The fact is, that he tried to discharge the obligations of his great office, knowing from the first that slavery must perish. The course pursued by Lincoln was so gentle, so kind and persistent, so wise and logical, that millions of Northern Democrats sprang to the defence, not only of the Union, but of his administration. Lincoln refused to be led or hurried by Frémont or Hunter, by Greeley or Sumner. From

first to last he was the real leader, and he kept step with events.

On the 22d of July, 1862, Lincoln sent word to the members of his cabinet that he wished to see them: It so happened that Secretary Chase was the first to arrive. He found Lincoln reading a book. Looking up from the page, the President said: "Chase, did you ever read this book?" "What book is it?" asked Chase. "Artemus Ward," replied Lincoln. "Let me read you this chapter, entitled '*Wax Wurx in Albany.*'" And so he began reading while the other members of the cabinet one by one came in. At last Stanton told Mr. Lincoln that he was in a great hurry, and if any business was to be done he would like to do it at once. Whereupon Mr. Lincoln laid down the open book, opened a drawer, took out a paper and said: "Gentlemen, I have called you together to notify you what I have determined to do. I want no advice. Nothing can change my mind."

He then read the Proclamation of Emancipation. Chase thought there ought to be something about God at the close, to which Lincoln replied: "Put it in, it won't hurt it." It was also agreed that the President would wait for a victory in the field before giving the Proclamation to the world.

The meeting was over, the members went

their way. Mr. Chase was the last to go, and as he went through the door looked back and saw that Mr. Lincoln had taken up the book and was again engrossed in the *Wax Wux at Albany*.

This was on the 22d of July, 1862. On the 22d of August of the same year—after Lincoln wrote his celebrated letter to Horace Greeley, in which he stated that his object was to save the Union; *that he would save it with slavery if he could*; that if it was necessary to destroy slavery in order to save the Union, he would; in other words, he would do what was necessary to save the Union.

This letter disheartened, to a great degree, thousands and millions of the friends of freedom. They felt that Mr. Lincoln had not attained the moral height upon which they supposed he stood. And yet, when this letter was written, the Emancipation Proclamation was in his hands, and had been for thirty days, waiting only an opportunity to give it to the world.

Some two weeks after the letter to Greeley, Lincoln was waited on by a committee of clergymen, and was by them informed that it was God's will that he should issue a Proclamation of Emancipation. He replied to them, in substance, that the day of miracles had passed. He also mildly and kindly suggested that if it were

God's will this Proclamation should be issued, certainly God would have made known that will to him—to the person whose duty it was to issue it.

On the 22d day of September, 1862, the most glorious date in the history of the Republic, the Proclamation of Emancipation was issued.

Lincoln had reached the generalization of all argument upon the question of slavery and freedom—a generalization that never has been, and probably never will be, excelled:

“ In giving freedom to the slave, we assume freedom to the free.”

This is absolutely true. Liberty can be retained, can be enjoyed, only by giving it to others. The spendthrift saves, the miser is prodigal. In the realm of Freedom, waste is husbandry. He who puts chains upon the body of another shackles his own soul. The moment the Proclamation was issued the cause of the Republic became sacred. From that moment the North fought for the human race. From that moment the North stood under the blue and stars, the flag of Nature, sublime and free.

In 1831, Lincoln went down the Mississippi on a flat-boat. He received the extravagant salary of ten dollars a month. When he reached New Orleans, he and some

of his companions went about the city.

Among other places they visited a slave market, where men and women were being sold at auction. A young colored girl was on the block. Lincoln heard the brutal words of the auctioneer—the savage remarks of bidders. The scene filled his soul with indignation and horror.

Turning to his companions, he said, "Boys, if I ever get a chance to hit slavery, by God I'll hit it hard!"

The helpless girl, unconsciously, had planted in a great heart the seeds of the Proclamation.

Thirty-one years afterward the chance came, the oath was kept, and to four millions of slaves, of men, women and children, was restored liberty, the jewel of the soul.

In the history, in the fiction of the world, there is nothing more intensely dramatic than this.

Lincoln held within his brain the grandest truths, and he held them as unconsciously, as easily, as naturally, as a waveless pool holds within its stainless breast a thousand stars.

In these two years we had traveled from the Ordinance of Secession to the Proclamation of Emancipation.

We were surrounded by enemies. Many of the so-called great in Europe and England were

against us. They hated the Republic, despised our institutions, and sought in many ways to aid the South.

Mr. Gladstone announced that Jefferson Davis had made a nation, and that he did not believe the restoration of the American Union by force attainable.

From the Vatican came words of encouragement for the South.

It was declared that the North was fighting for empire and the South for independence.

The Marquis of Salisbury said: "The people of the South are the natural allies of England. The North keeps an opposition shop in the same department of trade as ourselves."

Not a very elevated sentiment—but English.

Some of their statesmen declared that the subjugation of the South by the North would be a calamity to the world.

Louis Napoleon was another enemy, and he endeavored to establish a monarchy in Mexico, to the end that the great North might be destroyed. But the patience, the uncommon common sense, the statesmanship of Lincoln—in spite of foreign hate and Northern division—triumphed over all. And now we forgive all foes. Victory makes forgiveness easy.

Lincoln was by nature a diplomat. He knew the art of sailing against the wind. He

had as much shrewdness as is consistent with honesty. He understood, not only the rights of individuals, but of nations. In all his correspondence with other governments he neither wrote nor sanctioned a line which afterwards was used to tie his hands. In the use of perfect English he easily rose above all his advisers and all his fellows.

No one claims that Lincoln did all. He could have done nothing without the generals in the field, and the generals could have done nothing without their armies. The praise is due to all—to the private as much as to the officer; to the lowest who did his duty, as much as to the highest.

My heart goes out to the brave private as much as to the leader of the host.

But Lincoln stood at the centre and with infinite patience, with consummate skill, with the genius of goodness, directed, cheered, consoled and conquered.

Slavery was the cause of the war, and slavery was the perpetual stumbling-block. As the war went on, question after question arose—questions that could not be answered by theories. Should we hand back the slave to his master, when the master was using his slave to destroy the Union? If the South was right, slaves were property, and by the laws of war anything that

might be used to the advantage of the enemy might be confiscated by us. Events did not wait for discussion. General Butler denominated the negro as "a contraband." Congress provide that the property of the rebels might be confiscated.

The extreme Democrats of the North regarded the slave as more sacred than life. It was no harm to kill the master—to burn his house, to ravage his fields—but you must not free his slave.

If in war a nation has the right to take the property of its citizens—of its friends—certainly it has the right to take the property of those it has the right to kill.

Lincoln was wise enough to know that war is governed by the laws of war, and that during the conflict constitutions are silent. All that he could do he did in the interests of peace. He offered to execute every law—including the most infamous of all—to buy the slaves in the border States—to establish gradual, compensated emancipation; but the South would not hear. Then he confiscated the property of rebels—treated the slaves as contraband of war, used them to put down the Rebellion, armed them and clothed them in the uniform of the Republic—was in favor of making them citizens and allowing them to stand on an equality

with their white brethren under the flag of the Nation. During these years Lincoln moved with events, and every step he took has been justified by the considerate judgment of mankind.

Lincoln not only watched the war, but kept his hand on the political pulse. In 1863 a tide set in against the administration. A Republican meeting was to be held in Springfield, Illinois, and Lincoln wrote a letter to be read at this convention. It was in his happiest vein. It was a perfect defence of his administration, including the Proclamation of Emancipation. Among other things he said:

“ But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or it is not valid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction, but if it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life.”

To the Northern Democrats who said they would not fight for negroes, Lincoln replied:

“ Some of them seem willing to fight for you — but no matter.”

Of negro soldiers:

“ But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us they must be prompted by the strongest motive —

even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept."

There is one line in this letter that will give it immortality:

"The Father of waters again goes unvexed to the sea."

This line is worthy of Shakespeare.

Another:

"Among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet."

He draws a comparison between the white men against us and the black men for us:

"And then there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue and clenched teeth and steady eye and well-poised bayonet they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they strove to hinder it."

Under the influence of this letter, the love of country, of the Union, and above all, the love of liberty, took possession of the heroic North.

There was the greatest moral exaltation ever known.

The spirit of liberty took possession of the people. The masses became sublime.

To fight for yourself is natural—to fight for others is grand; to fight for your country is noble—to fight for the human race—for the liberty of land and brain—is nobler still.

As a matter of fact, the defenders of slavery had sown the seeds of their own defeat. They dug the pit in which they fell. Clay and Webster and thousands of others had by their eloquence made the Union almost sacred. The Union was the very tree of life, the source and stream and sea of liberty and law.

For the sake of slavery millions stood by the Union, for the sake of liberty millions knelt at the altar of the Union; and this love of the Union is what, at last, overwhelmed the Confederate hosts.

It does not seem possible that only a few years ago our Constitution, our laws, our Courts, the Pulpit and the Press defended and upheld the institution of slavery—that it was a crime to feed the hungry—to give water to the lips of thirst—shelter to a woman flying from the whip and chain!

The old flag still flies—the stars are there—the stains have gone.

Lincoln always saw the end. He was unmoved by the storms and currents of the times. He advanced too rapidly for the conservative politicians, too slowly for the radical enthusi-

asts. He occupied the line of safety, and held by his personality—by the force of his great character, by his charming candor—the masses on his side.

The soldiers thought of him as a father.

All who had lost their sons in battle felt that they had his sympathy—felt that his face was as sad as theirs. They knew that Lincoln was actuated by one motive, and that his energies were bent to the attainment of one end—the salvation of the Republic.

They knew that he was kind, sincere and merciful. They knew that in his veins there was no drop of tyrants' blood. They knew that he used his power to protect the innocent, to save reputation and life—that he had the brain of a philosopher—the heart of a mother.

During all the years of war, Lincoln stood the embodiment of mercy, between discipline and death. He pitied the imprisoned and condemned. He took the unfortunate in his arms, and was the friend even of the convict. He knew temptation's strength—the weakness of the will—and how in fury's sudden flame the judgment drops the scales, and passion—blind and deaf—usurps the throne.

One day a woman, accompanied by a Senator, called on the President. The woman was the wife of one of Mosby's men. Her husband had

been captured, tried and condemned to be shot. She came to ask for the pardon of her husband. The President heard her story and then asked what kind of a man her husband was. "Is he intemperate, does he abuse the children and beat you?" "No, no," said the wife, "he is a good man, a good husband, he loves me and he loves the children, and we cannot live without him. The only trouble is that he is a fool about politics—I live in the North, born there, and if I get him home, he will do no more fighting for the South." "Well," said Mr. Lincoln, after examining the papers, "I will pardon your husband and turn him over to you for safe keeping." The poor woman, overcome with joy, sobbed as though her heart would break.

"My dear woman," said Lincoln, "if I had known how badly it was going to make you feel, I never would have pardoned him." "You do not understand me," she cried between her sobs. "You do not understand me." "Yes, yes, I do," answered the President, "and if you do not go away at once I shall be crying with you."

On another occasion, a member of Congress, on his way to see Lincoln, found in one of the ante-rooms of the White House an old white-haired man, sobbing—his wrinkled face wet with tears. The old man told him that for several days he had tried to see the President—

that he wanted a pardon for his son. The Congressman told the old man to come with him and he would introduce him to Mr. Lincoln. On being introduced, the old man said: "Mr. Lincoln, my wife sent me to you. We had three boys. They all joined your army. One of 'em has been killed, one's a-fighting now, and one of 'em, the youngest, has been tried for deserting and he's going to be shot day after to-morrow. He never deserted. He's wild, and he may have drunk too much and wandered off, but he never deserted. 'Taint in the blood. He's his mother's favorite, and if he's shot, I know she'll die." The President, turning to his secretary, said: "Telegraph General Butler to suspend the execution in the case of —— [giving his name] until further orders from me, and ask him to answer——."

The Congressman congratulated the old man on his success—but the old man did not respond. He was not satisfied. "Mr. President," he began, "I can't take that news home. It won't satisfy his mother. How do I know but what you'll give further orders to-morrow?" "My good man," said Mr. Lincoln, "I have to do the best I can. The generals are complaining because I pardon so many. They say that my mercy destroys discipline. Now, when you get home you tell his mother what you said to me

about my giving further orders, and then you tell her that I said this: 'If your son lives until they get further orders from me, that when he does die people will say that old Methusaleh was a baby compared to him.'"

The pardoning power is the only remnant of absolute sovereignty that a President has. Through all the years, Lincoln will be known as Lincoln the loving, Lincoln the merciful.

Lincoln had the keenest sense of humor, and always saw the laughable side even of disaster. In his humor there was logic and the best of sense. No matter how complicated the question, or how embarrassing the situation, his humor furnished an answer and a door of escape.

Vallandigham was a friend of the South, and did what he could to sow the seeds of failure. In his opinion everything, except rebellion, was unconstitutional.

He was arrested, convicted by a court martial, and sentenced to imprisonment.

There was doubt about the legality of the trial, and thousands in the North denounced the whole proceeding as tyrannical and infamous. At the same time millions demanded that Vallandigham should be punished.

Lincoln's humor came to the rescue. He disapproved of the findings of the court, changed the punishment, and ordered that Mr. Vallan-

digham should be sent to his friends in the South. Those who regarded the act as unconstitutional almost forgave it for the sake of its humor.

Horace Greeley always had the idea that he was greatly superior to Lincoln, because he lived in a larger town, and for a long time insisted that the people of the North and the people of the South desired peace. He took it upon himself to lecture Lincoln. Lincoln, with that wonderful sense of humor, united with shrewdness and profound wisdom, told Greeley that, if the South really wanted peace, he (Lincoln) desired the same thing, and was doing all he could to bring it about. Greeley insisted that a commissioner should be appointed, with authority to negotiate with the representatives of the Confederacy. This was Lincoln's opportunity. He authorized Greeley to act as such commissioner. The great editor felt that he was caught. For a time he hesitated, but finally went, and found that the Southern commissioners were willing to take into consideration any offers of peace that Lincoln might make, consistent with the independence of the Confederacy.

The failure of Greeley was humiliating, and the position in which he was left, absurd.

Again the humor of Lincoln had triumphed.

Lincoln, to satisfy a few fault-finders in the North, went to Grant's headquarters and met some Confederate commissioners. He urged that it was hardly proper for him to negotiate with the representatives of rebels in arms—that if the South wanted peace, all they had to do was to stop fighting. One of the commissioners cited as a precedent the fact that Charles the First negotiated with rebels in arms. To which Lincoln replied that Charles the First lost his head. The conference came to nothing, as Mr. Lincoln expected.

The commissioners, one of them being Alexander H. Stephens, who, when in good health, weighed about ninety pounds, dined with the President and Gen. Grant. After dinner, as they were leaving, Stephens put on an English ulster, the tails of which reached the ground, while the collar was somewhat above the wearer's head.

As Stephens went out, Lincoln touched Grant and said: "Grant, look at Stephens. Did you ever see as little a nubbin with as much shuck?"

Lincoln always tried to do things in the easiest way. He did not waste his strength. He was not particular about moving along straight lines. He did not tunnel the mountains. He was willing to go around, and reach the end desired as a river reaches the sea.

One of the most wonderful things ever done by Lincoln was the promotion of General Hooker. After the battle of Fredericksburg, General Burnside found great fault with Hooker, and wished to have him removed from the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln disapproved of Burnside's order, and gave Hooker the command. He then wrote Hooker this memorable letter:

“I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier — which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession — in which you are right. You have confidence — which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition to thwart him as much as you could — in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you command. Only those generals who gain successes

## xxxviii Influence of Lincoln

can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military successes, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence in him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you, so far as I can, to put it down. Neither you, nor Napoleon, if he were alive, can get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories."

This letter has, in my judgment, no parallel. The mistaken magnanimity is almost equal to the prophecy:

"I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their command and withholding confidence in him, will now turn upon you."

Chancellorsville was the fulfillment.

Mr. Lincoln was a statesman. The great stumbling-block—the great obstruction—in Lincoln's way, and in the way of thousands, was the old doctrine of States Rights.

This doctrine was first established to protect slavery. It was clung to to protect the inter-

State slave trade. It became sacred in connection with the Fugitive Slave Law, and it was finally used as the corner-stone of Secession.

This doctrine was never appealed to in defence of the right—always in support of the wrong. For many years politicians upon both sides of this question endeavored to express the exact relations existing between the Federal Government and the States, and I know of no one who succeeded, except Lincoln. In his message of 1861, delivered on July the 4th, the definition is given, and it is perfect:

“Whatever concerns the whole should be confided to the whole — to the General Government. Whatever concerns only the State should be left exclusively to the State.”

When that definition is realized in practice, this country becomes a Nation. Then we shall know that the first allegiance of the citizen is not to his State, but to the Republic, and that the first duty of the Republic is to protect the citizen, not only when in other lands, but at home, and that this duty cannot be discharged by delegating it to the States.

Lincoln believed in the sovereignty of the people—in the supremacy of the Nation—in the territorial integrity of the Republic.

A great actor can be known only when he has

assumed the principal character in a great drama. Possibly the greatest actors have never appeared, and it may be that the greatest soldiers have lived the lives of perfect peace. Lincoln assumed the leading part in the greatest drama ever enacted upon the stage of this continent.

His criticisms of military movements, his correspondence with his generals and others on the conduct of the war, show that he was at all times master of the situation—that he was a natural strategist, that he appreciated the difficulties and advantages of every kind, and that in “the still and mental” field of war he stood the peer of any man beneath the flag.

Had McClellan followed his advice, he would have taken Richmond.

Had Hooker acted in accordance with his suggestions, Chancellorsville would have been a victory for the Nation.

Lincoln’s political prophecies were all fulfilled.

We know now that he not only stood at the top, but that he occupied the centre, from first to last, and that he did this by reason of his intelligence, his humor, his philosophy, his courage and his patriotism.

In passion’s storm he stood, unmoved, patient, just and candid. In his brain there was no

cloud, and in his heart no hate. He longed to save the South as well as North, to see the Nation one and free.

He lived until the end was known.

He lived until the Confederacy was dead—until Lee surrendered, until Davis fled, until the doors of Libby Prison were opened, until the Republic was supreme.

He lived until Lincoln and Liberty were united forever.

He lived to cross the desert—to reach the palms of victory—to hear the murmured music of the welcome waves.

He lived until all loyal hearts were his—until the history of his deeds made music in the souls of men—until he knew that on Columbia's Calendar of worth and fame his name stood first.

He lived until there remained nothing for him to do as great as he had done.

What he did was worth living for, worth dying for.

He lived until he stood in the midst of universal Joy, beneath the outstretched wings of Peace—the foremost man in all the world.

And then the horror came. Night fell on noon. The Savior of the Republic, the breaker of chains, the liberator of millions, he who had “assured freedom to the free,” was dead.

Upon his brow Fame placed the immortal wreath, and for the first time in the history of the world a Nation bowed and wept.

The memory of Lincoln is the strongest, tenderest tie that binds all hearts together now, and holds all States beneath a Nation's flag.

Abraham Lincoln—strange mingling of mirth and tears, of the tragic and grotesque, of cap and crown, of Socrates and Democritus, of Æsop and Marcus Aurelius, of all that is gentle and just, humorous and honest, merciful, wise, laughable, lovable and divine, and all consecrated to the use of man; while through all, and over all, were an overwhelming sense of obligation, of chivalric loyalty to truth, and upon all, the shadow of the tragic end.

Nearly all the great historic characters are impossible monsters, disproportioned by flattery, or by calumny deformed. We know nothing of their peculiarities, or nothing but their peculiarities. About these oaks there clings none of the earth of humanity.

Washington is now only a steel engraving. About the real man who lived and loved and hated and schemed, we know but little. The glass through which we look at him is of such high magnifying power that the features are exceedingly indistinct.

Hundreds of people are now engaged in

smoothing out the lines of Lincoln's face—forcing all features to the common mould—so that he may be known, not as he really was, but, according to their poor standard, as he should have been.

Lincoln was not a type. He stands alone—no ancestors, no fellows, no successors.

He had the advantage of living in a new country, of social equality, of personal freedom, of seeing in the horizon of his future the perpetual star of hope. He preserved his individuality and his self-respect. He knew and mingled with men of every kind; and, after all, men are the best books. He became acquainted with the ambitions and hopes of the heart, the means used to accomplish ends, the springs of action and the seeds of thought. He was familiar with nature, with actual things, with common facts. He loved and appreciated the poem of the year, the drama of the seasons.

In a new country a man must possess at least three virtues—honesty, courage and generosity. In cultivated society, cultivation is often more important than soil. A well-executed counterfeit passes more readily than a blurred genuine. It is necessary only to observe the unwritten laws of society—to be honest enough to keep out of prison, and generous enough to subscribe in public—where the

subscription can be defended as an investment.

In a new country, character is essential; in the old, reputation is sufficient. In the new, they find what a man really is; in the old, he generally passes for what he resembles. People separated only by distance are much nearer together, than those divided by the walls of caste.

It is no advantage to live in a great city, where poverty degrades and failure brings despair. The fields are lovelier than paved streets, and the great forests than walls of brick. Oaks and elms are more poetic than steeples and chimneys.

In the country is the idea of home. There you see the rising and setting sun; you become acquainted with the stars and clouds. The constellations are your friends. You hear the rain on the roof and listen to the rhythmic sighing of the winds. You are thrilled by the resurrection called Spring, touched and saddened by Autumn—the grace and poetry of death. Every field is a picture, a landscape; every landscape a poem; every flower a tender thought, and every forest a fairy-land. In the country you preserve your identity—your personality. There you are an aggregation of atoms, but in the city you are only an atom of an aggregation.

In the country you keep your cheek close to

the breast of Nature. You are calmed and ennobled by the space, the amplitude and scope of earth and sky—by the constancy of the stars.

Lincoln never finished his education. To the night of his death he was a pupil, a learner, an inquirer, a seeker after knowledge. You have no idea how many men are spoiled by what is called education. For the most part, colleges are places where pebbles are polished and diamonds are dimmed. If Shakespeare had graduated at Oxford, he might have been a quibbling attorney, or a hypocritical parson.

Lincoln was a great lawyer. There is nothing shrewder in this world than intelligent honesty. Perfect candor is sword and shield.

He understood the nature of man. As a lawyer he endeavored to get at the truth, at the very heart of a case. He was not willing even to deceive himself. No matter what his interest said, what his passion demanded, he was great enough to find the truth and strong enough to pronounce judgment against his own desires.

Lincoln was a many-sided man, acquainted with smiles and tears, complex in brain, single in heart, direct as light; and his words, candid as mirrors, gave the perfect image of his thought. He was never afraid to ask—never too dignified to admit that he did not know,

No man had keener wit, or kinder humor.

It may be that humor is the pilot of reason. People without humor drift unconsciously into absurdity. Humor sees the other side—stands in the mind like a spectator, a good-natured critic, and gives its opinion before judgment is reached. Humor goes with good nature, and good nature is the climate of reason. In anger, reason abdicates and malice extinguishes the torch. Such was the humor of Lincoln that he could tell even unpleasant truths as charmingly as most men can tell the things we wish to hear.

He was not solemn. Solemnity is a mask worn by ignorance and hypocrisy—it is the preface, prologue, and index to the cunning or the stupid.

He was natural in his life and thought—master of the story-teller's art, in illustration apt, in application perfect, liberal in speech, shocking Pharisees and prudes, using any word that wit could disinfect.

He was a logician. His logic shed light. In its presence the obscure became luminous, and the most complex and intricate political and metaphysical knots seemed to untie themselves. Logic is the necessary product of intelligence and sincerity. It cannot be learned. It is the child of a clear head and a good heart.

Lincoln was candid, and with candor often

deceived the deceitful. He had intellect without arrogance, genius without pride, and religion without cant—that is to say, without bigotry and without deceit.

He was an orator—clear, sincere, natural. He did not pretend. He did not say what he thought others thought, but what he thought.

If you wish to be sublime you must be natural—you must keep close to the grass. You must sit by the fireside of the heart; above the clouds it is too cold. You must be simple in your speech; too much polish suggests insincerity.

The great orator idealizes the real, transfigures the common, makes even the inanimate throb and thrill, fills the gallery of the imagination with statues and pictures perfect in form and color, brings to light the gold hoarded by memory the miser, shows the glittering coin to the spendthrift hope, enriches the brain, ennobles the heart, and quickens the conscience. Between his lips words bud and blossom.

If you wish to know the difference between an orator and an elocutionist—between what is felt and what is said—between what the heart and brain can do together and what the brain can do alone—read Lincoln's wondrous speech at Gettysburg, and then the oration of Edward Everett.

The speech of Lincoln will never be forgot-

ten. It will live until languages are dead and lips are dust. The oration of Everett will never be read.

The elocutionists believe in the virtue of voice, the sublimity of syntax, the majesty of long sentences, and the genius of gesture.

The orator loves the real, the simple, the natural. He places the thought above all. He knows that the greatest ideas should be expressed in the shortest words—that the greatest statues need the least drapery.

Lincoln was an immense personality—firm but not obstinate. Obstinacy is egotism—firmness, heroism. He influenced others without effort, unconsciously; and they submitted to him as men submit to nature—unconsciously. He was severe with himself, and for that reason lenient with others.

He appeared to apologize for being kinder than his fellows.

He did merciful things as stealthily as others committed crimes.

Almost ashamed of tenderness, he said and did the noblest words and deeds with that charming confusion, that awkwardness, that is the perfect grace of modesty.

As a noble man, wishing to pay a small debt to a poor neighbor, reluctantly offers a hundred-dollar bill and asks for change, fearing that he

may be suspected either of making a display of wealth or a pretence of payment, so Lincoln hesitated to show his wealth of goodness, even to the best he knew.

A great man stooping, not wishing to make his fellows feel that they were small or mean.

By his candor, by his kindness, by his perfect freedom from restraint, by saying what he thought, and saying it absolutely in his own way, he made it not only possible, but popular, to be natural. He was the enemy of mock solemnity, of the stupidly respectable, of the cold and formal.

He wore no official robes either on his body or his soul. He never pretended to be more or less, or other, or different, from what he really was. He had the unconscious naturalness of Nature's self.

He built upon the rock. The foundation was secure and broad. The structure was a pyramid, narrowing as it rose. Through days and nights of sorrow, through years of grief and pain, with unswerving purpose, "with malice towards none, with charity for all," with infinite patience, with unclouded vision, he hoped and toiled. Stone after stone was laid, until at last the Proclamation found its place. On that the Goddess stands.

He knew others, because perfectly acquainted

with himself. He cared nothing for place, but everything for principle; little for money, but everything for independence. Where no principle was involved, easily swayed—willing to go slowly, if in the right direction—sometimes willing to stop; but he would not go back, and he would not go wrong.

He was willing to wait. He knew that the event was not waiting, and that fate was not the fool of chance. He knew that slavery had defenders, but no defence, and that they who attack the right must wound themselves. He was neither tyrant nor slave. He neither knelt nor scorned. With him, men were neither great nor small—they were right or wrong.

Through manners, clothes, titles, rags and race he saw the real—that which is. Beyond accident, policy, compromise and war he saw the end.

He was patient as Destiny, whose undecipherable hieroglyphs were so deeply graven on his sad and tragic face.

Nothing discloses real character like the use of power. It is easy for the weak to be gentle. Most people can bear adversity. But if you wish to know what a man really is, give him power. This is the supreme test. It is the glory of Lincoln that, having almost absolute power, he never abused it, except on the side of mercy.

Wealth could not purchase, power could not awe, this divine, this loving man.

He knew no fear except the fear of doing wrong. Hating slavery, pitying the master—seeking to conquer, not persons, but prejudices—he was the embodiment of the self-denial, the courage, the hope and the nobility of a Nation.

He spoke not to inflame, not to upbraid, but to convince.

He raised his hands, not to strike, but in benediction.

He longed to pardon.

He loved to see the pearls of joy on the cheeks of a wife whose husband he had rescued from death.

Lincoln was the grandest figure of the fiercest civil war. He is the gentlest memory of our world.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "R. G. Ingersoll". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping tail that curves to the right.



# Lincoln's Grave<sup>1</sup>

BY MAURICE THOMPSON

May one who fought in honor for the South  
Uncovered stand and sing by Lincoln's grave?  
Why, if I shrunk not at the cannon's mouth,  
Nor swerved one inch for any battle-wave,  
Should I now tremble in this quiet close,  
Hearing the prairie wind go lightly by  
From billowy plains of grass and miles of corn,  
    While out of deep repose  
The great sweet spirit lifts itself on high  
And broods above our land this summer morn?

. . . . .  
Meseems I feel his presence. Is he dead?  
Death is a word. He lives and grander grows.  
At Gettysburg he bows his bleeding head;  
He spreads his arms where Chickamauga flows,  
As if to clasp old soldiers to his breast,  
Of South or North no matter which they be,  
Not thinking of what uniform they wore,  
    His heart a palimpsest,  
Record on record of humanity,

<sup>1</sup> From a poem read before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University.

Where love is first and last forevermore.

. . . . .

He was the Southern mother leaning forth,  
 At dead of night to hear the cannon roar,  
 Beseeching God to turn the cruel North  
 And break it that her son might come once more;  
 He was New England's maiden pale and pure,  
 Whose gallant lover fell on Shiloh's plain;  
 He was the mangled body of the dead;  
     He writhing did endure  
 Wounds and disfigurement and racking pain,  
 Gangrene and amputation, all things dread.

He was the North, the South, the East, the West,  
 The thrall, the master, all of us in one;  
 There was no section that he held the best;  
 His love shone as impartial as the sun;  
 And so revenge appealed to him in vain,  
 He smiled at it, as at a thing forlorn,  
 And gently put it from him, rose and stood  
     A moment's space in pain,  
 Remembering the prairies and the corn  
 And the glad voices of the field and wood.

. . . . .

And then when Peace set wing upon the wind  
 And northward flying fanned the clouds away,  
 He passed as martyrs pass. Ah, who shall find  
 The chord to sound the pathos of that day!  
 Mid-April blowing sweet across the land,  
 New bloom of freedom opening to the world,

## Lincoln's Grave

lv

Loud pæans of the homeward-looking host,  
The salutations grand  
From grimy guns, the tattered flags upfurled;  
And he must sleep to all the glory lost!

Sleep! loss! But there is neither sleep nor loss,  
And all the glory mantles him about;  
Above his breast the precious banners cross,  
Does he not hear his armies tramp and shout?  
Oh, every kiss of mother, wife or maid  
Dashed on the grizzly lip of veteran,  
Comes forthright to that calm and quiet mouth,  
And will not be delayed,  
And every slave, no longer slave but man,  
Sends up a blessing from the broken South.

. . . . .

He is not dead, France knows he is not dead;  
He stirs strong hearts in Spain and Germany,  
In far Siberian mines his words are said,  
He tells the English Ireland shall be free,  
He calls poor serfs about him in the night,  
And whispers of a power that laughs at kings,  
And of a force that breaks the strongest chain;  
Old tyranny feels his might  
Tearing away its deepest fastenings,  
And jewelled sceptres threaten him in vain.

Years pass away, but freedom does not pass,  
Thrones crumble, but man's birthright crumbles not,  
And, like the wind across the prairie grass,  
A whole world's aspirations fan this spot

With ceaseless panting after liberty,  
One breath of which would make dark Russia fair,  
And blow sweet summer through the exile's cave,  
    And set the exile free;  
For which I pray, here in the open air  
Of Freedom's morning-tide, by Lincoln's grave.

# Illustrations

ABRAHAM LINCOLN . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
After the original etching by Thomas Johnson based on the photograph by Hesler in 1861.	
	PAGE
JEFFERSON DAVIS . . . . .	62
Wood-engraving after the photograph by Brady.	
ABRAHAM LINCOLN . . . . .	132
Wood-engraving from the original photograph taken in Spring- field in 1861. (The first photograph with a beard.)	
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HIS FAMILY . . . . .	188
After the engraving by William Sartain.	
LINCOLN'S LETTER TO SEWARD, JUNE 28, 1862 . . . . .	236
Fac-simile of the original manuscript.	



**Complete Works of  
Abraham Lincoln**

Volume VII

[1861---1862]



# Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln

---

## LETTER TO GOVERNOR MORTON

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 29, 1861.

**H**IS EXCELLENCY, Governor O. P. Morton: Your letter by the hand of Mr. Prunk was received yesterday. I write this letter because I wish you to believe of us (as we certainly believe of you) that we are doing the very best we can. You do not receive arms from us as fast as you need them; but it is because we have not near enough to meet all the pressing demands, and we are obliged to share around what we have, sending the larger share to the points which appear to need them most. We have great hope that our own supply will be ample before long, so that you and all others can have as many as you need. I see an article in an Indianapolis newspaper denouncing me for not answering your letter sent by special messenger two or three weeks ago. I did make what I thought

the best answer to that letter. As I remember, it asked for ten heavy guns to be distributed, with some troops, at Lawrenceburg, Madison, New Albany, and Evansville; and I ordered the guns and directed you to send the troops, if you had them. As to Kentucky, you do not estimate that State as more important than I do, but I am compelled to watch all points. While I write this I am, if not in range, at least in hearing of cannon-shot from an army of enemies more than 100,000 strong. I do not expect them to capture this city; but I know they would if I were to send the men and arms from here to defend Louisville, of which there is not a single hostile armed soldier within forty miles, nor any force known to be moving upon it from any distance. It is true the army in our front may make a half-circle around southward and move on Louisville, but when they do we will make a half-circle around northward and meet them; and in the mean time we will get up what forces we can from other sources to also meet them.

I hope Zollicoffer has left Cumberland Gap (though I fear he has not), because, if he has, I rather infer he did it because of his dread of Camp Dick Robinson, reinforced from Cincinnati, moving on him, than because of his intention to move on Louisville. But if he does

go round and reinforce Buckner, let Dick Robinson come round and reinforce Sherman, and the thing is substantially as it was when Zollicoffer left Cumberland Gap. I state this as an illustration; for, in fact, I think if the Gap is left open to us Dick Robinson should take it and hold it; while Indiana and the vicinity of Louisville in Kentucky can reinforce Sherman faster than Zollicoffer can Buckner.

You requested that Lieutenant-Colonel Wood of the army should be appointed a brigadier-general. I will only say that very formidable objection has been made to this from Indiana.

Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN.

\*LETTER TO GENERAL SCOTT

[WASHINGTON], September 30, 1861.

The Sanitary Commission is doing a work of great humanity, and of direct practical value to the nation, in this time of trial. It is entitled to the gratitude and the confidence of the people, and I trust it will be generously supported. There is no agency through which voluntary offerings of patriotism can be more effectively made.

A. LINCOLN.

MEMORANDUM FOR A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN, [October 1?] 1861

On or about the 5th of October (the exact date to be determined hereafter) I wish a move-

ment made to seize and hold a point on the railroad connecting Virginia and Tennessee near the mountain-pass called Cumberland Gap. That point is now guarded against us by Zollicoffer, with 6,000 or 8,000 rebels at Barboursville, Ky., say twenty-five miles from the Gap, toward Lexington. We have a force of 5,000 or 6,000 under General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, about twenty-five miles from Lexington and seventy-five from Zollicoffer's camp, on the road between the two. There is not a railroad anywhere between Lexington and the point to be seized, and along the whole length of which the Union sentiment among the people largely predominates. We have military possession of the railroad from Cincinnati to Lexington, and from Louisville to Lexington, and some home guards, under General Crittenden, are on the latter line. We have possession of the railroad from Louisville to Nashville, Tenn., so far as Muldraugh's Hill, about forty miles, and the rebels have possession of that road all south of there. At the Hill we have a force of 8,000, under General Sherman, and about an equal force of rebels is a very short distance south, under General Buckner.

We have a large force at Paducah, and a smaller at Fort Holt, both on the Kentucky side, with some at Bird's Point, Cairo, Mound City,

Evansville, and New Albany, all on the other side, and all which, with the gun-boats on the river, are perhaps sufficient to guard the Ohio from Louisville to its mouth.

About supplies of troops, my general idea is that all from Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Kansas, not now elsewhere, be left to Frémont. All from Indiana and Michigan, not now elsewhere, be sent to Anderson at Louisville. All from Ohio needed in western Virginia be sent there, and any remainder be sent to Mitchel at Cincinnati, for Anderson. All east of the mountains be appropriated to McClellan and to the coast.

As to movements, my idea is that the one for the coast and that on Cumberland Gap be simultaneous, and that in the mean time preparation, vigilant watching, and the defensive only be acted upon; this, however, not to apply to Frémont's operations in northern and middle Missouri. That before these movements Thomas and Sherman shall respectively watch but not attack Zollicoffer and Buckner. That when the coast and Gap movements shall be ready Sherman is merely to stand fast, while all at Cincinnati and all at Louisville, with all on the line, concentrate rapidly at Lexington, and thence to Thomas's camp, joining him, and the whole thence upon the Gap. It is for the mil-

itary men to decide whether they can find a pass through the mountains at or near the Gap which cannot be defended by the enemy with a greatly inferior force, and what is to be done in regard to this.

The coast and Gap movements made, Generals McClellan and Frémont, in their respective departments, will avail themselves of any advantages the diversions may present.

\*LETTER TO SECRETARY SEWARD

EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 4, 1861.

*My dear Sir:* Please see Mr. Walker, well vouched as a Union man and son-in-law of Governor Morehead, and pleading for his release. I understand the Kentucky arrests were not made by special direction from here and I am willing if you are that any of the parties may be released when James Guthrie and James Speed think they should be. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

\*MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY CAMERON

October 10, 1861.

*Secretary of War:* Please see Colonel Barret, and see if you can not agree with him about taking his Cavalry Regiment to Kansas and the Indian frontier.

A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO HIS HIGHNESS MOHAMMED SAID  
PACHA, VICEROY OF EGYPT

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1861.

*Great and good Friend:* I have received from Mr. Thayer, consul-general of the United States at Alexandria, a full account of the liberal, enlightened, and energetic proceedings which, on his complaint, you have adopted in bringing to speedy and condign punishment the parties, subjects of your highness in Upper Egypt, who were concerned in an act of criminal persecution against Faris, an agent of certain Christian missionaries in Upper Egypt. I pray your highness to be assured that these proceedings, at once so prompt and so just, will be regarded as a new and unmistakable proof equally of your highness's friendship for the United States and of the firmness, integrity, and wisdom with which the government of your highness is conducted. Wishing you great prosperity and success.

I am your friend,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

His Highness Mohammed Said Pacha, Viceroy  
of Egypt and its Dependencies.

ORDER AUTHORIZING SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT  
OF *Habeas Corpus*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1861.

*Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott:* The military line of the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* in any place between that place and the city of Washington.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

\*LETTER TO SECRETARY SMITH

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1861.

*Dear Sir:* How is this? I supposed I was appointing for Register of Wills a *citizen of this District*. Now the commission comes to me "Moses Kelly, of *New Hampshire*." I do not like this. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO ARCHBISHOP HUGHES

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 21, 1861.

*Right reverend Sir:* I am sure you will pardon me if in my ignorance I do not address you with technical correctness. I find no law authorizing the appointment of chaplains for

our hospitals; and yet the services of chaplains are more needed, perhaps, in the hospitals than with the healthy soldiers in the field. With this view, I have given a sort of *quasi* appointment (a copy of which I inclose) to each of three Protestant ministers, who have accepted and entered upon the duties. If you perceive no objection, I will thank you to give me the name or names of one or more suitable persons of the Catholic Church, to whom I may with propriety tender the same service.

Many thanks for your kind and judicious letters to Governor Seward, and which he regularly allows me both the pleasure and the profit of perusing. With the highest respect,

Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN.

LETTERS TO GENERAL S. R. CURTIS, WITH  
INCLOSURES:

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861.

*My dear Sir:* Herewith is a document—half letter, half order—which, wishing you to see, but not to make public, I send unsealed. Please read it and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of the Department of the West at the time it reaches him. I cannot now know whether Frémont or Hunter will then be in command. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861.

*Dear Sir:* On receipt of this, with the accompanying inclosures, you will take safe, certain, and suitable measures to have the inclosure addressed to Major-General Frémont delivered to him with all reasonable despatch, subject to these conditions only: that if, when General Frémont shall be reached by the messenger—yourself or any one sent by you—he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in a battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further orders. After, and not till after, the delivery to General Frémont, let the inclosure addressed to General Hunter be delivered to him.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

(General Orders No. 18.)

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861.

Major-General Frémont, of the United States Army, the present commander of the Western Department of the same, will, on the receipt of this order, call Major-General Hunter, of the United States Volunteers, to relieve him tem-

porarily in that command, when he (Major-General Frémont) will report to general headquarters by letter for further orders.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

By command: E. D. TOWNSEND,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
THE WEST

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861.

*Sir:* The command of the Department of the West having devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions. Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.

The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat upon northwestern Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from the enemy, excepting in the southeast of the State. Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from your own base of supplies and reinforcements, that you should give up the pursuit, halt your main

army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalia and the other Rolla, the present termini of railroads; then recruit the condition of both corps by reëstablishing and improving their discipline and instructions, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously employing just so much force as is necessary for this. From these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious, co-operation with Lane on the Kansas border, it would be so easy to concentrate and repel any army of the enemy returning on Missouri from the southwest, that it is not probable any such attempt will be made before or during the approaching cold weather. Before spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this. If you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have a surplus of force which you can withdraw from these points and direct to others as may be needed, the railroads furnishing ready means of reinforcing these main points if occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time continue to occur, but these can be met by de-

tachments and local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of themselves.

While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of Price or an attempt by this long and circuitous route to reach Memphis would be exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole force engaged in it. Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

ORDER RETIRING GENERAL SCOTT AND APPOINTING GENERAL MCCLELLAN HIS SUCCESSOR.

(General Orders No. 94.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
WASHINGTON, November 1, 1861.

The following order from the President of the United States, announcing the retirement from active command of the honored veteran Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, will be read by the army with profound regret:

“EXECUTIVE MANSION,

“WASHINGTON, November 1, 1861.

“On the 1st day of November, A. D. 1861, upon his own application to the President of the United States, Brevet Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott is ordered to be placed, and hereby is placed, upon the list of retired officers of the army

of the United States, without reduction in his current pay, subsistence, or allowances.

“The American people will hear with sadness and deep emotion that General Scott has withdrawn from the active control of the army, while the President and a unanimous cabinet express their own and the nation’s sympathy in his personal affliction, and their profound sense of the important public services rendered by him to his country during his long and brilliant career, among which will ever be gratefully distinguished his faithful devotion to the Constitution, the Union, and the flag when assailed by parricidal rebellion. A. LINCOLN.”

The President is pleased to direct that Major-General George B. McClellan assume the command of the army of the United States.

The headquarters of the army will be established in the city of Washington.

All communications intended for the commanding general will hereafter be addressed direct to the adjutant-general.

The duplicate returns, orders, and other papers heretofore sent to the assistant adjutant-general, headquarters of the army, will be discontinued.

By order of the Secretary of War.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

ORDER APPROVING THE PLAN OF GOVERNOR  
GAMBLE OF MISSOURI, November 6, 1861

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1861.

The Governor of the State of Missouri, acting under the direction of the convention of that State, proposes to the Government of the United States that he will raise a military force, to serve within the State as State militia during the war there, to cooperate with the troops in the service of the United States in repelling the invasion of the State and suppressing rebellion therein; the said State militia to be embodied and to be held in the camp and in the field, drilled, disciplined, and governed according to the army regulations and subject to the articles of war; the said State militia not to be ordered out of the State except for the immediate defense of the State of Missouri, but to cooperate with the troops in the service of the United States in military operations within the State or necessary to its defense, and when officers of the State militia act with officers in the service of the United States of the same grade, the officers of the United States service shall command the combined force; the State militia to be armed, equipped, clothed, subsisted, transported, and paid by the United States during such time as they shall be actually engaged as an embodied military force in service in accordance with regulations of the United States Army or general orders as issued from time to time.

In order that the treasury of the United States may not be burdened with the pay of unnecessary officers, the governor proposes that, although the State law requires him to appoint upon the general staff an adjutant-general, a commissary-general, an inspector-general, a quartermaster-general, a paymaster-general, and a surgeon-general, each with the rank of colonel of cavalry, yet he proposes that the Government of the United States pay only the adjutant-general, the quartermaster-general, and inspector-general, their services being necessary in the relations which would exist between the State militia and the United States. The governor further proposes that, while he is allowed by the State law to appoint aides-de-camp to the governor at his discretion, with the rank of colonel, three only shall be reported to the United States for payment. He also proposes that the State militia shall be commanded by a single major-general and by such number of brigadier-generals as shall allow one for a brigade of not less than four regiments, and that no greater number of staff-officers shall be appointed for regimental, brigade, and division duties than is provided for in the Act of Congress of the 22d July, 1861; and that whatever be the rank of such officers as fixed by the law of the State, the compensation that they shall receive from the United States shall only be that which belongs to the rank given by said act of Congress to officers in the United States service performing the same duties.

The field-officers of a regiment in the State militia

are one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and one major, and the company officers are a captain, a first lieutenant, and a second lieutenant.

The governor proposes that, as the money to be disbursed is the money of the United States, such staff officers in the service of the United States as may be necessary to act as disbursing officers for the State militia shall be assigned by the War Department for that duty; or, if such cannot be spared from their present duty, he will appoint such persons disbursing officers for the State militia as the President of the United States may designate. Such regulations as may be required, in the judgment of the President, to insure regularity of returns and to protect the United States from any fraudulent practices, shall be observed and obeyed by all in office in the State militia.

The above propositions are accepted on the part of the United States, and the Secretary of War is directed to make the necessary orders upon the Ordnance, Quartermaster, Commissary, Pay, and Medical departments to carry this agreement into effect. He will cause the necessary staff-officers in the United States service to be detailed for duty in connection with the Missouri State militia, and will order them to make the necessary provision in their respective offices for fulfilling this agreement. All requisitions upon the different officers of the United States under this agreement to be made in substance in the same mode for the Missouri State militia as similar requisitions are made for troops in the service of the

United States, and the Secretary of War will cause any additional regulations that may be necessary to insure regularity and economy in carrying this agreement into effect to be adopted and communicated to the Governor of Missouri for the government of the Missouri State militia.

November 6, 1861.

This plan approved, with the modification that the governor stipulates that when he commissions a major-general of militia it shall be the same person at the time in command of the United States Department of the West; and in case the United States shall change such commander of the department, he (the governor) will revoke the State commission given to the person relieved, and give one to the person substituted to the United States command of said department.

A LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO GENERAL MCCLERNAND<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1861.

*My dear Sir:* This is not an official, but a social letter. You have had a battle, and without being able to judge as to the precise measure of its value, I think it is safe to say that you and

<sup>1</sup> McClelland had been an Illinois lawyer and politician. He was an old acquaintance of Lincoln's before entering the military career he began so brilliantly. Friends looked forward to his advancement to the highest position, but Grant found him guilty of disobedience in 1863 and relieved him of his command.

all with you have done honor to yourselves and the flag, and service to the country. Most gratefully do I thank you and them. In my present position I must care for the whole nation; but I hope it will be no injustice to any other State for me to indulge a little home pride that Illinois does not disappoint us. I have just closed a long interview with Mr. Washburne, in which he has detailed the many difficulties you and those with you labor under. Be assured we do not forget or neglect you. Much, very much, goes undone; but it is because we have not the power to do it faster than we do. Some of your forces are without arms, but the same is true here and at every other place where we have considerable bodies of troops. The plain matter of fact is, our good people have rushed to the rescue of the government faster than the government can find arms to put into their hands. It would be agreeable to each division of the army to know its own precise destination; but the government cannot immediately, nor inflexibly at any time, determine as to all; nor, if determined, can it tell its friends without at the same time telling its enemies. We know you do all as wisely and well as you can; and you will not be deceived if you conclude the same is true of us. Please give my respects and thanks to all.

Yours very truly,      A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GEORGE BANCROFT

NEW YORK, November 15, 1861.

*My dear Sir:* Following out your suggestion, a very numerous meeting of New Yorkers assembled last week to take measures for relieving the loyal sufferers of Hatteras. I take the liberty to inclose to you some remarks which I made on the occasion. You will find in them a copy of an unpublished letter of one of your most honored predecessors, with which you cannot fail to be pleased.

Your administration has fallen upon times which will be remembered as long as human events find a record. I sincerely wish to you the glory of perfect success. Civil war is the instrument of Divine Providence to root out social slavery. Posterity will not be satisfied with the result unless the consequences of the war shall effect an increase of free States. This is the universal expectation and hope of men of all parties.

Very respectfully yours,

GEO. BANCROFT.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, November 18, 1861.

*My dear Sir:* I esteem it a high honor to have received a note from Mr. Bancroft, inclosing the report of proceedings of a New York meeting taking measures for the relief of Union people of North Carolina. I thank you and all others participating for this benevolent and patriotic movement.

The main thought in the closing paragraph

of your letter is one which does not escape my attention, and with which I must deal in all due caution, and with the best judgment I can bring to it.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

\* LETTER TO GENERAL HIRAM WALBRIDGE

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1861.

*Dear Sir:* Your note reminding me of the fact that as early as April last you pointed out to me on the map Port Royal and Branfort as advantageous places to make lodgements on the Southern coast, is received. I am free to confess you were the first who called my attention to that particular locality. I also remember that you insisted we should call six hundred thousand men into the field, a considerable length of time before I had brought my own mind up to anything near so large a scale.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

DRAFT OF A PROPOSED BILL FOR COMPENSATED  
ABOLISHMENT IN DELAWARE,

[November 26 ?] 1861

Be it enacted by the State of Delaware that on condition the United States of America will, at the present session of Congress, engage by law to pay, and thereafter faithfully pay, to the said State of Delaware, in the six per cent. bonds of

said United States, the sum of seven hundred and nineteen thousand and two hundred dollars in thirty-one equal annual installments, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude at any time after the first day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, within the said State of Delaware, except in the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; nor, except in the punishment of crime as aforesaid, shall any person who shall be born after the passage of this act, nor any person above the age of thirty-five years, be held in slavery or to involuntary servitude within said State of Delaware at any time after the passage of this act.

And be it further enacted that said State shall in good faith prevent, as far as possible, the carrying of any person out of said State into involuntary servitude beyond the limits of said State at any time after the passage of this act.

And be it further enacted that said State may make provision of apprenticeship, not to extend beyond the age of twenty-one years for males nor eighteen for females, for all minors whose mothers were not free at the respective births of such minors.

On reflection I like No. 2 the better. By it the nation would pay the State \$23,200 per annum for thirty-one years, and

All born after the passage of the act would be born free, and

All slaves above the age of thirty-five years would become free on the passage of the act, and

All others would become free on arriving at the age of thirty-five years, until January, 1893, when

All remaining of all ages would become free, subject to apprenticeship for minors born of slave mothers up to the respective ages of twenty-one and eighteen.

If the State would desire to have the money sooner, let the bill be altered only in fixing the time of final emancipation earlier and making the annual installments correspondingly fewer in number, by which they would also be correspondingly larger in amount. For instance, strike out "1893" and insert "1872," and strike out "thirty-one" annual installments and insert "ten" annual installments. The installments would then be \$71,920 instead of \$23,000 as now. In all other particulars let the bill stand precisely as it is.

## MEMORANDUM OF ADVICE TO MRS. DOUGLAS

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

November 27, 1861.

Yesterday Mrs. Douglas called, saying she is guardian of the minor children of her late hus-

band; that she is being urged, against her inclination, to send them South on the plea of avoiding the confiscation of their property there, and asking my counsel in the case.

I expect the United States will overcome the attempt to confiscate property because of loyalty to the government; but if not, I still do not expect the property of absent minor children will be confiscated. I therefore think Mrs. Douglas may safely act her pleasure in the premises.

But it is especially dangerous for my name to be connected with the matter, for nothing would more certainly excite the secessionists to do the worst they can against the children.

A. LINCOLN.

INQUIRIES FROM THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE  
POTOMAC CAMPAIGN, [December 1 ?] 1861

WASHINGTON,

December 10, 1861.

*Your Excellency:* I inclose the paper you left with me, filled as requested. In arriving at the numbers given, I have left the minimum number in garrison and observation.

Information received recently leads me to believe that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces nearly, and I have now my mind actively turned toward another plan of cam-

paign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy nor by many of our own people.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

[*Inclosure.*]

[The roman type indicates President Lincoln's handwriting in ink; the italics General McClellan's in pencil.]

If it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac without awaiting further increase of numbers or better drill and discipline, how long would it require to actually get in motion?

*If bridge trains ready by December 15, probably 25th.*

After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join the movement from southwest of the river?

*Seventy-one thousand.*

How many from northeast of it?

*Thirty-three thousand.*

Suppose, then, that of those southwest of the river fifty thousand move forward and menace the enemy at Centreville; the remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria to Richmond, there to be joined by the whole movable force from northeast of the river, having landed from the Potomac, just below the

mouth of the Occoquan, moved by land up the south side of that stream to the crossing point named, then the whole move together by the road thence to Brentsville and beyond to the railroad just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad bridges south and north of the point.

If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac below to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear; or, if the landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in the rear. Both points will probably not be successfully resisted at the same time.

The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly, should fight back slowly into the intrenchments behind them.

Armed vessels and transportation should remain at the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat.

ORDER AUTHORIZING GENERAL HALLECK TO  
SUSPEND THE WRIT OF *Habeas Corpus*,  
December 2, 1861

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,

*General:* As an insurrection exists in the United States, and is in arms in the State of

Missouri, you are hereby authorized and empowered to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* within the limits of the military division under your command, and to exercise martial law as you find it necessary in your discretion to secure the public safety and the authority of the United States.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed, at Washington, this second day of December, A. D. 1861.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS,  
December 3, 1861

**F**ELLOW-CITIZENS of the Senate and House of Representatives: In the midst of unprecedented political troubles we have cause of great gratitude to God for unusual good health and most abundant harvests.

You will not be surprised to learn that, in the peculiar exigencies of the times, our intercourse with foreign nations has been attended with profound solicitude, chiefly turning upon our own domestic affairs.

A disloyal portion of the American people have, during the whole year, been engaged in an attempt to divide and destroy the Union. A nation which endures factious domestic division is exposed to disrespect abroad; and one party, if not both, is sure, sooner or later, to invoke foreign intervention. Nations thus tempted to interfere are not always able to resist the counsels of seeming expediency and ungenerous ambition, although measures adopted under such influences seldom fail to be unfortunate and injurious to those adopting them.

The disloyal citizens of the United States who have offered the ruin of our country in return for the aid and comfort which they have invoked abroad, have received less patronage and encouragement than they probably expected. If it were just to suppose, as the insurgents have seemed to assume, that foreign nations in this case, discarding all moral, social, and treaty obligations, would act solely and selfishly for the most speedy restoration of commerce, including, especially, the acquisition of cotton, those nations appear as yet not to have seen their way to their object more directly or clearly through the destruction than through the preservation of the Union. If we could dare to believe that foreign nations are actuated by no higher principle than this, I am quite sure a sound argument could be made to show them that they can reach their aim more readily and easily by aiding to crush this rebellion than by giving encouragement to it.

The principal lever relied on by the insurgents for exciting foreign nations to hostility against us, as already intimated, is the embarrassment of commerce. Those nations, however, not improbably saw from the first that it was the Union which made as well our foreign as our domestic commerce. They can scarcely have failed to perceive that the effort for disunion pro-

duces the existing difficulty; and that one strong nation promises more durable peace and a more extensive, valuable, and reliable commerce than can the same nation broken in hostile fragments.

It is not my purpose to review our discussions with foreign states, because, whatever might be their wishes or dispositions, the integrity of our country and the stability of our government mainly depend, not upon them, but on the loyalty, virtue, patriotism, and intelligence of the American people. The correspondence itself, with the usual reservations, is herewith submitted.

I venture to hope it will appear that we have practised prudence and liberality toward foreign powers, averting causes of irritation, and with firmness maintaining our own rights and honor.

Since, however, it is apparent that here, as in every other State, foreign dangers necessarily attend domestic difficulties, I recommend that adequate and ample measures be adopted for maintaining the public defenses on every side. While under this general recommendation provision for defending our sea-coast line readily occurs to the mind, I also in the same connection ask the attention of Congress to our great lakes and rivers. It is believed that some fortifications and depots of arms and munitions, with

harbor and navigation improvements, all at well-selected points upon these, would be of great importance to the national defense and preservation. I ask attention to the views of the Secretary of War, expressed in his report upon the same general subject.

I deem it of importance that the loyal regions of East Tennessee and western North Carolina should be connected with Kentucky and other faithful parts of the Union by railroad. I therefore recommend as a military measure that Congress provide for the construction of such road as speedily as possible. Kentucky, no doubt, will coöperate, and, through her legislature, make the most judicious selection of a line. The northern terminus must connect with some existing railroad; and whether the route shall be from Lexington or Nicholasville to the Cumberland Gap, or from Lebanon to the Tennessee line, in the direction of Knoxville, or on some still different line, can easily be determined. Kentucky and the General Government coöperating, the work can be completed in a very short time; and when done it will be not only of vast present usefulness, but also a valuable permanent improvement, worth its cost in all the future.

Some treaties, designed chiefly for the interests of commerce, and having no grave political

importance, have been negotiated, and will be submitted to the Senate for their consideration.

Although we have failed to induce some of the commercial powers to adopt a desirable melioration of the rigor of maritime war, we have removed all obstructions from the way of this humane reform, except such as are merely of temporary and accidental occurrence.

I invite your attention to the correspondence between her Britannic Majesty's minister accredited to this government, and the Secretary of State, relative to the detention of the British ship *Perthshire*, in June last, by the United States steamer *Massachusetts*, for a supposed breach of the blockade. As this detention was occasioned by an obvious misapprehension of the facts, and as justice requires that we should commit no belligerent act not founded in strict right, as sanctioned by public law, I recommend that an appropriation be made to satisfy the reasonable demand of the owners of the vessel for her detention.

I repeat the recommendation of my predecessor, in his annual message to Congress in December last, in regard to the disposition of the surplus which will probably remain after satisfying the claims of American citizens against China, pursuant to the awards of the commissioners under the act of the 3d of March, 1859.

If, however, it should not be deemed advisable to carry that recommendation into effect, I would suggest that authority be given for investing the principal, over the proceeds of the surplus referred to, in good securities, with a view to the satisfaction of such other just claims of our citizens against China as are not unlikely to arise hereafter in the course of our extensive trade with that empire.

By the act of the 5th of August last, Congress authorized the President to instruct the commanders of suitable vessels to defend themselves against, and to capture, pirates. This authority has been exercised in a single instance only. For the more effectual protection of our extensive and valuable commerce, in the eastern seas especially, it seems to me that it would also be advisable to authorize the commanders of sailing vessels to recapture any prizes which pirates may make of United States vessels and their cargoes, and the consular courts, now established by law in eastern countries, to adjudicate the cases, in the event that this should not be objected to by the local authorities.

If any good reason exists why we should persevere longer in withholding our recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia, I am unable to discern it. Unwilling, however, to inaugurate a novel policy in regard

to them without the approbation of Congress, I submit for your consideration the expediency of an appropriation for maintaining a *chargé d'affaires* near each of those new states. It does not admit of doubt that important commercial advantages might be secured by favorable treaties with them.

The operations of the treasury during the period which has elapsed since your adjournment have been conducted with signal success. The patriotism of the people has placed at the disposal of the government the large means demanded by the public exigencies. Much of the national loan has been taken by citizens of the industrial classes whose confidence in their country's faith, and zeal for their country's deliverance from present peril, have induced them to contribute to the support of the government the whole of their limited acquisitions. This fact imposes peculiar obligations to economy in disbursement and energy in action.

The revenue from all sources, including loans, for the financial year ending on the 30th June, 1861, was \$86,835,900.27, and the expenditures for the same period, including payments on account of the public debt, were \$84,578,834.47; leaving a balance in the treasury, on the 1st July, of \$2,257,065.80. For the first quarter of the financial year ending on the 30th September,

1861, the receipts from all sources, including the balance of 1st of July, were \$102,532,509.27, and the expenses \$98,239,733.09; leaving a balance on the 1st October, 1861, of \$4,292,776.18.

Estimates for the remaining three quarters of the year, and for the financial year 1863, together with his views of ways and means for meeting the demands contemplated by them, will be submitted to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury. It is gratifying to know that the expenditures made necessary by the rebellion are not beyond the resources of the loyal people, and to believe that the same patriotism which has thus far sustained the government will continue to sustain it till peace and union shall again bless the land.

I respectfully refer to the report of the Secretary of War for information respecting the numerical strength of the army, and for recommendations having in view an increase of its efficiency and the well-being of the various branches of the service intrusted to his care. It is gratifying to know that the patriotism of the people has proved equal to the occasion, and that the number of troops tendered greatly exceeds the force which Congress authorized me to call into the field.

I refer with pleasure to those portions of his report which make allusion to the creditable

degree of discipline already attained by our troops, and to the excellent sanitary condition of the entire army.

The recommendation of the secretary for an organization of the militia upon a uniform basis is a subject of vital importance to the future safety of the country, and is commended to the serious attention of Congress.

The large addition to the regular army, in connection with the defection that has so considerably diminished the number of its officers, gives peculiar importance to his recommendation for increasing the corps of cadets to the greatest capacity of the Military Academy.

By mere omission, I presume, Congress has failed to provide chaplains for hospitals occupied by volunteers. This subject was brought to my notice, and I was induced to draw up the form of a letter, one copy of which, properly addressed, has been delivered to each of the persons, and at the dates respectively named and stated, in a schedule, containing also the form of the letter, marked A, and herewith transmitted.

These gentlemen, I understand, entered upon the duties designated at the times respectively stated in the schedule, and have labored faithfully therein ever since. I therefore recommend that they be compensated at the same rate as chaplains in the army. I further suggest that

general provision be made for chaplains to serve at hospitals as well as with regiments.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy presents in detail the operations of that branch of the service, the activity and energy which have characterized its administration, and the results of measures to increase its efficiency and power. Such have been the additions, by construction and purchase, that it may almost be said a navy has been created and brought into service since our difficulties commenced.

Besides blockading our extensive coast, squadrons larger than ever before assembled under our flag have been put afloat and performed deeds which have increased our naval renown.

I would invite special attention to the recommendation of the secretary for a more perfect organization of the navy by introducing additional grades in the service.

The present organization is defective and unsatisfactory, and the suggestions submitted by the department will, it is believed, if adopted, obviate the difficulties alluded to, promote harmony, and increase the efficiency of the navy.

There are three vacancies on the bench of the Supreme Court—two by the decease of Justices Daniel and McLean, and one by the resignation of Justice Campbell. I have so far forbore making nominations to fill these vacancies for

reasons which I will now state. Two of the outgoing judges resided within the States now overrun by revolt; so that if successors were appointed in the same localities they could not now serve upon their circuits; and many of the most competent men there probably would not take the personal hazard of accepting to serve, even here, upon the supreme bench. I have been unwilling to throw all the appointments northward, thus disabling myself from doing justice to the South on the return of peace; although I may remark that to transfer to the North one which has heretofore been in the South, would not, with reference to territory and population, be unjust.

During the long and brilliant judicial career of Judge McLean his circuit grew into an empire,—altogether too large for any one judge to give the courts therein more than a nominal attendance,—rising in population from 1,470,018 in 1830, to 6,151,405 in 1860.

Besides this, the country generally has outgrown our present judicial system. If uniformity was at all intended, the system requires that all the States shall be accommodated with circuit courts, attended by supreme judges, while, in fact, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Florida, Texas, California and Oregon have never had any such courts. Nor can this well

be remedied without a change of the system; because the adding of judges to the Supreme Court, enough for the accommodation of all parts of the country, with circuit courts, would create a court altogether too numerous for a judicial body of any sort. And the evil, if it be one, will increase as new States come into the Union. Circuit courts are useful, or they are not useful. If useful, no State should be denied them; if not useful, no State should have them. Let them be provided for all, or abolished as to all.

Three modifications occur to me, either of which, I think, would be an improvement upon our present system. Let the Supreme Court be of convenient number in every event. Then, first, let the whole country be divided into circuits of convenient size, the supreme judges to serve in a number of them corresponding to their own number, and independent circuit judges to be provided for the rest. Or, secondly, let the supreme judges be relieved from circuit duties, and circuit judges provided for all the circuits. Or, thirdly, dispense with circuit courts altogether, leaving the judicial functions wholly to the district courts and an independent Supreme Court.

I respectfully recommend to the consideration of Congress the present condition of the statute

laws, with the hope that Congress will be able to find an easy remedy for many of the inconveniences and evils which constantly embarrass those engaged in the practical administration of them. Since the organization of the government, Congress has enacted some 5,000 acts and joint resolutions, which fill more than 6,000 closely printed pages, and are scattered through many volumes. Many of these acts have been drawn in haste and without sufficient caution, so that their provisions are often obscure in themselves, or in conflict with each other, or at least so doubtful as to render it very difficult for even the best-informed persons to ascertain precisely what the statute law really is.

It seems to me very important that the statute laws should be made as plain and intelligible as possible, and be reduced to as small a compass as may consist with the fullness and precision of the will of the legislature and the perspicuity of its language. This, well done, would, I think, greatly facilitate the labors of those whose duty it is to assist in the administration of the laws, and would be a lasting benefit to the people by placing before them, in a more accessible and intelligible form, the laws which so deeply concern their interests and their duties.

I am informed by some whose opinions I respect that all the acts of Congress now in force,

and of a permanent and general nature, might be revised and rewritten so as to be embraced in one volume (or, at most, two volumes) of ordinary and convenient size; and I respectfully recommend to Congress to consider of the subject, and, if my suggestion be approved, to devise such plan as to their wisdom shall seem most proper for the attainment of the end proposed.

One of the unavoidable consequences of the present insurrection is the entire suppression, in many places, of all the ordinary means of administering civil justice by the officers, and in the forms of existing law. This is the case, in whole or in part, in all the insurgent States; and as our armies advance upon and take possession of parts of those States, the practical evil becomes more apparent. There are no courts nor officers to whom the citizens of other States may apply for the enforcement of their lawful claims against citizens of the insurgent States; and there is a vast amount of debt constituting such claims. Some have estimated it as high as \$200,000,000, due, in large part, from insurgents in open rebellion to loyal citizens who are, even now, making great sacrifices in the discharge of their patriotic duty to support the government.

Under these circumstances, I have been urgently solicited to establish, by military power,

courts to administer summary justice in such cases. I have thus far declined to do it, not because I had any doubt that the end proposed—the collection of the debts—was just and right in itself, but because I have been unwilling to go beyond the pressure of necessity in the unusual exercise of power. But the powers of Congress, I suppose, are equal to the anomalous occasion, and therefore I refer the whole matter to Congress, with the hope that a plan may be devised for the administration of justice in all such parts of the insurgent States and Territories as may be under the control of this government, whether by a voluntary return to allegiance and order, or by the power of our arms; this, however, not to be a permanent institution, but a temporary substitute, and to cease as soon as the ordinary courts can be reëstablished in peace.

It is important that some more convenient means should be provided, if possible, for the adjustment of claims against the government, especially in view of their increased number by reason of the war. It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims in their nature belong to the judicial department; be-

sides, it is apparent that the attention of Congress will be more than usually engaged, for some time to come, with great national questions. It was intended, by the organization of the Court of Claims, mainly to remove this branch of business from the halls of Congress; but while the court has proved to be an effective and valuable means of investigation, it in great degree fails to effect the object of its creation for want of power to make its judgments final.

Fully aware of the delicacy, not to say the danger, of the subject, I commend to your careful consideration whether this power of making judgments final may not properly be given to the court, reserving the right of appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court, with such other provisions as experience may have shown to be necessary.

I ask attention to the report of the Postmaster-General, the following being a summary statement of the condition of the department:

The revenue from all sources during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1861, including the annual permanent appropriation of \$700,000 for the transportation of "free mail matter," was \$9,049,296.40, being about two per cent. less than the revenue for 1860.

The expenditures were \$13,606,759.11, showing a decrease of more than eight per cent. as

compared with those of the previous year, and leaving an excess of expenditure over the revenue for the last fiscal year of \$4,557,462.71.

The gross revenue for the year ending June 30, 1863, is estimated at an increase of four per cent. on that of 1861, making \$8,683,000, to which should be added the earnings of the department in carrying free matter, viz., \$700,000, making \$9,383,000.

The total expenditures for 1863 are estimated at \$12,528,000, leaving an estimated deficiency of \$3,145,000 to be supplied from the treasury in addition to the permanent appropriation.

The present insurrection shows, I think, that the extension of this District across the Potomac River, at the time of establishing the capital here, was eminently wise, and consequently that the relinquishment of that portion of it which lies within the State of Virginia was unwise and dangerous. I submit for your consideration the expediency of regaining that part of the District and the restoration of the original boundaries thereof, through negotiations with the State of Virginia.

The report of the Secretary of the Interior, with the accompanying documents, exhibits the condition of the several branches of the public business pertaining to that department. The depressing influences of the insurrection have

been especially felt in the operations of the Patent and General Land Offices. The cash receipts from the sales of public lands during the past year have exceeded the expenses of our land system only about \$200,000. The sales have been entirely suspended in the Southern States, while the interruptions to the business of the country, and the diversion of large numbers of men from labor to military service, have obstructed settlements in the new States and Territories of the Northwest.

The receipts of the Patent Office have declined in nine months about \$100,000, rendering a large reduction of the force employed necessary to make it self-sustaining.

The demands upon the Pension Office will be largely increased by the insurrection. Numerous applications for pensions, based upon the casualties of the existing war, have already been made. There is reason to believe that many who are now upon the pension rolls and in receipt of the bounty of the government are in the ranks of the insurgent army, or giving them aid and comfort. The Secretary of the Interior has directed a suspension of the payment of the pensions of such persons upon proof of their disloyalty. I recommend that Congress authorize that officer to cause the names of such persons to be stricken from the pension rolls.

The relations of the government with the Indian tribes have been greatly disturbed by the insurrection, especially in the Southern Superintendency and in that of New Mexico. The Indian country south of Kansas is in the possession of insurgents from Texas and Arkansas. The agents of the United States appointed since the 4th of March for this superintendency have been unable to reach their posts, while the most of those who were in office before that time have espoused the insurrectionary cause, and assume to exercise the powers of agents by virtue of commissions from the insurrectionists. It has been stated in the public press that a portion of those Indians have been organized as a military force, and are attached to the army of the insurgents.

Although the government has no official information upon this subject, letters have been written to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by several prominent chiefs, giving assurance of their loyalty to the United States, and expressing a wish for the presence of Federal troops to protect them. It is believed that upon the repossession of the country by the Federal forces the Indians will readily cease all hostile demonstrations and resume their former relations to the government.

Agriculture, confessedly the largest interest

of the nation, has not a department, nor a bureau, but a clerkship only, assigned to it in the government. While it is fortunate that this great interest is so independent in its nature as to not have demanded and extorted more from the government, I respectfully ask Congress to consider whether something more cannot be given voluntarily with general advantage.

Annual reports exhibiting the condition of our agriculture, commerce, and manufactures would present a fund of information of great practical value to the country. While I make no suggestion as to details, I venture the opinion that an agricultural and statistical bureau might profitably be organized.

The execution of the laws for the suppression of the African slave-trade has been confided to the Department of the Interior. It is a subject of gratulation that the efforts which have been made for the suppression of this inhuman traffic have been recently attended with unusual success. Five vessels being fitted out for the slave-trade have been seized and condemned. Two mates of vessels engaged in the trade, and one person in equipping a vessel as a slaver, have been convicted and subjected to the penalty of fine and imprisonment, and one captain, taken with a cargo of Africans on board his vessel, has been convicted of the highest grade of offense

under our laws. the punishment of which is death.

The Territories of Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada, created by the last Congress, have been organized, and civil administration has been inaugurated therein under auspices especially gratifying when it is considered that the leaven of treason was found existing in some of these new countries when the Federal officers arrived there.

The abundant natural resources of these Territories, with the security and protection afforded by organized government, will doubtless invite to them a large immigration when peace shall restore the business of the country to its accustomed channels.

I submit the resolutions of the legislature of Colorado, which evidence the patriotic spirit of the people of the Territory. So far, the authority of the United States has been upheld in all the Territories, as it is hoped it will be in the future. I commend their interests and defense to the enlightened and generous care of Congress.

I recommend to the favorable consideration of Congress the interests of the District of Columbia. The insurrection has been the cause of much suffering and sacrifice to its inhabitants; and as they have no representative in Congress,

that body should not overlook their just claims upon the government.

At your late session a joint resolution was adopted authorizing the President to take measures for facilitating a proper representation of the industrial interests of the United States at the exhibition of the industry of all nations to be holden at London in the year 1862. I regret to say I have been unable to give personal attention to this subject—a subject at once so interesting in itself, and so extensively and intimately connected with the material prosperity of the world. Through the Secretaries of State and of the Interior a plan, or system, has been devised and partly matured and which will be laid before you.

Under and by virtue of the act of Congress entitled “An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,” approved August 6, 1861, the legal claims of certain persons to the labor and service of certain other persons have become forfeited; and numbers of the latter, thus liberated, are already dependent on the United States, and must be provided for in some way. Besides this, it is not impossible that some of the States will pass similar enactments for their own benefit respectively, and by operation of which persons of the same class will be thrown upon them for disposal. In such case

I recommend that Congress provide for accepting such persons from such States, according to some mode of valuation, in lieu, *pro tanto*, of direct taxes, or upon some other plan to be agreed on with such States respectively; that such persons, on such acceptance by the General Government, be at once deemed free; and that, in any event, steps be taken for colonizing both classes (or the one first mentioned, if the other shall not be brought into existence) at some place or places in a climate congenial to them. It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization.

To carry out the plan of colonization may involve the acquiring of territory, and also the appropriation of money beyond that to be expended in the territorial acquisition. Having practised the acquisition of territory for nearly sixty years, the question of constitutional power to do so is no longer an open one with us. The power was questioned at first by Mr. Jefferson, who, however, in the purchase of Louisiana, yielded his scruples on the plea of great expediency. If it be said that the only legitimate object of acquiring territory is to furnish homes for white men, this measure effects that object; for the emigration of colored men leaves additional

room for white men remaining or coming here. Mr. Jefferson, however, placed the importance of procuring Louisiana more on political and commercial grounds than on providing room for population.

On this whole proposition, including the appropriation of money with the acquisition of territory, does not the expediency amount to absolute necessity—that without which the government itself cannot be perpetuated?

The war continues. In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in every case thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the legislature.

In the exercise of my best discretion I have adhered to the blockade of the ports held by the insurgents, instead of putting in force, by proclamation, the law of Congress enacted at the last session for closing those ports.

So, also, obeying the dictates of prudence as well as the obligations of law, instead of transcending I have adhered to the act of Congress

to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes. If a new law upon the same subject shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed. We should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable.

The inaugural address at the beginning of the administration, and the message to Congress at the late special session, were both mainly devoted to the domestic controversy out of which the insurrection and consequent war have sprung. Nothing now occurs to add or subtract, to or from, the principles or general purposes stated and expressed in those documents.

The last ray of hope for preserving the Union peaceably expired at the assault upon Fort Sumter; and a general review of what has occurred since may not be unprofitable. What was painfully uncertain then is much better defined and more distinct now; and the progress of events is plainly in the right direction. The insurgents confidently claimed a strong support from north of Mason and Dixon's line; and the friends of the Union were not free from apprehension on the point. This, however, was soon settled definitely, and on the right side. South of the line,

noble little Delaware led off right from the first. Maryland was made to seem against the Union. Our soldiers were assaulted, bridges were burned, and railroads torn up within her limits, and we were many days, at one time, without the ability to bring a single regiment over her soil to the capital. Now her bridges and railroads are repaired and open to the government; she already gives seven regiments to the cause of the Union and none to the enemy; and her people, at a regular election, have sustained the Union by a larger majority and a larger aggregate vote than they ever before gave to any candidate or any question. Kentucky, too, for some time in doubt, is now decidedly, and, I think, unchangeably, ranged on the side of the Union. Missouri is comparatively quiet, and, I believe, cannot again be overrun by the insurrectionists. These three States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, neither of which would promise a single soldier at first, have now an aggregate of not less than forty thousand in the field for the Union, while of their citizens certainly not more than a third of that number, and they of doubtful whereabouts and doubtful existence, are in arms against it. After a somewhat bloody struggle of months, winter closes on the Union people of western Virginia, leaving them masters of their own country.

An insurgent force of about 1500, for months dominating the narrow peninsular region constituting the counties of Accomac and Northampton, and known as the eastern shore of Virginia, together with some contiguous parts of Maryland, have laid down their arms, and the people there have renewed their allegiance to and accepted the protection of the old flag. This leaves no armed insurrectionist north of the Potomac or east of the Chesapeake.

Also we have obtained a footing at each of the isolated points, on the southern coast, of Hatteras, Port Royal, Tybee Island, near Savannah, and Ship Island; and we likewise have some general accounts of popular movements in behalf of the Union in North Carolina and Tennessee.

These things demonstrate that the cause of the Union is advancing steadily and certainly southward.

Since your last adjournment Lieutenant-General Scott has retired from the head of the army. During his long life the nation has not been unmindful of his merit; yet, on calling to mind how faithfully, ably, and brilliantly he has served the country from a time far back in our history when few of the now living had been born, and thenceforward continually, I cannot but think we are still his debtors. I submit,

therefore, for your consideration what further mark of recognition is due to him and to ourselves as a grateful people.

With the retirement of General Scott came the executive duty of appointing in his stead a general-in-chief of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor of General McClellan for the position, and in this the nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. The designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in considerable degree the selection of the country as well as of the executive, and hence there is better reason to hope there will be given him the confidence and cordial support thus by fair implication promised, and without which he cannot with so full efficiency serve the country.

It has been said that one bad general is better than two good ones; and the saying is true, if taken to mean no more than that an army is better directed by a single mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and cross-purposes with each other.

And the same is true in all joint operations wherein those engaged can have none but a common end in view, and can differ only as to the

choice of means. In a storm at sea no one on board can wish the ship to sink; and yet not infrequently all go down together because too many will direct, and no single mind can be allowed to control.

It continues to develop that the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principle of popular government—the rights of the people. Conclusive evidence of this is found in the most grave and maturely considered public documents as well as in the general tone of the insurgents. In those documents we find the abridgment of the existing right of suffrage and the denial to the people of all right to participate in the selection of public officers except the legislative, boldly advocated, with labored arguments to prove that large control of the people in government is the source of all political evil. Monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refuge from the power of the people.

In my present position I could scarcely be justified were I to omit raising a warning voice against this approach of returning despotism.

It is not needed nor fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions; but there is one point, with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is the effort to place capital on an equal footing with, if not

above, labor, in the structure of government. It is assumed that labor is available only in connection with capital; that nobody labors unless somebody else, owning capital, somehow by the use of it induces him to labor. This assumed, it is next considered whether it is best that capital shall hire laborers, and thus induce them to work by their own consent, or buy them, and drive them to it without their consent. Having proceeded thus far, it is naturally concluded that all laborers are either hired laborers or what we call slaves. And, further, it is assumed that whoever is once a hired laborer is fixed in that condition for life.

Now, there is no such relation between capital and labor as assumed, nor is there any such thing as a free man being fixed for life in the condition of a hired laborer. Both these assumptions are false, and all inferences from them are groundless.

Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration. Capital has its rights, which are as worthy of protection as any other rights. Nor is it denied that there is, and probably always will be, a relation between labor and capital producing mutual benefits. The

error is in assuming that the whole labor of the community exists within that relation. A few men own capital, and that few avoid labor themselves, and with their capital hire or buy another few to labor for them. A large majority belong to neither class—neither work for others nor have others working for them. In most of the Southern States a majority of the whole people, of all colors, are neither slaves nor masters; while in the Northern a large majority are neither hirers nor hired. Men with their families—wives, sons, and daughters—work for themselves, on their farms, in their houses, and in their shops taking the whole product to themselves, and asking no favors of capital on the one hand, nor of hired laborers or slaves on the other. It is not forgotten that a considerable number of persons mingle their own labor with capital—that is, they labor with their own hands and also buy or hire others to labor for them; but this is only a mixed and not a distinct class. No principle stated is disturbed by the existence of this mixed class.

Again, as has already been said, there is not, of necessity, any such thing as the free hired laborer being fixed to that condition for life. Many independent men everywhere in these States, a few years back in their lives, were hired laborers. The prudent, penniless beginner in

the world labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him. This is the just and generous and prosperous system which opens the way to all—gives hope to all, and consequent energy and progress and improvement of condition to all. No men living are more worthy to be trusted than those who toil up from poverty—none less inclined to take or touch aught which they have not honestly earned. Let them beware of surrendering a political power which they already possess, and which, if surrendered, will surely be used to close the door of advancement against such as they, and to fix new disabilities and burdens upon them, till all of liberty shall be lost.

From the first taking of our national census to the last are seventy years; and we find our population at the end of the period eight times as great as it was at the beginning. The increase of those other things which men deem desirable has been even greater. We thus have, at one view, what the popular principle, applied to government, through the machinery of the States and the Union, has produced in a given time; and also what, if firmly maintained, it promises for the future. There are already among us those who, if the Union be preserved, will live

to see it contain 250,000,000. The struggle of to-day is not altogether for to-day—it is for a vast future also. With a reliance on Providence all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1861.

*Schedule A.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, D. C., 1861.

REV. ———.

*Sir:* Having been solicited by Christian ministers and other pious people to appoint suitable persons to act as chaplains at the hospitals for our sick and wounded soldiers, and feeling the intrinsic propriety of having such persons to so act, and yet believing there is no law conferring the power upon me to appoint them, I think fit to say that if you will voluntarily enter upon and perform the appropriate duties of such position, I will recommend that Congress make compensation therefor at the same rate as chaplains in the army are compensated.

The following are the names and dates, respectively, of the persons and times to whom and when such letters were delivered:

Rev. G. G. Goss. . . . . September 25, 1861.

Rev. John G. Butler. . . . . September 25, 1861.

Rev. Henry Hopkins. . . . . September 25, 1861.

Rev. F. M. Magrath. . . . . October 30, 1861.

Rev. F. E. Boyle.....October 30, 1861.  
 Rev. John C. Smith.....November 7, 1861.  
 Rev. Wm. Y. Brown....November 7, 1861.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
 December 4, 1861

*To the House of Representatives:* I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State, in reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th July last, in relation to the correspondence between this government and foreign nations respecting the rights of blockade, privateering, and the recognition of the so-called Confederate States.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
 December 4, 1861

*To the House of Representatives:* I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State, in reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 31st July last, upon the subject of increasing and extending the trade and commerce of the United States with foreign countries.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

EXECUTIVE MANSION, December 6, 1861.

*My dear Sir:* Captain Francis G. Young, of the California regiment (Colonel Baker's), is

in some difficulty—I do not precisely understand what. I believe you know I was unfavorably impressed toward him because of apparently contradictory accounts he gave me of some matters at the battle of Ball's Bluff. At length he has brought me the paper which accompanies this, showing, I think, that he is entitled to respectful consideration. As you see, it is signed by several senators and representatives as well as other well-known and respectable gentlemen. I attach considerable consequence to the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler, late Major Shaler of the New York Seventh. These things, and his late connection with Colonel Baker, induce me to ask you if, consistently with the public service, the past, whatever it is, cannot be waived, and he placed in service and given another chance?

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
December 9, 1861

*To the House of Representatives:* I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State, in reply to the resolution of the House of the 4th instant, relative to the intervention of certain European powers in the affairs of Mexico.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.



Jefferson Davis

*Wood Engraving from a Photograph by Brady.*



DRAFT OF A DESPATCH PROPOSING ARBITRATION  
IN THE "TRENT" AFFAIR—NOT USED  
OR SENT, [December 10?], 1861

**T**HE DESPATCH of her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, dated the 30th of November, 1861, and of which your Lordship kindly furnished me a copy, has been carefully considered by the President; and he directs me to say that if there existed no fact or facts pertinent to the case beyond those stated in said despatch, the reparation sought by Great Britain from the United States would be justly due and should be promptly made. The President is unwilling to believe that her Majesty's government will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to him to be only a partial record, in the making up of which he has been allowed no part. He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case with no assurance that her Majesty's government will consent to hear him; yet this much he directs me to say, that this government has intended no affront to the British flag or to the British nation; nor has it intended to force into discussion an embarrassing question, all of which is evident by the fact hereby

asserted, that the act complained of was done by the officer without orders from or expectation of the government. But being done, it was no longer left to us to consider whether we might not, to avoid a controversy, waive an unimportant though a strict right; because we, too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justly jealous of their rights, and in whose presence our government could undo the act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong, or at least very questionable. The United States Government and people are still willing to make reparation upon such showing.

Accordingly I am instructed by the President to inquire whether her Majesty's government will hear the United States upon the matter in question. The President desires, among other things, to bring into view and have considered the existing rebellion in the United States; the position Great Britain has assumed, including her Majesty's proclamation in relation thereto; the relation the persons whose seizure is the subject of complaint bore to the United States, and the object of their voyage at the time they were seized; the knowledge which the master of the *Trent* had of their relation to the United States, and of the object of their voyage at the time he received them on board for the voyage; the place of the seizure; and the precedents and

respective positions assumed in analogous cases between Great Britain and the United States.

Upon a submission containing the foregoing facts, with those set forth in the before-mentioned despatch to your lordship, together with all other facts which either party may deem material, I am instructed to say the Government of the United States will, if agreed to by her Majesty's government, go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations, and will abide the award.

Or, in the alternative, her Majesty's government may, upon the same record, determine whether any—and, if any, what—reparation is due from the United States; provided no such reparation shall be different in character from nor transcend that proposed by your lordship as instructed in and by the despatch aforesaid; and provided further, that the determination thus made shall be the law for all future analogous cases between Great Britain and the United States.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, December 14, 1861

*To the Senate of the United States:* In compliance with the resolution of your honorable body "that the President be requested to furnish to the Senate copies of the charges, testimony, and finding of the recent court of inquiry in the

case of Colonel Dixon S. Miles, of the United States Army," I have the honor to transmit herewith the copies desired, which have been procured from the War Department.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, December 17, 1861

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*

I transmit to the Senate and House of Representatives copies of the correspondence between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the governor of the State of Maine, on the subject of the fortification of the sea-coast and lakes.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, December 20, 1861

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*

I transmit to Congress a letter from the secretary of the executive committee of the commission appointed to represent the interests of those American citizens who may desire to become exhibitors at the industrial exhibition to be held in London in 1862, and a memorial of that commission, with a report of the executive committee thereof, and copies of circulars announcing the decisions of her Majesty's commissioners in London, giving directions to be observed in regard to articles intended for exhibition, and also of circular forms of application, demands for

space, approvals, etc., according to the rules prescribed by the British commissioners.

As these papers fully set forth the requirements necessary to enable those citizens of the United States who may wish to become exhibitors to avail themselves of the privileges of the exhibition, I commend them to your early consideration, especially in view of the near approach of the time when the exhibition will begin.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
December 23, 1861

*To the House of Representatives:* In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th July last, requesting information respecting the Asiatic coolie-trade, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with the documents which accompanied it.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, December 30, 1861

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:* I transmit to Congress a correspondence which has taken place between the Secretary of State and authorities of Great Britain and France on the subject of the recent removal of certain citizens of the United States from the British mail-

steamer *Trent*, by order of Captain Wilkes, in command of the United States war-steamer *San Jacinto*.  
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HALLECK

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 31, 1861.

*General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo.:*  
General McClellan is sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert? When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reinforced from Columbus? A simultaneous movement by you on Columbus might prevent it.

A. LINCOLN.

[Similar despatch to Buell same date.]

\*LETTER TO MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER<sup>1</sup>

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1861.

*Dear Sir:* Yours of the 23d is received, and I am constrained to say it is difficult to answer so ugly a letter in good temper. I am, as you intimate, losing much of the great confidence

<sup>1</sup>General Hunter was in command of the Department of Kansas at the time this letter was sent him. He considered himself dishonored by an appointment to such an obscure military post, and protested to the President against it. On the big yellow envelope in which the letter was enclosed the dissatisfied General wrote: "The President's reply to my 'ugly letter.' This lay on his table a month after it was written, and when finally sent, was by a special conveyance, with the direction that it was only to be given to me when I was in good humor."

I placed in you, not from any act or omission of yours touching the public service, up to the time you were sent to Leavenworth, but from the flood of grumbling despatches and letters I have seen from you since. I knew you were being ordered to Leavenworth at the time it was done; and I aver that with as tender a regard for your honor and your sensibilities as I had for my own, it never occurred to me that you were being "humiliated, insulted and disgraced!" nor have I, up to this day, heard an intimation that you have been wronged, coming from any one but yourself. No one has blamed you for the retrograde movement from Springfield, nor for the information you gave General Cameron; and this you could readily understand, if it were not for your unwarranted assumption that the ordering you to Leavenworth must necessarily have been done as a *punishment* for some *fault*. I thought then, and think yet, the position assigned to you is as responsible, and as honorable, as that assigned to Buell—I know that General McClellan expected more important results from it. My impression is that at the time you were assigned to the new Western Department, it had not been determined to replace General Sherman in Kentucky; but of this I am not certain, because the idea that a command in Kentucky was very de-

sirable, and one in the farther West undesirable, had never occurred to me. You constantly speak of being placed in command of only 3,000. Now tell me, is this not mere impatience? Have you not known all the while that you are to command four or five times that many?

I have been, and am sincerely your friend; and if, as such, I dare to make a suggestion, I would say you are adopting the best possible way to ruin yourself. "Act well your part, there all the honor lies." He who does *something* at the head of one Regiment, will eclipse him who does *nothing* at the head of a hundred.

Your friend, as ever, A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL

WASHINGTON CITY, January 1, 1862.

*Brigadier-General Buell, Louisville:*

General McClellan should not be disturbed with business. I think you better get in concert with General Halleck at once. I write you to-night. I also telegraph and write Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON CITY, January 1, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, St. Louis, Mo.:*

General McClellan should not yet be disturbed with business. I think General Buell and your-

self should be in communication and concert at once. I write you to-night and also telegraph and write him.

A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1862.

*My dear General Halleck:* General McClellan is not dangerously ill, as I hope, but would better not be disturbed with business. I am very anxious that, in case of General Buell's moving toward Nashville, the enemy shall not be greatly reinforced, and I think there is danger he will be from Columbus. It seems to me that a real or feigned attack on Columbus from up-river at the same time would either prevent this or compensate for it by throwing Columbus into our hands. I wrote General Buell a letter similar to this, meaning that he and you shall communicate and act in concert, unless it be your judgment and his that there is no necessity for it. You and he will understand much better than I how to do it. Please do not lose time in this matter.

Yours very truly,      A. LINCOLN.

NOTE TO SECRETARY CHASE, January 2, 1862

I have just been with General McClellan; and he is very much better.

A. LINCOLN.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, January 2, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I transmit to Congress a copy of a letter to the Secretary of State from James R. Partridge, secretary to the executive committee of the industrial exhibition to be held in London in the course of the present year, and a copy of the correspondence to which it refers relative to a vessel for the purpose of taking such articles as persons in this country may wish to exhibit on that occasion. As it appears that no naval vessel can be spared for the purpose, I recommend that authority be given to charter a suitable merchant vessel, in order that facilities similar to those afforded by the government for the exhibition of 1851 may also be extended to those citizens of the United States who may desire to contribute to the exhibition of this year.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1862.

*General Buell:*

Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? Please tell me the progress and condition of the movement in that direction. Answer.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 6, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Your despatch of yesterday has been received, and it disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write you to-day. I am not competent to criticize your views, and therefore what I offer is in justification of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville. First, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication, which Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the midst of loyal people who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again, I cannot see why the movement on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward Nashville is the main object. But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now, I fear, are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South. My despatch, to which yours is an answer, was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know the answer, which

I cannot safely show them. They would despair, possibly resign to go and save their families somehow, or die with them. I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety.

Yours very truly,  
A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1862.

*Brigadier-General Buell, Louisville:* Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like despatch to Major-General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

INDORSEMENT ABOUT ALLOTMENT COMMISSIONERS FOR IOWA, January 9, 1862

It would afford me great pleasure to oblige Mr. Vandever in the within matter, if I knew it would not be disagreeable to the other Iowa members. Will he please procure their names with his own and send them to me?

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, January 10, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I transmit to Congress a translation of an instruction to the minister of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria accredited to this government, and a copy of a note to that minister from the Secretary of State relative to the questions involved in the taking from the British steamer *Trent* of certain citizens of the United States by order of Captain Wilkes of the United States Navy. This correspondence may be considered as a sequel to that previously communicated to Congress relating to the same subject.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

INDORSEMENT ON LETTER FROM GENERAL HALLECK, January 10, 1862

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
ST. LOUIS, January 6, 1861.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT.

In reply to your Excellency's letter of the 1st instant, I have to state that on receiving your telegram I immediately communicated with General Buell, and have since sent him all the information I could obtain of the enemy's movements about Columbus and Camp Beauregard. No considerable force has been sent from those places to Bowling Green. They have about 22,000 men at Columbus, and the place

is strongly fortified. I have at Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah only about 15,000, which, after leaving guards at these places, would give me but little over 10,000 men with which to assist General Buell. It would be madness to attempt anything serious with such a force, and I cannot at the present time withdraw any from Missouri without risking the loss of this State.

The troops recently raised in other States of this department have, without my knowledge, been sent to Kentucky and Kansas.

I am satisfied that the authorities at Washington do not appreciate the difficulties with which we have to contend here. The operations of Lane, Jennison, and others have so enraged the people of Missouri that it is estimated that there is a majority of 80,000 against the government. We are virtually in an enemy's country. Price and others have a considerable army in the southwest, against which I am operating with all my available force.

This city and most of the middle and northern counties are insurrectionary,—burning bridges, destroying telegraph lines, etc.,—and can be kept down only by the presence of troops. A large portion of the foreign troops organized by General Frémont are unreliable; indeed, many of them are already mutinous. They have been tampered with by politicians, and made to believe that if they get up a mutiny and demand Frémont's return the government will be forced to restore him to duty here. It is believed that some high officers are in the plot. I

have already been obliged to disarm several of these organizations, and I am daily expecting more serious outbreaks.

Another grave difficulty is the want of proper general officers to command the troops and enforce order and discipline, and especially to protect public property from robbery and plunder. Some of the brigadier-generals assigned to this department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command. I assure you, Mr. President, it is very difficult to accomplish much with such means. I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull ax, a broken saw, and rotten timber. It is true that I have some very good green timber, which will answer the purpose as soon as I can get it into shape and season it a little.

I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error, which produced the disaster of Bull Run.

To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read.

General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each

other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

[*Indorsement.*]

The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done.

A. LINCOLN.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE RESIGNATION OF SECRETARY CAMERON <sup>1</sup>

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 11, 1862.

**M**Y DEAR SIR: As you have more than once expressed a desire for a change of position, I can now gratify you consistently with my view of the public interest. I therefore propose nominating you to the Senate next Monday as minister to Russia.

Very sincerely, your friend,

A. LINCOLN.

*(Private.)*

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 11, 1862.

*Dear Sir:* Though I have said nothing hitherto in response to your wish, expressed long since, to resign your seat in the Cabinet, I have not been unmindful of it. I have been only unwilling to consent to a change at a time and under circumstances which might give occasion to misconstruction, and unable till now to see how such misconstruction could be avoided.

<sup>1</sup>From the beginning of his official duties, Secretary Cameron proved not to be the man to meet the tremendous difficulties of the War Department. His unfortunate maladministration culminated when, in his report for December, 1861, he advocated a measure in favor of arming slaves and using "their services

But the desire of Mr. Clay to return home and to offer his services to his country in the field enables me now to gratify your wish, and at the same time evince my personal regard for you, and my confidence in your ability, patriotism, and fidelity to public trust.

I therefore tender to your acceptance, if you still desire to resign your present position, the post of minister to Russia. Should you accept it, you will bear with you the assurance of my undiminished confidence, of my affectionate esteem, and of my sure expectation that, near the great sovereign whose personal and hereditary friendship for the United States so much endears him to Americans, you will be able to render services to your country not less important than those you could render at home.

Very sincerely, your friend,

A. LINCOLN.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

January 11, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of this date, and to thank you, with pro-  
against the rebels, under proper military regulations, discipline, and command." The report was sent out before the President had chance to pass upon it, but at his order it was withdrawn from circulation. Lincoln handled the case with rare tact. Soon after he found opportunity for relieving his Secretary from a position for which he was unqualified, and conferred upon him a foreign mission.

found respect, for its kind and generous tone. When you were elected President, a result to which I contributed my best exertions, I had no thought of leaving the Senate of the United States or of accepting any position within your gift. But when you invited me to Springfield, Illinois, and presented me the choice of one of two named places in the list of your constitutional advisers, I could not, for grave public reasons and after great reflections, refuse a trust so trying and laborious.

My life had been one of constant labor and excitement. I looked to the Senate as the best field, after such a life, in which to serve my country and my State. It was only when I realized that I might be of service to the general cause in the darkly foreshadowed future that I ventured to undertake the manifold and various responsibilities of the War Department.

I felt when I saw the traitors leaving their seats in Congress, and when the *Star of [the] West* was fired upon in Charleston harbor, that a bloody conflict was inevitable.

I have devoted myself without interruption to my official duties, and have given to them all my energies. I have done my best. It was impossible, in the direction of operations so extensive, but that some mistakes should have happened and some complications and complaints should have arisen. In view of such considerations, I thank you for the expression of your confidence in my ability, patriotism, and fidelity to public trust. Thus my own conscientious

sense of doing my duty by the executive and by my country is approved by the acknowledged head of the government himself.

When I became a member of your administration I avowed my purpose to retire from the cabinet as soon as my duty to my country would allow me to do so. In your letter of this day's date, so illustrative of your just and upright character, you revive the fact that I some time ago expressed the same purpose to you, and in reminding me of this you proffer for my acceptance one of the highest diplomatic positions at your bestowal as an additional mark of your confidence and esteem.

In retiring from the War Department I feel that the mighty army of the United States is ready to do battle for the Constitution; that it is marshaled by gallant and experienced leaders; that it is animated with the greatest enthusiasm for the good cause, and also that my successor in this department is my personal friend, who unites to wonderful intellect and vigor the grand essential of being in earnest in the present struggle, and of being resolved upon a speedy and overwhelming triumph of our arms. I therefore frankly accept the new distinction you have tendered me, and as soon as important and long-neglected private business can be arranged I will enter upon the important duties of the mission which you have assigned me.

I have the honor to be, my dear sir,

Your obedient and humble servant,

SIMON CAMERON.

## LETTER TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 13, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Your despatch of yesterday is received, in which you say: "I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares, I have not seen nor asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered and do not now offer them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do. With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the

weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate: Suppose, last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate and not to criticize. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting, every particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements. This had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of the terms of the three months' men. Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN,

[*Indorsement.*]

January 13, 1862.

Having to-day written General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send General Halleck a copy of it.

A. LINCOLN.

LETTERS TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 15, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* This will introduce Governor G. Koerner, of Illinois, who is my personal friend, and who calls on you at my particular request. Please open the sealed letter he will hand you before he leaves you and confer with him as to its contents.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

[*Inclosure.*]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 15, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* The Germans are true and patriotic, and so far as they have got cross in Missouri it is upon mistake and misunderstanding.

Without a knowledge of its contents, Governor Koerner, of Illinois, will hand you this letter. He is an educated and talented German gentleman, as true a man as lives. With his assistance you can set everything right with the

Germans. I write this without his knowledge, asking him at the same time, by letter, to deliver it. My clear judgment is that, with reference to the German element in your command, you should have Governor Koerner with you; and if agreeable to you and him, I will make him a brigadier-general, so that he can afford to so give his time. He does not wish to command in the field, though he has more military knowledge than many who do. If he goes into the place he will simply be an efficient, zealous, and unselfish assistant to you. I say all this upon intimate personal acquaintance with Governor Koerner.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, January 17, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I transmit to Congress a translation of an instruction to the minister of his Majesty the King of Prussia accredited to this government, and a copy of a note to that minister from the Secretary of State relating to the capture and detention of certain citizens of the United States, passengers on board the British steamer *Trent*, by order of Captain Wilkes of the United States Navy.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## \*ORDER TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, January 20, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
Commanding Armies of the United States:

You or any officer you may designate will in your discretion suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* so far as may relate to Major Chase, lately of the Engineer Corps of the Army of the United States, now alleged to be guilty of treasonable practices against this Government.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President,  
WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

## LETTER TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 22, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* On reflection I think it will not do, as a rule, for the adjutant-general to attend me wherever I go: not that I have any objection to his presence, but that it would be an uncompensating encumbrance both to him and me. When it shall occur to me to go anywhere, I wish to be free to go at once, and not to have to notify the adjutant-general and wait till he can get ready.

It is better, too, for the public service that he shall give his time to the business of his office, and not to personal attendance on me.

While I thank you for the kindness of the suggestion, my view of the matter is as I have stated. Yours truly,  
A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, January 24, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I submit to Congress the accompanying copy of a correspondence between the Secretary of State, the Spanish minister, and the Secretary of the Navy, concerning the bark *Providencia*, a Spanish vessel seized on her voyage from Havana to New York by a steamer of the United States blockading squadron, and subsequently released. I recommend the appropriation of the amount of the award of the referee.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

INDORSEMENT ON LETTER FROM SECRETARY  
STANTON, January 24, 1862

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 24, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In my opinion the success of military operations and the safety of the country require some changes to be made in the Bureau of Ordnance, and perhaps some others, in order to secure more vigor and activity; and I desire to have your sanction for making them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

## [Indorsement.]

The Secretary of War has my authority to exercise his discretion in the matter within mentioned.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 24, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* On reflection, I think you better make a peremptory order on the ordnance officer at Pittsburg to ship the ten mortars and two beds to Cairo instantly, and all others as fast as finished, till ordered to stop, reporting each shipment to the department here.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 1<sup>1</sup>

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 27, 1862.

Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of all the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe; the Army of the

<sup>1</sup>This is the first instance of Lincoln using his power as commander-in-chief of the army. Up to now he had been diffident about exercising such authority, but finding those who were supposed military experts, accomplishing nothing, he, himself, studied the war situation night and day, read a number of strategical works, pored over reports and held long conferences with eminent officers. His taking hold of the army infused new hope throughout the North.

Potomac; the Army of Western Virginia; the army near Munfordville, Kentucky; the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 31, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* It is my wish that the expedition commonly called the "Lane Expedition" shall be, as much as has been promised at the adjutant-general's office, under the supervision of General McClellan, and not any more. I have not intended, and do not now intend, that it shall be a great, exhausting affair, but a snug, sober column of 10,000 or 15,000. General Lane has been told by me many times that he is under the command of General Hunter, and

assented to it as often as told. It was the distinct agreement between him and me, when I appointed him, that he was to be under Hunter.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 31, 1862.

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, January 31, 1862

EXECUTIVE MANSION, January 31, 1862.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
As a sequel to the correspondence on the subject previously communicated, I transmit to Congress extracts from a despatch of the 20th ultimo from Mr. Adams, United States minister at London, to the Secretary of State, and a copy of an instruction from Earl Russell to Lord

Lyons, of the 10th instant, relative to the removal of certain citizens of the United States from the British mail-steamer *Trent* by order of the commander of the United States war-steamer *San Jacinto*.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN <sup>1</sup>

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 3, 1862.

**M**Y DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

*First.* Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

*Second.* Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

*Third.* Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

*Fourth.* In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of

<sup>1</sup>The plan of campaign as given here has been highly praised by military critics. McClellan would not agree to this plan and Lincoln let him have his own way, an action which brought down bitter criticism upon him.

the enemy's communications, while mine would?

*Fifth.* In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours truly,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

*Memorandum accompanying Letter of President Lincoln to General McClellan, dated February 3, 1862*

*First.* Suppose the enemy should attack us in force before we reach the Occoquan, what?

*Second.* Suppose the enemy in force shall dispute the crossing of the Occoquan, what? In view of this, might it not be safest for us to cross the Occoquan at Colchester, rather than at the village of Occoquan? This would cost the enemy two miles more of travel to meet us but would, on the contrary, leave us two miles farther from our ultimate destination.

*Third.* Suppose we reach Maple Valley without an attack, will we not be attacked there in force by the enemy marching by the several roads from Manassas; and if so, what?

LETTER TO WILLIAM H. HERNDON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 3, 1862.

*Dear William:* Yours of January 30th just received. Do just as you say about the money,

matter. 'As you well know, I have not time to write a letter of respectable length. God bless you, says

Your friend,

A. LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO L. W. POWELL

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 4, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I herewith return the letters and printed paper submitted by you in behalf of Mr. Samuel B. Churchill. While I would be glad to oblige you, I cannot now interfere with the case.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

#### RESPITE FOR NATHANIEL GORDON,

February 4, 1862

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

*To all to whom these presents shall come,  
greeting:*

Whereas it appears that at a term of the Circuit Court of the United States of America for the southern district of New York, held in the month of November, A. D. 1861, Nathaniel Gordon was indicted and convicted for being engaged in the slave-trade, and was by the said court sentenced to be put to death by hanging

by the neck on Friday the 7th day of February, A. D. 1862;

And whereas a large number of respectable citizens have earnestly besought me to commute the said sentence of the said Nathaniel Gordon to a term of imprisonment for life, which application I have felt it to be my duty to refuse;

And whereas it has seemed to me probable that the unsuccessful application made for the commutation of his sentence may have prevented the said Nathaniel Gordon from making the necessary preparation for the awful change which awaits him:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, have granted and do hereby grant unto him, the said Nathaniel Gordon, a respite of the above-recited sentence until Friday, the 21st day of February, A. D. 1862, between the hours of twelve o'clock at noon and three o'clock in the afternoon of the said day, when the said sentence shall be executed.

In granting this respite it becomes my painful duty to admonish the prisoner that, relinquishing all expectation of pardon by human authority, he refer himself alone to the mercy of the common God and Father of all men.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed

my name and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this  
[L. S.] 4th day of February, A. D. 1862, and of  
the independence of the United States  
the eighty-sixth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:

W. H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, February 4, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
The third section of the "Act further to promote the efficiency of the navy," approved December 21, 1861, provides:

That the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the retired list of the navy, for the command of squadrons and single ships, such officers as he may believe that the good of the service requires to be thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon the recommendation of the President of the United States they shall receive a vote of thanks of Congress for their services and gallantry in action against an enemy, be restored to the active list, and not otherwise.

In conformity with this law, Captain Samuel F. Du Pont, of the navy, was nominated to the Senate for continuance as the flag-officer in com-

mand of the squadron which recently rendered such important service to the Union in the expedition to the coast of South Carolina.

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond with the intention of the law, or be more pregnant with happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend that Captain Samuel F. Du Pont receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the capture of Forts Walker and Beauregard, commanding the entrance of Port Royal harbor, on the 7th of November, 1861.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, February 7, 1862

*To the Senate of the United States:* In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, requesting a communication of any recent correspondence relating to the presentation of American citizens to the court of France, I transmit a copy of a despatch of the 14th ultimo from the United States minister at Paris to the Secretary of State, and of an instruction of Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton of the 3d instant.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

DIRECTIONS TO GENERAL BUELL

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1862.

*Major-General D. C. Buell, Louisville:* The President directs me to say that he has read

your communication to Major-General G. B. McClellan, dated the 1st and mailed the 6th of this month, and he approves the operations you propose therein, and believes, if vigorously prosecuted, they cannot fail. He desires you and Major-General Halleck to coöperate as far as possible, and says that your two heads together will succeed.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

LETTER TO GENERALS DAVID HUNTER AND J. H.  
LANE

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 10, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER AND BRIGADIER-  
GENERAL LANE, Leavenworth, Kansas:

My wish has been and is to avail the government of the services of both General Hunter and General Lane, and, so far as possible, to personally oblige both. General Hunter is the senior officer, and must command when they serve together; though in so far as he can consistently with the public service and his own honor oblige General Lane, he will also oblige me. If they cannot come to an amicable understanding, General Lane must report to General Hunter for duty, according to the rules, or decline the service.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, February 12, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*

I transmit to Congress a copy of a special treaty between the United States and his Majesty the King of Hanover for the abolition of the state dues, which was signed at Berlin on the 6th of November last. In this treaty, already approved by the Senate and ratified on the part of the United States, it is stipulated that the sums specified in Articles III and IV to be paid to the Hanoverian government shall be paid at Berlin on the day of the exchange of ratifications.

I therefore recommend that seasonable provision be made to enable the executive to carry this stipulation into effect.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

#### AMNESTY TO POLITICAL OR STATE PRISONERS

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 14, 1862.

The breaking out of a formidable insurrection, based on a conflict of political ideas, being an event without precedent in the United States, was necessarily attended by great confusion and perplexity of the public mind. Disloyalty, before unsuspected, suddenly became bold, and treason astonished the world by bringing at once into the field military forces superior in numbers to the standing army of the United States.

Every department of the government was paralyzed by treason. Defection appeared in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, in the cabinet, in the Federal courts; ministers and consuls returned from foreign countries to enter the insurrectionary councils, or land or naval forces; commanding and other officers of the army and in the navy betrayed the councils or deserted their posts for commands in the insurgent forces. Treason was flagrant in the revenue and in the post-office service, as well as in the Territorial governments and in the Indian reserves.

Not only governors, judges, legislators, and ministerial officers in the States, but even whole States, rushed, one after another, with apparent unanimity, into rebellion. The capital was besieged, and its connection with all the States cut off.

Even in the portions of the country which were most loyal, political combinations and secret societies were formed, furthering the work of disunion; while, from motives of disloyalty or cupidity, or from excited passions or perverted sympathies, individuals were found furnishing men, money, and materials of war and supplies to the insurgents' military and naval forces. Armies, ships, fortifications, navy-yards, arsenals, military posts and garrisons, one after another were betrayed or abandoned to the insurgents.

Congress had not anticipated and so had not provided for the emergency. The municipal authorities were powerless and inactive. The judicial machinery seemed as if it had been designed not to sustain the government, but to embarrass and betray it.

Foreign intervention, openly invited and industriously instigated by the abettors of the insurrection, became imminent, and has only been prevented by the practice of strict and impartial justice, with the most perfect moderation, in our intercourse with nations.

The public mind was alarmed and apprehensive, though fortunately not distracted or disheartened. It seemed to be doubtful whether the Federal Government, which one year before had been thought a model worthy of universal acceptance, has indeed the ability to defend and maintain itself.

Some reverses, which perhaps were unavoidable, suffered by newly levied and inefficient forces, discouraged the loyal, and gave new hopes to the insurgents. Voluntary enlistments seemed about to cease, and desertions commenced. Parties speculated upon the question whether conscription had not become necessary to fill up the armies of the United States.

In this emergency the President felt it his duty to employ with energy the extraordinary powers which the Constitution confides to him in cases of insurrection. He called into the field such military and naval forces, unauthorized by the existing laws, as seemed necessary. He directed measures to prevent the use of the post-office for treasonable correspondence. He subjected passengers to and from foreign countries to new passport regulations, and he instituted a blockade, suspended the writ of *habeas corpus* in various places, and caused persons who were represented to him as being or about to engage in disloyal or treasonable practices to be arrested by special civil as well as mili-

tary agencies, and detained in military custody, when necessary, to prevent them and deter others from such practices.

Examinations of such cases were instituted, and some of the persons so arrested have been discharged from time to time, under circumstances or upon conditions compatible, as was thought, with the public safety.

Meantime a favorable change of public opinion has occurred. The line between loyalty and disloyalty is plainly defined; the whole structure of the government is firm and stable; apprehensions of public danger and facilities for treasonable practices have diminished with the passions which prompted heedless persons to adopt them. The insurrection is believed to have culminated and to be declining.

The President, in view of these facts, and anxious to favor a return to the normal course of the administration, as far as regard for the public welfare will allow, directs that all political prisoners or state prisoners now held in military custody be released on their subscribing to a parole engaging them to render no aid or comfort to the enemies in hostility to the United States.

The Secretary of War will, however, at his discretion, except from the effect of this order any persons detained as spies in the service of the insurgents, or others whose release at the present moment may be deemed incompatible with the public safety.

To all persons who shall be so released, and who shall keep their parole, the President grants an am-

nesty for any past offenses of treason or disloyalty which they may have committed.

Extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the military authorities alone.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

#### MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, February 15, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:* The third section of the "Act further to promote the efficiency of the navy," approved December 21, 1861, provides:

That the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the retired list of the navy, for the command of squadrons and single ships, such officers as he may believe that the good of the service requires to be thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon the recommendation of the President of the United States they shall receive a vote of thanks of Congress for their services and gallantry in action against an enemy, be restored to the active list, and not otherwise.

In conformity with this law, Captain Louis M. Goldsborough, of the navy, was nominated to the Senate for continuance as flag-officer in command of the North Atlantic blockading squadron which recently rendered such impor-

tant service to the Union in the expedition to the coast of North Carolina.

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond with the intention of the law, or be more pregnant with happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend that Louis M. Goldsborough receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the combined attack of the forces commanded by him and Brigadier-General Burnside in the capture of Roanoke Island and the destruction of rebel gunboats on the 7th, 8th, and 10th of February, 1862.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

NOTE CONCERNING "CONTRABANDS," February  
15, 1862

I shall be obliged if the Secretary of the Treasury will in his discretion give Mr. Pierce such instructions in regard to Port Royal contrabands as may seem judicious.

A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 16, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, St. Louis, Mo.:*  
You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside; to prevent

which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full coöperation.

Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed.

It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly toward Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meanwhile Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas.

Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the Upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tennessee?

In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING WASHINGTON'S  
BIRTHDAY, February 19, 1862

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA:

*A Proclamation*

It is recommended to the people of the United States that they assemble in their customary places of meeting for public solemnities on the 22d day of February instant, and celebrate the anniversary of the birth of the Father of his Country, by causing to be read to them his immortal farewell address.

Given under my hand and the seal of the United States, at Washington, the 19th day of February, in the year of our [L. S.] Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-sixth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:

W. H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, February 25, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I transmit to Congress a copy of an instruction from Prince Gortchacow to Mr. de Stoeckl, the minister of his Imperial Majesty the Em-

peror of Russia accredited to this government, and of a note of the Secretary of State to the latter, relative to the adjustment of the question between the United States and Great Britain, growing out of the removal of certain of our citizens from the British mail-steamer *Trent* by order of the commander of the United States war-steamer *San Jacinto*.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, February 26, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
In transmitting to Congress the accompanying copy of two letters, bearing date of the 14th of February, 1861, from his Majesty the Major King of Siam to the President of the United States, and of the President's answer thereto, I submit for their consideration the question as to the proper place of deposit of the gifts received with the royal letters referred to.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2.—IN RELATION TO  
STATE PRISONERS

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 27, 1862.

It is ordered:

*First.* That a special commission of two persons, one of military rank and the other in civil life, be appointed to examine the cases of the state prisoners

remaining in the military custody of the United States, and to determine whether in view of the public safety and the existing rebellion they should be discharged, or remain in military custody, or be remitted to the civil tribunals for trial.

*Second.* That Major-General John A. Dix, commanding in Baltimore, and the Hon. Edwards Pierpont, of New York, be, and they are hereby appointed, commissioners for the purpose above mentioned; and they are authorized to examine, hear, and determine the cases aforesaid *ex parte* and in a summary manner, at such times and places as in their discretion they may appoint, and make full report to the War Department.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

ORDER RELATING TO COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE,  
February 28, 1862

Considering that the existing circumstances of the country allow a partial restoration of commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of those parts of the United States heretofore declared to be in insurrection and the citizens of the loyal States of the Union, and exercising the authority and discretion confided to me by the Act of Congress, approved July 13, 1861, entitled "An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other pur-

poses," I hereby license and permit such commercial intercourse in all cases within the rules and regulations which have been or may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for conducting and carrying on the same on the inland waters and ways of the United States.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, March 3, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:* I transmit to Congress a copy of a despatch to the Secretary of State from the minister resident of the United States at Lisbon concerning recent measures which have been adopted by the government of Portugal intended to encourage the growth and to enlarge the area of the culture of cotton in its African possessions.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
March 3, 1862

*To the House of Representatives of the United States:* I transmit herewith a communication of the Secretary of War, inclosing a report of the adjutant-general, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d of January, 1862.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, March 3, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I transmit to Congress a translation of an instruction to the minister of his Majesty the King of Italy accredited to this government, and a copy of a note to that minister from the Secretary of State, relating to the settlement of the question arising out of the capture and detention of certain citizens of the United States, passengers on board the British steamer *Trent*, by order of Captain Wilkes of the United States navy.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS RECOMMENDING COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION, March 6, 1862

FELLOW-CITIZENS of the Senate and House of Representatives: I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be substantially as follows:

*Resolved*, That the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.

If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is the end; but if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the

<sup>1</sup>A similar resolution as the one contained in this message passed both Houses but the South ignored it. Thaddeus Stevens denounced it as "about the most diluted milk-and-water-gruel proposition ever given to the American people." On April 16, 1862, Congress appropriated nearly \$1,000,000 for the liberation of the slaves in the District of Columbia.

fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it. The Federal Government would find its highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave States north of such part will then say, "The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section." To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion; and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the States initiating it. The point is not that all the States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say "initiation" because, in my judgment, gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all. In the mere financial or pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census tables and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself how very soon the current expenditures of this war would pur-

chase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named State. Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them.

In the annual message, last December, I thought fit to say, "The Union must be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be employed." I said this not hastily, but deliberately. War has been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency, toward ending the struggle, must and will come.

The proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than are the in-

stitution and property in it, in the present aspect of affairs?

While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO SECRETARY SEWARD

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 7, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Mr. James F. B. Marshall, of Massachusetts, is now with me on the question of the Honolulu commissioner. It pains me some that this tilt for the place of Colonel Baker's friend grows so fierce now the colonel is no longer alive to defend him. I presume, however, we shall have no rest from it. Mr. Marshall appears to be a very intelligent gentleman, and well acquainted with the affairs of the Sandwich Islands. The California delegation also expect the place for some one of their citizens. In self-defense I am disposed to say, "Make a selection and send it to me."

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 2

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 8, 1862.

Ordered, 1. That the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that part of the said army destined to enter upon active operations (including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the fortifications about Washington) into four army corps, to be commanded, according to seniority of rank, as follows:

First corps to consist of four divisions, and to be commanded by Major-General I. McDowell. Second corps to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General E. V. Sumner. Third corps to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General S. P. Heintzelman. Fourth corps to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General E. D. Keyes.

2. That the divisions now commanded by the officers above assigned to the commands of army corps shall be embraced in and form part of their respective corps.

3. The forces left for the defense of Washington will be placed in command of Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth, who shall also be military governor of the District of Columbia.

4. That this order be executed with such

promptness and despatch as not to delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the Army of the Potomac.

5. A fifth army corps, to be commanded by Major-General N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own and General Shield's (late General Lander's) divisions.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

### PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 3

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 8, 1862.

Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of all the army corps shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about 50,000 troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved *en route* for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.

That any movement as aforesaid *en route* for a new base of operations which may be ordered

by the general-in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th day of March instant, and the general-in-chief shall be responsible that it so move as early as that day.

Ordered, That the army and navy coöperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.

A. LINCOLN.

LORENZO THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL BUELL CONCERNING  
COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 8, 1862.

*Major-General D. C. Buell, Louisville:* The President directs me to inform you that the act of Congress of July 13, 1861, prohibits commercial intercourse with States proclaimed to be in rebellion (which includes all south of Kentucky and Missouri), except under license of the President and under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. By the President's directions the secretary has lately made rules and regulations, copies of which are this day sent by mail. The President desires you to enforce no rules inconsistent with them, and if any such have been made, that you

will rescind them. Please acknowledge receipt of this instruction.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.  
[Same to General H. W. Halleck.]

LETTER TO HENRY J. RAYMOND  
(*Private.*)

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 9, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I am grateful to the New York journals, and not less so to the "Times" than to others, for their kind notices of the late special message to Congress.

Your paper, however, intimates that the proposition, though well intentioned, must fail on the score of expense. I do hope you will reconsider this. Have you noticed the facts that less than one half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at \$400 per head—that eighty-seven days' cost of this war would pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri at the same price? Were those States to take the step, do you doubt that it would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?

Please look at these things and consider whether there should not be another article in the "Times."

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

MEMORANDUM OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE  
PRESIDENT AND SOME BORDER SLAVE STATE  
REPRESENTATIVES, BY HON. J. W. CRISFIELD

*Dear Sir:* I called, at the request of the President, to ask you to come to the White House tomorrow morning, at nine o'clock, and bring such of your colleagues as are in town.

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1862.

Yesterday, on my return from church, I found Mr. Postmaster-General Blair in my room, writing the above note, which he immediately suspended, and verbally communicated the President's invitation, and stated that the President's purpose was to have some conversation with the delegations of Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware, in explanation of his message of the 6th instant.

This morning these delegations, or such of them as were in town, assembled at the White House at the appointed time, and after some little delay were admitted to an audience. Mr. Leary and myself were the only members from Maryland present, and, I think, were the only members of the delegation at that time in the city. I know that Mr. Pearce, of the Senate, and Messrs. Webster and Calvert, of the House, were absent.

After the usual salutations, and we were

seated, the President said, in substance, that he had invited us to meet him to have some conversation with us in explanation of his message of the 6th; that since he had sent it in several of the gentlemen then present had visited him, but had avoided any allusion to the message, and he therefore inferred that the import of the message had been misunderstood, and was regarded as inimical to the interests we represented; and he had resolved he would talk with us, and disabuse our minds of that erroneous opinion.

The President then disclaimed any intent to injure the interests or wound the sensibilities of the slave States. On the contrary, his purpose was to protect the one and respect the other; that we were engaged in a terrible, wasting, and tedious war; immense armies were in the field, and must continue in the field as long as the war lasts; that these armies must, of necessity, be brought into contact with slaves in the States we represented and in other States as they advanced; that slaves would come to the camps, and continual irritation was kept up; that he was constantly annoyed by conflicting and antagonistic complaints: on the one side a certain class complained if the slave was not protected by the army; persons were frequently found who, participating in these views, acted in a way unfriendly to the slaveholder; on the other hand,

slaveholders complained that their rights were interfered with, their slaves induced to abscond and protected within the lines; these complaints were numerous, loud, and deep; were a serious annoyance to him and embarrassing to the progress of the war; that it kept alive a spirit hostile to the government in the States we represented; strengthened the hopes of the Confederates that at some day the border States would unite with them, and thus tend to prolong the war; and he was of opinion, if this resolution should be adopted by Congress and accepted by our States, these causes of irritation and these hopes would be removed, and more would be accomplished toward shortening the war than could be hoped from the greatest victory achieved by Union armies; that he made this proposition in good faith, and desired it to be accepted, if at all, voluntarily, and in the same patriotic spirit in which it was made; that emancipation was a subject exclusively under the control of the States, and must be adopted or rejected by each for itself; that he did not claim nor had this government any right to coerce them for that purpose; that such was no part of his purpose in making this proposition, and he wished it to be clearly understood; that he did not expect us there to be prepared to give an answer, but he hoped we would take the subject into serious

consideration, confer with one another, and then take such course as we felt our duty and the interests of our constituents required of us.

Mr. Noell, of Missouri, said that in his State slavery was not considered a permanent institution; that natural causes were there in operation which would at no distant day extinguish it, and he did not think that this proposition was necessary for that; and, besides that, he and his friends felt solicitous as to the message on account of the different constructions which the resolution and message had received. The New York "Tribune" was for it, and understood it to mean that we must accept gradual emancipation according to the plan suggested, or get something worse.

The President replied that he must not be expected to quarrel with the New York "Tribune" before the right time; he hoped never to have to do it; he would not anticipate events. In respect to emancipation in Missouri, he said that what had been observed by Mr. Noell was probably true, but the operation of these natural causes had not prevented the irritating conduct to which he had referred, or destroyed the hopes of the Confederates that Missouri would at some time range herself alongside of them, which, in his judgment, the passage of this resolution by

Congress and its acceptance by Missouri would accomplish.

Mr. Crisfield, of Maryland, asked what would be the effect of the refusal of the State to accept this proposal, and desired to know if the President looked to any policy beyond the acceptance or rejection of this scheme.

The President replied that he had no designs beyond the action of the States on this particular subject. He should lament their refusal to accept it, but he had no designs beyond their refusal of it.

Mr. Menzies, of Kentucky, inquired if the President thought there was any power except in the States themselves to carry out his scheme of emancipation.

The President replied that he thought there could not be. He then went off into a course of remarks not qualifying the foregoing declaration nor material to be repeated to a just understanding of his meaning.

Mr. Crisfield said he did not think the people of Maryland looked upon slavery as a permanent institution; and he did not know that they would be very reluctant to give it up if provision was made to meet the loss and they could be rid of the race; but they did not like to be coerced into emancipation, either by the direct action of the government or by indirection, as through the

emancipation of slaves in this District, or the confiscation of Southern property as now threatened; and he thought before they would consent to consider this proposition they would require to be informed on these points.

The President replied that, unless he was expelled by the act of God or the Confederate armies, he should occupy that house for three years; and as long as he remained there Maryland had nothing to fear either for her institutions or her interests on the points referred to.

Mr. Crisfield immediately added: Mr. President, if what you now say could be heard by the people of Maryland, they would consider your proposition with a much better feeling than I fear without it they will be inclined to do.

The President: That (meaning a publication of what he said) will not do; it would force me into a quarrel before the proper time; and, again intimating, as he had before done, that a quarrel with the "Greeley faction" was impending, he said he did not wish to encounter it before the proper time, nor at all if it could be avoided.

Governor Wickliffe, of Kentucky, then asked him respecting the constitutionality of his scheme.

The President replied: As you may suppose, I have considered that; and the proposition now

submitted does not encounter any constitutional difficulty. It proposes simply to coöperate with any State by giving such State pecuniary aid; and he thought that the resolution, as proposed by him, would be considered rather as the expression of a sentiment than as involving any constitutional question.

Mr. Hall, of Missouri, thought that if this proposition was adopted at all, it should be by the votes of the free States, and come as a proposition from them to the slave States, affording them an inducement to put aside this subject of discord; that it ought not to be expected that members representing slaveholding constituencies should declare at once, and in advance of any proposition to them, for the emancipation of slavery.

The President said he saw and felt the force of the objection; it was a fearful responsibility, and every gentleman must do as he thought best; that he did not know how this scheme was received by the members from the free States; some of them had spoken to him and received it kindly; but for the most part they were as reserved and chary as we had been, and he could not tell how they would vote. And in reply to some expression of Mr. Hall as to his own opinion regarding slavery, he said he did not pretend to disguise his antislavery feeling; that he thought it was wrong, and should continue to

think so; but that was not the question we had to deal with now. Slavery existed, and that, too, as well by the act of the North as of the South; and in any scheme to get rid of it, the North as well as the South was morally bound to do its full and equal share. He thought the institution wrong and ought never to have existed; but yet he recognized the rights of property which had grown out of it, and would respect those rights as fully as similar rights in any other property; that property can exist, and does legally exist. He thought such a law wrong, but the rights of property resulting must be respected; he would get rid of the odious law, not by violating the right, but by encouraging the proposition and offering inducements to give it up.

Here the interview, so far as this subject is concerned, terminated by Mr. Crittenden's assuring the President that, whatever might be our final action, we all thought him solely moved by a high patriotism and sincere devotion to the happiness and glory of his country; and with that conviction we should consider respectfully the important suggestions he had made.

After some conversation on the current war news, we retired, and I immediately proceeded to my room and wrote out this paper.

J. W. CRISFIELD.

We were present at the interview described

in the foregoing paper of Mr. Crisfield, and we certify that the substance of what passed on the occasion is in this paper faithfully and fully given.

J. W. MENZIES,  
J. J. CRITTENDEN,  
R. MALLORY.

March 10, 1862.

#### LETTER TO SECRETARY CHASE

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 10, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Thomas H. Campbell, bearer of this, has several times been our auditor of State, and I personally know him to be an honest man, of thorough business capacity. He is here now to do something in adjusting the accounts of the State and the United States growing out of the war. He is thoroughly disinterested, not even receiving pay for what he does. No man can be more safely trusted. I beg you to afford him all proper facilities, with perfect assurance that no confidence reposed in him will be abused.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL BUELL

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1862.

*General D. C. Buell:* The evidence is very strong that the enemy in front of us here is breaking up and moving off. General McClel-

lan is after him. Some part of the force may be destined to meet you. Look out and be prepared. I telegraphed Halleck, asking him to assist you if needed.

A. LINCOLN.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CAPTAIN G. V. FOX, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF NAVY

NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 10, 1862. 10.27 A.M.

*Captain G. V. Fox, Fort Monroe:* It is directed by the President that the *Monitor* be not too much exposed, and that in no event shall any attempt be made to proceed with her unattended to Norfolk. If vessels can be procured and loaded with stone and sunk in the channel, it is important that it should be done. *San Jacinto* and *Dacotah* have sailed from Boston for Hampton Roads, and the *Sabine* in tow of *Baltic*, and a tug from New York. Gunboats will be ordered forthwith. Would it not be well to detain the *Minnesota* until other vessels arrive?

GIDEON WELLES.

PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER NO. 3

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 11, 1862.

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field as the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered he is relieved

from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

Ordered further, that the two departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tenn., be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that until otherwise ordered Major-General Halleck have command of said department.

Ordered also, that the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Frémont.

That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, March 12, 1862

*To the Senate of the United States:* In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 11th instant, requesting a "copy of any cor-

respondence on the records or files of the Department of State in regard to railway systems in Europe," I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, and the papers by which it was accompanied.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

\*ENDORSEMENT ON AN APPLICATION FOR A POSITION IN THE N. Y. CUSTOM HOUSE, March 13, 1862

I do not remember Curtis H. Hall, the writer of the within; but Daniel E. Ruckel, mentioned, was a dear friend of mine; and any favor done a member of his family would be appreciated by me.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO JAMES A. McDOUGALL

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 14, 1862.

**M**Y DEAR SIR: As to the expensiveness of the plan of gradual emancipation with compensation, proposed in the late message, please allow me one or two brief suggestions.

Less than one half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head.

Thus, all the slaves in Delaware by the census of 1860, are . . .	1,798 400
	<hr/>
Cost of the slaves . . . . .	\$719,200
One day's cost of the war . . . . .	2,000,000

Again, less than eighty-seven days' cost of this war would, at the same price, pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri.

Thus, slaves in Delaware . . . . .	1,798
“ “ Maryland . . . . .	87,188
“ “ District of Columbia .	3,181



Abraham Lincoln

*Wood Engraving from Original Photograph taken  
in Springfield, 1861. Said to be his First  
Photograph taken with a beard.*



Thus, slaves in Kentucky .....	225,490
“            “            Missouri .....	114,965
	<hr/>
	432,622
	400
	<hr/>
Cost of slaves.....	\$173,048,800
Eighty-seven days' cost of the war	174,000,000

Do you doubt that taking the initiatory steps on the part of those States and this District would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?

A word as to the time and manner of incurring the expense. Suppose, for instance, a State devises and adopts a system by which the institution absolutely ceases therein by a named day—say January 1, 1882. Then let the sum to be paid to such a State by the United States be ascertained by taking from the census of 1860 the number of slaves within the State, and multiplying that number by four hundred—the United States to pay such sums to the State in twenty equal annual installments, in six per cent. bonds of the United States.

The sum thus given, as to time and manner, I think, would not be half as onerous as would be an equal sum raised now for the indefinite prosecution of the war; but of this you can

judge as well as I. I inclose a census table for your convenience.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, March 14, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I submit to Congress the accompanying copy of a correspondence between the Secretary of State, the Danish *chargé d'affaires*, and the Secretary of the Navy, concerning the case of the bark *Jargen Lorentzen*, a Danish vessel seized on her voyage from Rio de Janeiro to Havana by the United States ship *Morning Light*, and subsequently released. I recommend the appropriation of the award of the referees.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

LETTER TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 15, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* It is represented to me that Messrs. Hedden and Hoey had a contract with the government, closed on the 26th of October last, to deliver fifty thousand arms by the 15th of the then next January—that within the time they delivered twenty-eight thousand, which were accepted and paid for; that not on time, but ten days after time, they were ready and offered to deliver the remaining twenty-two thousand,

which were refused simply on the question of time.

If this statement be true and these men acted in good faith, I think they should not be ruined by the transaction, but that the guns should be accepted and paid for. Of course, I understand the principle of strict law would not oblige the government to take them, even if it were an individual.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO SECRETARY SEWARD

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 15, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I am very glad of your note saying "recent despatches from him" [Dryer at Honolulu] "are able, judicious, and loyal," and that if I agree we will leave him there. I am glad to agree so long as the public interest does not seem to require his removal.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO DR. SAMUEL BOYD TOBEY

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 19, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* A domestic affliction, of which doubtless you are informed, has delayed me so long in making acknowledgment of the very kind and appropriate letter signed on behalf and by direction of a meeting of the representatives of the Society of Friends for New England, held

at Providence, Rhode Island, the 8th of second month, 1862, by Samuel Boyce, clerk, and presented to me by yourself and associates.

Engaged as I am in a great war, I fear it will be difficult for the world to understand how fully I appreciate the principles of peace inculcated in this letter and everywhere by the Society of Friends.

Grateful to the good people you represent for the prayers in behalf of our common country, I look forward hopefully to an early end of war and return to peace. Your obliged friend,

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, March 20, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
The third section of the "Act further to promote the efficiency of the navy," approved December 21, 1861, provides:

That the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the retired list of the navy for the command of squadrons and single ships such officers as he may believe that the good of the service requires to be thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon the recommendation of the President of the United States they shall receive a vote of thanks of Congress for their services and gallantry in action against an enemy, be restored to the active list, and not otherwise.

In conformity with this law, Captain Samuel F. Du Pont, of the navy, was nominated to the Senate for continuance as the flag-officer in command of the squadron which recently rendered such important service to the Union in the expedition to the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond with the intention of the law, or be more pregnant with happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend that Captain Samuel F. Du Pont receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the capture, since the 21st of December, 1861, of various points on the coasts of Georgia and Florida, particularly Brunswick, Cumberland Island and Sound, Amelia Island, the towns of St. Mary's, St. Augustine, Jacksonville, and Fernandina.

Yours very truly,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

#### DESPATCH TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, St. Louis, Missouri:*  
Please suspend the order sending General Denver to Kansas until you hear from the Secretary of War or myself.

A. LINCOLN.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, March 26, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I transmit a copy of a communication of the 21st of December last, addressed to the Secretary of State by the governor of the Territory of Nevada, and commend to the particular attention of Congress those parts of it which show that further legislation is desirable for the public welfare in that quarter.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 21, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Frémont, and I write this to assure you I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases.

Yours very truly,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## INSTRUCTION TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 3, 1862.

The Secretary of War will order that one or the other of the corps of General McDowell

and General Sumner remain in front of Washington until further orders from the department, to operate at or in the direction of Manassas Junction, or otherwise, as occasion may require; that the other corps not so ordered to remain go forward to General McClellan as speedily as possible; that General McClellan commence his forward movements from his new base at once, and that such incidental modifications as the foregoing may render proper be also made.

A. LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 3, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck St. Louis, Mo.:*  
Colonel James A. Barrett, with a cavalry regiment now at St. Louis, wishes to be ordered to New Mexico. Let him go if, in your discretion, you think it not inconsistent with the public interest.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 4, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, St. Louis, Missouri:*  
I am sorry to learn that, after all, General Denver has gone to Kansas. Cannot General Davis go there? There is a hard pressure on me in this matter.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
April 5, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of yesterday, requesting any information which may have been received at the Department of State showing the system of revenue and finance now existing in any foreign country, I transmit a copy of a recent despatch from Mr. Pike, the United States minister at The Hague. This is understood to be the only information on the subject of the resolution recently received which has not been made public.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862. 8 P. M.

*General G. B. McClellan:* Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

A. LINCOLN, President.

LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Your despatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you knew the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance.

After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position; General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was divided and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn

<sup>1</sup> McClellan had established a base of supplies at Fort Monroe. His campaign against Richmond was laid, but he had delayed operations. Such procrastination harassed the President for it opened him to criticism. Lincoln's annoyance betrayed itself in several pointed remarks as: "It is called the Army of the Potomac but it is only McClellan's bodyguard" and "If McClellan is not using the Army I should like to borrow it for awhile."

back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied. I was constrained to substitute something for it myself.

And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond *via* Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken as he said from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away. I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time; and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone.

And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is noting now—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can; but you must act.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## \*DESPATCH TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 9, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

If the rigor of the confinement of Magoffin at Alton is endangering his life, or materially impairing his health, I wish it mitigated as far as it can be consistently with his safe detention.

A. LINCOLN.

## PROCLAMATION RECOMMENDING THANKSGIVING FOR VICTORIES, April 10, 1862

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

*A Proclamation*

It has pleased Almighty God to vouchsafe signal victories to the land and naval forces engaged in suppressing an internal rebellion, and at the same time to avert from our country the dangers of foreign intervention and invasion:

It is therefore recommended to the people of the United States that, at their next weekly assemblages in their accustomed places of public worship which shall occur after notice of this proclamation shall have been received, they especially acknowledge and render thanks to our Heavenly Father for these inestimable blessings; that they then and there implore spiritual con-

solation in behalf of all who have been brought into affliction by the casualties and calamities of sedition and civil war; and that they reverently invoke the divine guidance for our national counsels, to the end that they may speedily result in the restoration of peace, harmony, and unity throughout our borders, and hasten the establishment of fraternal relations among all the countries of the earth.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this tenth day of April, in the year of our [L. S.] Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

TELEGRAM TO R. YATES AND WM. BUTLER

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1862.

*Hon. R. Yates and William Butler, Springfield, Illinois:* I fully appreciate General Pope's splendid achievements, with their invaluable results; but you must know that major-generalships in the regular army are not as plenty as blackberries.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
April 14, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 3d ultimo, requesting information in regard to the present condition of Mexico, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, and the documents by which it was accompanied.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, April 16, 1862

*Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:* The act entitled "An act for the release of certain persons held to service or labor in the District of Columbia" has this day been approved and signed.

I have never doubted the constitutional authority of Congress to abolish slavery in this District; and I have ever desired to see the national capital freed from the institution in some satisfactory way. Hence there has never been in my mind any question upon the subject except the one of expediency, arising in view of all the circumstances. If there be matters within and about this act which might have taken a course or shape more satisfactory to my judgment, I do not attempt to specify them. I am gratified that the two principles of compensation and

colonization are both recognized and practically applied in the act.

In the matter of compensation, it is provided that claims may be presented within ninety days from the passage of the act, "but not thereafter"; and there is no saving for minors, *femmes covert*, insane or absent persons. I presume this is an omission by mere oversight, and I recommend that it be supplied by an amendatory or supplemental act.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

#### MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, April 18, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:* I transmit to Congress a copy of a correspondence between the Secretary of State and Benjamin E. Brewster, of Philadelphia, relative to the arrest in that city of Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, at the suit of Pierce Butler, for trespass *vi et armis*, assault and battery, and false imprisonment.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Your despatch of the 19th was received that day. Fredericksburg is evacuated and the bridges destroyed by the enemy, and a small part of McDowell's command occupies this side of the Rappahannock,

opposite the town. He purposes moving his whole force to that point.

A. LINCOLN.

UNSIGNED DRAFT OF LETTER TO JAMES G.  
BERRETT

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 22, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* With some reluctance and in accordance with the request made in your letter of the 17th, I have withdrawn the nomination of yourself to the Senate to be one of the commissioners under the act of Congress abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. In so far as your letter assumes that the tendering you the office without your solicitation or knowledge attests my confidence in your loyalty to the United States, now and heretofore, you are entirely right. So far, however, as it assumes that, in my judgment, your imprisonment mentioned was wholly undeserved, an explanatory word from me is due. I think you made a mistake which justified men having less evidence to the contrary than I have to suspect your loyalty, and to act accordingly. The arrest, though made by my general authority, was in fact made without my knowledge at the time; but being done, the question of undoing it was a little different from that of the original making, and required a little time to solve it satisfactorily.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 23, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Pittsburg Landing:* The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battle at Pittsburg Landing, and whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, April 24, 1862

*To the Senate of the United States:* In obedience to your resolution of the 17th instant, I herewith communicate the testimony and judgment of the recent naval court of inquiry in the case of Lieutenant Charles E. Fleming, of the United States navy; also the testimony and finding of the naval retiring board in the case of said Lieutenant Fleming.

I have the honor to state that the judgment and finding aforesaid have not been approved by me.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## \*LETTER TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 24, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* The Member of Congress from the District including Tiffin, O., calls on

me about the Post-master at that place. I believe I turned over a despatch to you from some persons there, asking a suspension, so as for them to be heard, or something of the sort. If nothing, or nothing amounting to anything, has been done, I think the suspension might now be suspended, and the commission go forward.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
April 26, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 24th of February last, requesting information in regard to insurgent privateers in foreign ports, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the documents by which it was accompanied.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 27, 1862.

*Governor Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee:* Your despatch of yesterday just received, as also, in due course, was your former one. The former one was sent to General Halleck, and we have his answer, by which I have no doubt he (General Halleck) is in communication with you before this. General Halleck

understands better than we can here, and he must be allowed to control in that quarter. If you are not in communication with Halleck, telegraph him at once, freely and frankly.

A. LINCOLN.

\*TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 29, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Would it derange or embarrass your operations if I were to appoint Captain Charles Griffin, a brigadier-general of volunteers? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, May 1, 1862

*To the Senate of the United States:* In answer to the resolution of the Senate [of April 22] in relation to Brigadier-General Stone, I have the honor to state that he was arrested and imprisoned under my general authority, and upon evidence which, whether he be guilty or innocent, required, as appears to me, such proceedings to be had against him for the public safety. I deem it incompatible with the public interest, as also, perhaps, unjust to General Stone, to make a more particular statement of the evidence.

He had not been tried because, in the state of military operations at the time of his arrest and

since, the officers to constitute a court-martial and for witnesses could not be withdrawn from duty without serious injury to the service. He will be allowed a trial without any unnecessary delay; the charges and specifications will be furnished him in due season, and every facility for his defense will be afforded him by the War Department.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, May 1, 1862

*To the Senate of the United States:* In accordance with the suggestion of the Secretary of the Treasury, contained in the accompanying letter, I have the honor to transmit the inclosed petition and report thereon of the Third Auditor for the consideration of Congress.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN<sup>1</sup>

EXECUTIVE MANSION, May 1, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:*

Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?

A. LINCOLN.

<sup>1</sup> It had taken McClellan a month to set up siege guns before Yorktown though his force outnumbered that of the enemy four to one.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 1, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee:* I am pressed by the Missouri members of Congress to give General Schofield independent command in Missouri. They insist that for want of this their local troubles gradually grow worse. I have forborne, so far, for fear of interfering with and embarrassing your operations. Please answer, telling me whether anything, and what, I can do for them without injuriously interfering with you.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. E. WOOL

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 4, 1862.

*Major-General Wool, Fortress Monroe:* The President desires to know whether your force is in condition for a sudden movement, if one should be ordered under your command.

Please have it in readiness.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

## RESPONSE TO EVANGELICAL LUTHERANS [May 6?], 1862

*Gentlemen:* I welcome here the representatives of the Evangelical Lutherans of the United States. I accept with gratitude their assurances

of the sympathy and support of that enlightened, influential, and loyal class of my fellow-citizens in an important crisis which involves, in my judgment, not only the civil and religious liberties of our own dear land, but in a large degree the civil and religious liberties of mankind in many countries and through many ages. You well know, gentlemen, and the world knows, how reluctantly I accepted this issue of battle forced upon me on my advent to this place by the internal enemies of our country. You all know, the world knows, the forces and the resources the public agents have brought into employment to sustain a government against which there has been brought not one complaint of real injury committed against society at home or abroad. You all may recollect that in taking up the sword thus forced into our hands, this government appealed to the prayers of the pious and the good, and declared that it placed its whole dependence upon the favor of God. I now humbly and reverently, in your presence, reiterate the acknowledgment of that dependence, not doubting that, if it shall please the Divine Being who determines the destinies of nations, this shall remain a united people, and that they will, humbly seeking the Divine guidance, make their prolonged national existence a source of new benefits to them-

selves and their successors, and to all classes and conditions of mankind.

TELEGRAM TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDS-  
BOROUGH

FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, May 7, 1862.

*Sir:* Major-General McClellan telegraphs that he has ascertained by a reconnoissance that the battery at Jamestown has been abandoned, and he again requests that gunboats may be sent up the James River.

If you have tolerable confidence that you can successfully contend with the *Merrimac* without the help of the *Galena* and two accompanying gunboats, send the *Galena* and two gunboats up the James River at once. Please report your action on this to me at once. I shall be found either at General Wool's headquarters or on board the *Miami*.

Your obedient servant,  
A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, May 9, 1862.

**M**Y DEAR SIR: I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing part of a despatch to you relating to army corps, which despatch of course will have reached you before this will.

I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of division, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from (and every modern military book), yourself only excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps

are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that senators and representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

But to return. Are you strong enough—are you strong enough, even with my help—to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH

FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, May 10, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I send you this copy of your report of yesterday for the purpose of saying to you in writing that you are quite right in supposing the movement made by you and therein reported was made in accordance with my wishes verbally expressed to you in advance. I avail myself of the occasion to thank you for your courtesy and all your conduct, so far as known to me, during my brief visit here.

Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN.

PROCLAMATION RAISING THE BLOCKADE OF  
CERTAIN PORTS, May 12, 1862BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA:*A Proclamation.*

Whereas, by my proclamation of the 19th of April, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, it was declared that the ports of certain States, including those of Beaufort, in the State of North Carolina, Port Royal, in the State of South Carolina, and New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, were, for reasons therein set forth, intended to be placed under blockade; and whereas the said ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans have since been blockaded;

but as the blockade of the same ports may now be safely relaxed with advantage to the interests of commerce:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, pursuant to the authority in me vested by the fifth section of the act of Congress approved on the 13th of July last, entitled "An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purpose," do hereby declare that the blockade of said ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans shall so far cease and determine, from and after the first day of June next, that commercial intercourse with those ports, except as to persons, things, and information contraband of war, may from that time be carried on, subject to the laws of the United States, and to the limitations and in pursuance of the regulations which are prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury in his order of this date, which is appended to this proclamation.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this 12th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, May 14, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
The third section of the "Act further to provide the efficiency of the navy," approved 21st of December, 1861, provides:

That the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the retired list of the navy for the command of squadrons and single ships such officers as he may believe that the good of the service requires to be thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon the recommendation of the President of the United States they shall receive a vote of thanks of Congress for their services and gallantry in action against an enemy, be restored to the active list, and not otherwise.

In conformity with this law, Captain David G. Farragut was nominated to the Senate for continuance as flag-officer in command of the squadron which recently rendered such important service to the Union by his successful operations on the lower Mississippi and capture of New Orleans.

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond with the intention of the law, or be more pregnant with happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend

that Captain D. G. Farragut receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the capture, since the 21st of December, 1861, of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, city of New Orleans, and the destruction of various rebel gunboats, rams, etc.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, May 14, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*

I submit herewith a list of naval officers who commanded vessels engaged in the recent brilliant operations of the squadron commanded by Flag-officer Farragut, which led to the capture of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, city of New Orleans, and the destruction of rebel gunboats, rams, etc., in April, 1862. For their services and gallantry on those occasions I cordially recommend that they should, by name, receive a vote of thanks of Congress:

LIST.

Captain Theodorus Bailey.  
Captain Henry W. Morris.  
Captain Thomas T. Craven.  
Commander Henry H. Bell.  
Commander Samuel Phillips Lee.  
Commander Samuel Swartwout.  
Commander Melancton Smith.

- Commander Charles Stewart Boggs.  
Commander John De Camp.  
Commander James Alden.  
Commander David D. Porter.  
Commander Richard Wainwright.  
Commander William B. Renshaw.  
Lieutenant Commanding Abram D. Harrell.  
Lieutenant Commanding Edward Donaldson.  
Lieutenant Commanding George H. Preble.  
Lieutenant Commanding Edward T. Nichols.  
Lieutenant Commanding Jonathan M. Wainwright.  
Lieutenant Commanding John Guest.  
Lieutenant Commanding Charles H. B. Caldwell.  
Lieutenant Commanding Napoleon B. Harrison.  
Lieutenant Commanding Albert N. Smith.  
Lieutenant Commanding Pierce Crosby.  
Lieutenant Commanding George M. Ransom.  
Lieutenant Commanding Watson Smith.  
Lieutenant Commanding John H. Russell.  
Lieutenant Commanding Walter W. Queen.  
Lieutenant Commanding K. Randolph Breese.  
Acting Lieutenant Commanding Salem E. Woolworth.  
Acting Lieutenant Commanding Charles H. Baldwin.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON CITY, May 15, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan, Cumberland, Va.:*

Your long despatch of yesterday is just received. I will answer more fully soon. Will say now that all your despatches to the Secretary of War have been promptly shown to me. Have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. Hoped that the opening of James River and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to Richmond, or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still unwilling to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here.

A. LINCOLN.

REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT TO RESOLUTIONS OF  
THE EAST BALTIMORE METHODIST CONFERENCE  
[May 15?], 1862.REVS. I. A. GERE, A. A. REESE, D. D., G. D.  
CHENOWETH.

*Gentlemen:* Allow me to tender to you, and through you to the East Baltimore Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, my grateful thanks for the preamble and resolutions of that body, copies of which you did me the honor to present yesterday. These kind words of approval, coming from so numerous a body

of intelligent Christian people, and so free from all suspicion of sinister motives, are indeed encouraging to me. By the help of an all-wise Providence, I shall endeavor to do my duty, and I shall expect the continuance of your prayers for a right solution of our national difficulties and the restoration of our country to peace and prosperity.

Yours obliged and humble servant,

A. LINCOLN.

\*SPEECH TO THE 12TH INDIANA REGIMENT  
*From the New York "Evening Post," May 15,*  
*1862.*

*Soldiers of the Twelfth Indiana Regiment:*  
It has not been customary heretofore, nor will it be hereafter, for me to say something to every regiment passing in review. It occurs too frequently for me to have speeches ready on all occasions. As you have paid such a mark of respect to the Chief Magistrate, it appears that I should say a word or two in reply.

Your Colonel has thought fit, on his own account and in your name, to say that you are satisfied with the manner in which I have performed my part in the difficulties which have surrounded the nation. For your kind expressions I am extremely grateful, but, on the other hand, I assure you that the nation is more

indebted to you, and such as you, than to me. It is upon the brave hearts and strong arms of the people of the country that our reliance has been placed in support of free government and free institutions.

For the part which you and the brave army of which you are a part have, under Providence, performed in this great struggle, I tender more thanks—greatest thanks that can be possibly due—and especially to this regiment, which has been the subject of good report. The thanks of the nation will follow you, and may God's blessing rest upon you now and forever. I hope that upon your return to your homes you will find your friends and loved ones well and happy. I bid you farewell.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont, Franklin:* The President desires to know whether you design to move on to the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and break it between Newbern and Salem, according to the plan you proposed and he approved; and also whether, having reached and broken that road, you cannot move forward rapidly upon Richmond by that route; and by what time you can reach the railroad, and how

long it will take you from there to reach Richmond. Please answer immediately.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1862.

*Major-General McDowell:*

What is the strength of your force now actually with you?

A. LINCOLN.

MEMORANDUM, IN THE HANDWRITING OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN, OF HIS PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS OF ABOVE DATE TO GENERAL MCDOWELL, AND GENERAL MEIGS'S INDORSEMENT THEREON, May 17, 1862

You will retain the separate command of the forces taken with you; but while coöperating with General McClellan you will obey his orders, except that you are to judge, and are not to allow your force to be disposed otherwise than so as to give the greatest protection to this capital which may be possible from that distance.

[*Indorsement.*]

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

The President having shown this to me, I suggested that it is dangerous to direct a subordinate not to obey the orders of his superior in any case, and

that to give instructions to General McClellan to this same end and furnish General McDowell with a copy thereof would effect the object desired by the President. He desired me to say that the sketch of instructions to General McClellan herewith he thought made this addition unnecessary.

Respectfully,

M. C. M.

INDORSEMENT RELATING TO GENERAL DAVID  
HUNTER'S ORDER OF MILITARY EMANCIPA-  
TION, May 17, 1862

No commanding general shall do such a thing  
upon my responsibility without consulting me.

A. LINCOLN.

LETTER FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL  
McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1862. 2 P. M.

**G**ENERAL: Your despatch to the President, asking reinforcements, has been received and carefully considered.

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York rivers than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to coöperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.

It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey River.

In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men.

A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation.

At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to coöperate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise as as frequently as may be necessary for efficient coöperation. When General McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him by that route.

The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves forward.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## \*LETTER TO CHARLES L. FLINT

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Allow me to thank you very cordially for the copy of your work on "Insects Injurious to Vegetation" which you have had the kindness to send me, and believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

A. LINCOLN.

PROCLAMATION REVOKING GENERAL HUNTER'S  
ORDER OF MILITARY EMANCIPATION, May 19,  
1862

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA:

*A Proclamation.*

Whereas there appears in the public prints what purports to be a proclamation of Major-General Hunter, in the words and figures following, to wit:

(General Orders No. 11.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,

HILTON HEAD, PORT ROYAL, S. C., May 9, 1862.

The three States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, comprising the military department of the South, having deliberately declared themselves no longer under the protection of the United States of

America, and having taken up arms against the said United States, it became a military necessity to declare martial law. This was accordingly done on the 25th day of April, 1862. Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible; the persons in these three States — Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina — heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free.

By command of Major-General D. Hunter:

(*Official.*)

ED. W. SMITH,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

And whereas the same is producing some excitement and misunderstanding: therefore,

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and declare that the Government of the United States had no knowledge, information, or belief of an intention on the part of General Hunter to issue such a proclamation; nor has it yet any authentic information that the document is genuine. And further, that neither General Hunter, nor any other commander or person, has been authorized by the Government of the United States to make a proclamation declaring the slaves of any State free; and that the supposed proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether void so far as respects such a declaration.

I further make known that, whether it be competent for me, as commander-in-chief of the

army and navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether, at any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps. On the sixth day of March last, by special message, I recommended to Congress the adoption of a joint resolution, to be substantially as follows:

Resolved, That the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconvenience, public and private, produced by such change of system.

The resolution, in the language above quoted, was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the nation to the States and people most immediately interested in the subject-matter. To the people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue—I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs

of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partizan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of May, in the year of our [L. S.] Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

\*AUTOGRAPH LETTER TO LADY VILLIERS

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, May 20, 1862.

Mr. Lyon has informed me that Lady Villiers has expressed a wish for my autograph. I beg

that her Ladyship will accept the assurance of my sincere gratification at this opportunity of subscribing myself

Very truly,  
Her Ladyship's obedient servant,  
A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* I have just been waited on by a large committee who present a petition signed by twenty-three senators and eighty-four representatives asking me to restore General Hamilton to his division. I wish to do this, and yet I do not wish to be understood as rebuking you. Please answer at once.

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Your long despatch of yesterday just received. You will have just such control of General McDowell and his forces as you therein indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats, if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can reach you in five

days after starting, whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it.

A. LINCOLN, President United States.

INDORSEMENT ON LETTER OF G. MONTAGUE  
HICKS, May 22, 1862

This note, as Colonel Hicks did verbally yesterday, attempts to excite me against the Secretary of War, and therein is offensive to me. My "order," as he is pleased to call it, is plainly no order at all.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.  
May 22, 1862.

*To the House of Representatives:* In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 20th instant, requesting information in regard to the indemnity obtained by the consul-general of the United States at Alexandria, Egypt, for the maltreatment of Faris-El-Hakim, an agent in the employ of the American missionaries in that country, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, and the documents by which it was accompanied.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
May 23, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, in answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d instant, calling for further correspondence relative to Mexican affairs.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1862. 4 P. M.

*Major-General George B. McClellan:* In consequence of General Bank's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Frémont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear.

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1862.

*Major-General George B. McClellan:* I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our

line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under General Anderson now opposing General McDowell's advance have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the 21st.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL RUFUS SAXTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 1 P. M.

*General Saxton:* Geary reports Jackson with 20,000 moving from Ashby's Gap by the Little River turnpike, through Aldie, toward Centreville. This, he says, is reliable. He is also informed of large forces south of him. We know a force of some 15,000 broke up Saturday night from in front of Fredericksburg and went we know not where. Please inform us, if possible, what has become of the force which pursued Banks yesterday; also any other information you have.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO COLONEL D. S. MILES

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 1.30 P. M.

*Colonel Miles, Harper's Ferry, Virginia:*

Could you not send scouts from Winchester who would tell whether enemy are north of Banks, moving on Winchester? What is the latest you have?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 4 P. M.

*Major-General Frémont, Franklin:* You are authorized to purchase the 400 horses, or take them wherever or however you can get them.

The exposed condition of General Banks makes his immediate relief a point of paramount importance. You are therefore directed by the President to move against Jackson at Harrisonburg and operate against the enemy in such way as to relieve Banks. This movement must be made immediately. You will acknowledge the receipt of this order, and specify the hour it is received by you.

A. LINCOLN.

### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 7.15 P. M.

*Major-General Frémont, Franklin, Virginia:*

Many thanks for the promptness with which you have answered that you will execute the order. Much—perhaps all—depends upon the celerity with which you can execute it. Put the utmost speed into it. Do not lose a minute.

A. LINCOLN.

### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, near Corinth, Miss.:*

Several despatches from Assistant Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton asking reinforcements for you have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our

commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us, and General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated, and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 5 P. M.

*Major-General McDowell, Fredericksburg:*

General Frémont has been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson's and Ewell's forces.

You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line or in advance of the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in coöperation with General Frémont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation interferes

with his movements, it is believed that the force which you move will be sufficient to accomplish this object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively against General Banks, you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release him.

Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting with Ewell eight miles from Winchester.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 8 P. M.

*Major-General McDowell:* I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my order. The change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one.

Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL.

*Major-General McDowell, Falmouth:*

In view of the operations of the enemy on the line of General Banks, the President thinks the whole force you designed to move from Fredericksburg should not be taken away, and he therefore directs that one brigade in addition to what you designed to leave at Fredericksburg

should be left there: this brigade to be the least effective of your command.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862.

*Major-General Banks, Winchester:* In your despatch of this evening to the President, you say that you intend to return with your command to Strasburg. The question is suggested whether you will not by that movement expose your stores and trains at Winchester. The President desires, therefore, more detailed information than you have yet furnished respecting the force and position of the enemy in your neighborhood before you make a movement that will subject Winchester or Harper's Ferry to danger from sudden attack.

You will please report fully before moving.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, May 24, 1862

*To the Senate of the United States:* I transmit a report from the Secretary of State in answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 22d instant, calling for further correspondence relative to Mexican affairs. A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. W. GEARY

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 25, 1862. 4.15 P. M.

*General Geary, White Plains:* Please give us your best present impression as to the number of the enemy's forces north of Strasburg and Front Royal. Are the forces still moving north through the gap at Front Royal and between you and there?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862. 2 P. M.

*Major-General McClellan:* The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him—precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south—in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington.

Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN, President.

ORDER TAKING MILITARY POSSESSION OF RAIL-  
ROADS

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

Ordered: By virtue of the authority vested by act of Congress, the President takes military possession of all the railroads in the United States, from and after this date until further ordered, and directs that the respective railroad companies, their officers and servants, shall hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of such troops and munitions of war as may be ordered by the military authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.

By order of the Secretary of War:

M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-General.

## TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY CHASE

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

*Secretary Chase, Fredericksburg, Virginia:*

It now appears that Banks got safely into Winchester last night, and is this morning retreating on Harper's Ferry. This justifies the inference that he is pressed by numbers superior to his own. I think it not improbable that Ewell, Jackson, and Johnson are pouring through the gap they made day before yesterday at Front Royal, making a dash northward. It will be a very valuable and very honorable

service for General McDowell to cut them off. I hope he will put all possible energy and speed into the effort.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,

May 25, 1862. 4.15 P. M.

*General Saxton, Harper's Ferry:* If Banks reaches Martinsburg, is he any the better for it? Will not the enemy cut him from thence to Harper's Ferry? Have you sent anything to meet him and assist him at Martinsburg? This is an inquiry, not an order.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862. 6.50 P. M.

*General Saxton, Harper's Ferry:* One good six-gun battery, complete in its men and appointments, is now on its way to you from Baltimore. Eleven other guns, of different sorts, are on their way to you from here. Hope they will all reach you before morning.

As you have but 2,500 men at Harper's Ferry, where are the rest which were in that vicinity and which we have sent forward? Have any of them been cut off?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

*General Saxton, Harper's Ferry:* I fear you have mistaken me. I did not mean to question the correctness of your conduct; on the contrary, I approve what you have done. As the 2,500 reported by you seemed small to me, I feared some had got to Banks and been cut off with him. Please tell me the exact number you now have in hand.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

*(Sent in cipher.)*

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,

May 25, 1862. 8.30 P. M.

*Major-General McClellan:* Your despatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into

Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal, with 10,000, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks; also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, it will be all we can do to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. We have about 20,000 of McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and General Frémont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his force remains for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one yet at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our

reach, we should be utterly helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the force you have.

A. LINCOLN.



Abraham Lincoln and his Family  
*Reproduced from an Engraving by William  
Sartain.*



## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, May 26, 1862

**T**O the Senate and House of Representatives: The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was clandestinely prepared during the winter of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable provisional government at Montgomery, in Alabama, on the 18th day of February, 1861. On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter, which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation. Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction were stopped and the lines of telegraph cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces which had been called out by the government for the defense of Washington were prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no adequate and effective organiza-

tion for the public defense. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the government fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it with all its blessings for the present age and for posterity.

I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers, the heads of all the departments, to meet on Sunday, the 21st day of April, 1861, at the office of the Navy Department; and then and there, with their unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should proceed to sea, to afford protection to the commercial marine and especially the California treasure-ships then on their way to this coast. I also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to purchase, or charter, and arm as quickly as possible, five steamships for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase, or charter, and arm an equal number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York to purchase, or charter, and arm an equal number. I directed Commander Gillis to pur-

chase, or charter, and arm and put to sea two other vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore Du Pont, with a view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital. I directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid and efficient services in the matter of his Excellency Edwin D. Morgan, the Governor of New York, or, in his absence, George D. Morgan, William M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were, by my direction, especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to act for his department in that crisis, in matters pertaining to the forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense.

On the same occasion I directed that Governor Morgan and Alexander Cummings, of the city of New York, should be authorized by the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, to make all necessary arrangements for the transportation of troops and munitions of war, in aid and assistance of the officers of the army of the United States, until communication by mails and telegraph should be completely reëstablished between the cities of Washington and New York. No security was required to be given by them, and either of them was authorized to act in case of inability to consult with the other.

On the same occasion I authorized and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to advance, without requiring security, two millions of dollars of public money to John A. Dix, George Opdyke, and Richard M. Blatchford, of New York, to be used by them in meeting such requisitions as should be directly consequent upon the military and naval measures necessary for the defense and support of the government, requiring them only to act without compensation, and to report their transactions when duly called upon.

The several departments of the government at that time contained so large a number of disloyal persons that it would have been impossible to provide safely through official agents only for the performance of the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their ability, loyalty, and patriotism.

The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the seaboard cities, inland, across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio and the northern lakes. I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the public funds thus confided without authority

of law to unofficial persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such misdirection occurred to me as objections to those extraordinary proceedings, and were necessarily overruled.

I recall these transactions now because my attention has been directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of Representatives on the 30th day of last month, which is in these words:

Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, by investing Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money, and authority to purchase military supplies without restrictions, without requiring from him any guarantee for the faithful performance of his duties, when the services of competent public officers were available, and by involving the government in a vast number of contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly injurious to the public service, and deserves the censure of the House.

Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in justice if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is unanimously entertained by the heads of departments who participated in

the proceedings which the House of Representatives has censured. It is due to Mr. Cameron to say that, although he fully approved the proceedings, they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that not only the President but all the other heads of departments were at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed in the premises.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862. 12.40 A. M.

*Major-General McClellan:* We have General Banks's official report. He has saved his army and baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000.

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 26, 1862. 1 P. M.

*Major-General McDowell, Falmouth, Va.:*

Despatches from Geary just received have been sent you. Should not the remainder of your forces, except sufficient to hold the point at Fredericksburg, move this way—to Manassas Junction or Alexandria? As commander of this department, should you not be here? I ask these questions.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862.

*Major-General George B. McClellan:* Can you not cut the Aquia Creek Railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL J. B. RICKETTS

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 26, 1862.

*General Ricketts, Alexandria:* The President wishes your brigade to move at once to Manassas by railroad. General Wadsworth has gone to Alexandria to assist in forwarding.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FRÉMONT

May 27, 1862. 9.58 P. M.

*Major-General Frémont:* I see that you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1862.

*Governor Andrew, Boston:* The President

directs that the militia be relieved, and the enlistments made for three years, or during the war. This, I think, will practically not be longer than for a year. The latest intelligence from General Banks states that he has saved nearly his whole command with small loss. Concentrations of our force have been made, which it is hoped will capture the enemy.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont, Moorefield:*

The President directs you to halt at Moorefield and await orders, unless you hear of the enemy being in the general direction of Romney, in which case you will move upon him.

Acknowledge the receipt of this order, and the hour it is received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 1 P. M.

*General McDowell, Manassas Junction:*

General McClellan at 6.30 P. M. yesterday telegraphed that Fitz-John Porter's division had fought and driven 13,000 of the enemy, under

General Branch, from Hanover Court House, and was driving them from a stand they had made on the railroad at the time the messenger left. Two hours later he telegraphed that Stoneman had captured an engine and six cars on the Virginia Central, which he at once sent to communicate with F. J. Porter. Nothing further from McClellan.

If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads near Hanover Court House, consider whether your forces in front of Fredericksburg should not push through and join him.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:*

What of F. J. Porter's expedition? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 4 P. M.

*General McDowell, Manassas Junction:*

You say General Geary's scouts report that they find no enemy this side of the Blue Ridge. Neither do I. Have they been to the Blue Ridge looking for them?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 5.40 P. M.

*General McDowell, Manassas Junction:*

I think the evidence now preponderates that Ewell and Jackson are still about Winchester. Assuming this, it is for you a question of legs. Put in all the speed you can. I have told Frémont as much, and directed him to drive at them as fast as possible. By the way, I suppose you know Frémont has got up to Moorefield, instead of going to Harrisonburg. A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 8.40 P. M.

*Major-General McClellan:* I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory. Still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover

<sup>1</sup>The victory alluded to was the Battle of Hanover Court House. As Lincoln conjectured, the Confederate forces were not concentrating on Richmond, but "Stonewall" Jackson was preparing to attack General Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, a movement which threatened Washington.

Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000 left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont, Moorefield:* The following despatch has just been received from General Hamilton at Harper's Ferry:

HARPER'S FERRY, May 28.

HON. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

There is very little doubt that Jackson's force is between Winchester and Charlestown. His troops were too much fatigued to pursue Banks. A large body of rebel cavalry is near Charlestown now.

Jackson and Ewell were near Bunker Hill yesterday at noon. Of this last there is no doubt.

C. S. HAMILTON, Brigadier-General.

The above probably indicates the true position of the enemy at this time. The President directs you to move upon him by the best route you can.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 11 P. M.

*Major-General John G. Frémont, Moorefield:*

The order to remain at Moorefield was based on the supposition that it would find you there.

Upon subsequent information that the enemy were still operating in the vicinity of Winchester and Martinsburg, you were directed to move against the enemy.

The President now again directs you to move against the enemy without delay.

Please acknowledge the receipt of this, and the time received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 10 A. M.

*General R. B. Marcy:* Yours just received. I think it cannot be certainly known whether the force which fought General Porter is the same which recently confronted McDowell. Another item of evidence bearing on it is that General Branch commanded against Porter, while it

was General Anderson who was in front of McDowell. He and McDowell were in correspondence about prisoners.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

May 29, 1862. 10:30 A.M.

*Major-General McClellan:* I think we shall be able within three days to tell you certainly whether any considerable force of the enemy—Jackson or any one else—is moving on to Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected development into your calculations.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 12 M.

*Major-General Banks, Williamsport, Md.:*

General McDowell's advance should, and probably will, be at or near Front Royal at twelve (noon) to-morrow. General Frémont will be at or near Strasburg as soon. Please watch the enemy closely, and follow and harrass and detain him if he attempts to retire. I mean this for General Saxton's force as well as that immediately with you.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 12 M.

*Major-General Frémont, Moorefield, Virginia:*

General McDowell's advance, if not checked by the enemy, should, and probably will, be at Front Royal by twelve (noon) to-morrow. His force, when up, will be about 20,000. Please have your force at Strasburg, or if the route you are moving on does not lead to that point, as near Strasburg as the enemy may be by the same time. Your despatch No. 30 received and satisfactory.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 12 M.

*Major-General McDowell, Manassas Junction:*

General Frémont's force should, and probably will, be at or near Strasburg by twelve (noon) to-morrow. Try to have your force, or the advance of it, at Front Royal as soon.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 1.20 P. M.

*General R. B. Marcy:* Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and

Fredericksburg Railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10 A. M.

*Major-General McDowell, Manassas Junction:*

I somewhat apprehend that Frémont's force, in its present condition, may not be quite strong enough in case it comes in collision with the enemy. For this additional reason I wish you to push forward your column as rapidly as possible. Tell me what number your force reaching Front Royal will amount to.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10.15 A. M.

*Major-General Banks, Williamsport, Md.:*

If the enemy in force is in or about Martinsburg, Charlestown, and Winchester, or any or all of them, he may come in collision with Frémont, in which case I am anxious that your force, with you and at Harper's Ferry, should so operate as to assist Frémont if possible; the same if the enemy should engage McDowell. This was the meaning of my despatch yesterday.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 11.30 A. M.

*Major General Frémont, Moorefield, Virginia:*

Yours of this morning from Moorefield just received. There cannot be more than 20,000, probably not more than 15,000, of the enemy at or about Winchester. Where is your force? It ought this minute to be near Strasburg.

Answer at once.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 12.40.

*Major-General McDowell, Rectorstown:*

Your despatch of to-day received and is satisfactory. Frémont has nominally 22,000, really about 17,000. Blenker's division is part of it. I have a despatch from Frémont this morning, not telling me where he is; but he says:

Scouts and men from Winchester represent Jackson's force variously at 30,000 to 60,000. With him Generals Ewell and Longstreet.

The high figures erroneous, of course.

Do you know where Longstreet is? Corinth is evacuated and occupied by us.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

May 30, 1862. 2.30 P. M.

*Major-General Frémont, Moorefield, Virginia:*

Yours, saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity at 5 p. m. Saturday, has been received and sent to General McDowell, and he directed to act in view of it. You must be up to time you promised, if possible.

Corinth was evacuated last night, and is occupied by our troops to-day; the enemy gone south to Okolona, on the railroad to Mobile.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

May 30, 1862. 2.30 P. M.

*Major-General McDowell:* Herewith I send a telegram just received from General Frémont.

The despatch is dated of last night, and the point he says he will be at five o'clock Saturday afternoon is "Strasburg, or as near it as it may be to the enemy at that time."

I direct Frémont to come to time as fixed by himself, and you will act your discretion, taking this information into your calculation.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 30, 1862. 9:30 P. M.

*Major-General McDowell, Rectorstown, Va.:*

I send you a despatch just received from Saxton at Harper's Ferry:

The rebels are in line of battle in front of our lines. They have nine pieces of artillery, and in position, and cavalry. I shelled the woods in which they were, and they in return threw a large number of shells into the lines and tents from which I moved last night to take up a stronger position. I expect a great deal from the battery on the mountain, having there 9-inch Dahlgren bearing directly on the enemy's approaches. The enemy appeared this morning and then retired, with the intention of drawing us on. I shall act on the defensive, as my position is a strong one. In a skirmish which took place this afternoon I took one horse. The enemy lost two men killed and seven wounded.

R. SAXTON, Brigadier-General.

It seems the game is before you. Have sent a copy to General Frémont. A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. A. MCCALL

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862. 3:35.

*Brigadier-General McCall, Fredericksburg:*

Are you about to withdraw from Fredericksburg; and if so, why, and by whose orders?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862. 10.20 P. M.

*Major-General McClellan:*

**A** CIRCLE whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front Royal, and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little northeast of Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of Jackson, Ewell, and Edward Johnson. Quite certainly they were within it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry at dark last evening, and are still in sight this morning. Shields, with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 a. m. yesterday, with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, 150 of the enemy, two locomotives, and eleven cars, some other property and stores, and saved the bridge.

General Frémont, from the direction of Moorefield, promises to be at or near Strasburg at 5 p. m. to-day. General Banks at Williamsport, with his old force and his new force at Harper's Ferry, is directed to coöperate. Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an additional force of the enemy, supposed to be An-

der's, having entered the valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true. Corinth is certainly in the hands of General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL G. A. MCCALL

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862.

*General McCall:* The President directs me to say to you that there can be nothing to justify a panic at Fredericksburg. He expects you to maintain your position there as becomes a soldier and a general.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., June 1, 1862. 9.30.

*Major-General McClellan:* You are probably engaged with the enemy. I suppose he made the attack. Stand well on your guard, hold all your ground, or yield any only inch by inch and in good order. This morning we merge General Wool's department into yours, giving you command of the whole, and sending General Dix to Fort Monroe and General Wool to Fort McHenry.

We also send General Sigel to report to you for duty.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., June 1, 1862. 1.15 P. M.

*Major-General McClellan:* You are already notified that General Sigel is to report to you for duty. I suggest (do not order) that he have command of such of the forces about Fort Monroe, Norfolk, Newport News, etc., as you may see fit to put into active service, or such other command as may be suitable to his rank.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,

June 1, 1862. 5 P. M.

*Major-General McClellan:* Thanks for what you could and did say in your despatch of noon to-day to the Secretary of War. If the enemy shall not have renewed the attack this afternoon, I think the hardest of your work is done.

Shields's advance came in collision with part of the enemy yesterday evening, six miles from Front Royal, in a direction between Winchester and Strasburg, driving them back, capturing a few prisoners and one rifled cannon. Firing in that direction to-day, heard both from Harper's Ferry and Front Royal, indicates a probability that Frémont has met the enemy.

We have concluded to send General Sigel to Harper's Ferry, so that what I telegraphed you about him this morning is revoked. Dix goes to Fort Monroe to-night.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1862.

*Major-General Banks, Williamsport:* Major-General Sigel has been assigned to command of the troops at Harper's Ferry, numbering about 10,000, and directed to report to you. That force has been added to your command, and it will receive further additions. Immediately on his arrival at Harper's Ferry—for which place he will start this evening—the President desires you to assume actively the offensive against the retreating enemy without the loss of an hour. You will please communicate with General Sigel as speedily as possible. You will, of course, see that Harper's Ferry is left secure.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy—so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it.

A. LINCOLN, President.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862. 6.15 P. M.

*Major-General McDowell, Front Royal, Va.:*

Anxious to know whether Shields can head or flank Jackson. Please tell about where Shields and Jackson, respectively, are at the time this reaches you.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECRETARY TO JUDGE-ADVOCATE LEE

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

*Dear Sir:* The President directs me to say that the rules of law stated in your within letter are correct and approved by him, and that he desires them to be followed. The order in Captain Cothran's case, mentioned in your letter, was evidently an oversight, and is not to be regarded as a precedent. Yours truly,

JNO. G. NICOLAY, Private Secretary.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
June 4, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* I transmit herewith a report of the Secretary of War in answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 2d of June, in relation to the

authority and action of the Hon. Edward Stanley, military governor of North Carolina.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth:* Your despatch of to-day to Secretary of War received. Thanks for the good news it brings. Have you anything from Memphis or other parts of the Mississippi River? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

(*Cipher.*)

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

*Hon. Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee:*

Do you really wish to have control of the question of releasing rebel prisoners so far as they may be Tennesseans? If you do, please tell us so. Your answer not to be made public.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL I. MCDOWELL

(*Cipher.*)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1862.

*Major-General McDowell:* The President directs that McCall's division be sent by water

to General McClellan immediately, and that you place such force at Fredericksburg by the time McCall leaves there as may, in your judgment, be necessary to hold that place. In respect to the operations of the residue of your force, the President reserves directions, to be given as soon as he determines.

Transportation has been ordered up the Rappahannock from here and from Fortress Monroe. Adjutant-General shall issue the order.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1862.

*Governor Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee:*

The President has received your two despatches of the 5th instant. He approves your proceedings of reprisal against the secessionists.

In regard to the release of the rebel prisoners, he holds the question as to the time when executive clemency shall be exercised under consideration. It has always been the design of the government to leave the exercise of that clemency to your judgment and discretion whenever the period arrives that it can properly be exercised.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi:*

We are changing one of the departmental lines, so as to give you all of Kentucky and Tennessee. In your movement upon Chattanooga I think it probable that you include some combination of the force near Cumberland Gap under General Morgan. Do you?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

*Major-General Banks, Winchester:* We are arranging a general plan for the valley of the Shenandoah, and in accordance with this you will move your main force to the Shenandoah at or opposite Front Royal as soon as possible.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont:* Halt at Harrisonburg, pursuing Jackson no farther. Get your force well in hand and stand on the defensive, guarding against a movement of the enemy either back toward Strasburg or toward Franklin, and await further orders, which will soon be sent you.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

*(Cipher.)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

*Hon. Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee:*

Your despatch about seizing seventy rebels to exchange for a like number of Union men was duly received. I certainly do not disapprove the proposition.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

*Major-General Burnside, Fortress Monroe:*

Your despatch in relation to the gunboats has been laid before the President. He has directed the *Hunchback* and *Perry* to remain where they are, and that Goldsborough's order for their removal be countermanded. This I understand to be satisfactory to you. I should be glad to have a detailed statement of your force and its position.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, June 10, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*  
I transmit to Congress a copy of a treaty for the suppression of the African slave-trade, between

the United States and her Britannic Majesty, signed in this city on the 7th of April last, and the ratifications of which were exchanged at London on the 20th ultimo.

A copy of the correspondence which preceded the conclusion of the instrument, between the Secretary of State and Lord Lyons, her Britannic Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, is also herewith transmitted.

It is desirable that such legislation as may be necessary to carry the treaty into effect should be enacted as soon as may comport with the convenience of Congress.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862. 11 A. M.

*Major-General Frémont:* Your despatch of yesterday to the President has just been received.

He directs me to say that Mount Jackson will serve the purpose he had in view as well as Harrisonburg, except that it does not so well guard against the enemy's operations toward western Virginia. But if, in view of all the circumstances, you prefer the position of Mount Jackson, you will occupy it instead of Harrisonburg.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
June 12, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* In obedience to the resolution of your honorable body of the 9th instant, requesting certain information in regard to the circuit court of the United States for the State of California, and the judge of said court, I have the honor to transmit a letter of the Attorney-General, with copies of two other letters, and of an indorsement of my own upon one of them, all which, taken together, contain all the information within my power to give upon the subject. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL F. SIGEL

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862.

*Major-General Sigel, Winchester:* Your despatches of yesterday and to-day were received. It cannot be possible that Jackson has any such reinforcement as thirty or thirty-five thousand.

McClellan telegraphs that two regiments of reinforcements were sent from Richmond to Jackson.

What necessity can there be for General Banks to fall back from Front Royal and his positions until Frémont comes up?

Does it not leave a gap for Jackson to pass through Front Royal as before?

The President directs that your forces and Banks's shall not fall back from Front Royal and their present positions until further developments.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

#### LETTER TO GENERAL FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont:* Accounts, which we do not credit, represent that Jackson is largely reinforced and turning upon you. Get your forces well in hand and keep us well and frequently advised; and if you find yourself really pressed by a superior force of the enemy, fall back cautiously toward or to Winchester, and we will have in due time Banks in position to sustain you. Do not fall back upon Harrisonburg unless upon tolerably clear necessity. We understand Jackson is on the other side of the Shenandoah from you, and hence cannot in any event press you into any necessity of a precipitate withdrawal.

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. Yours, preferring Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, is just received. On this point use your discretion, remembering that our object is to give such protection as you can to

western Virginia. Many thanks to yourself, officers, and men for the gallant battle of last Sunday.

A. L.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
June 13, 1862

*Fellow-citizens of the House of Representatives:* I herewith transmit a memorial addressed and presented to me in behalf of the State of New York, in favor of enlarging the locks of the Erie and Oswego canals. While I have not given, nor have leisure to give, the subject a careful examination, its great importance is obvious and unquestionable. The large amount of valuable statistical information which is collated and presented in the memorial will greatly facilitate the mature consideration of the subject, which I respectfully ask for it at your hands.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

LETTER TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont:* We cannot afford to keep your force and Banks's and McDowell's engaged in keeping Jackson south of Strasburg and Front Royal. You fought Jackson alone and worsted him. He can have no substantial reinforcements so long as a battle is pending at Richmond. Surely you and Banks in support-

ing distance are capable of keeping him from returning to Winchester. But if Sigel be sent forward to you, and McDowell (as he must) be put to other work, Jackson will break through at Front Royal again. He is already on the right side of the Shenandoah to do it, and on the wrong side of it to attack you. The orders already sent you and Banks place you and him in the proper positions for the work assigned you. Jackson cannot move his whole force on either of you before the other can learn of it and go to his assistance. He cannot divide his force, sending part against each of you, because he will be too weak for either. Please do as I directed in the order of the 8th and my despatch of yesterday, the 12th, and neither you nor Banks will be overwhelmed by Jackson. By proper scout lookouts, and beacons of smoke by day and fires by night, you can always have timely notice of the enemy's approach. I know not as to you, but by some this has been too much neglected.

A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 15, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* The night between your two late battles of Saturday and Sunday I went earnestly to work to find a way of putting General Wool's force under your control without

wounding any one's feelings. But, after all, General Dix was a little hurt at being taken from an independent command and put in a dependent one. I could not help this without giving up the principal object of the move. So soon as you can (which I do not expect is yet), I wish you to give me the benefit of your suggestions as to how an independent command can be given him without detriment. The Secretary of War has turned over to me your despatch about sending McDowell to you by water instead of by land. I now fear he cannot get to you either way in time. Shields's division has got so terribly out of shape, out at elbows, and out at toes, that it will require a long time to get it in again. I expect to see McDowell within a day or two, when I will again talk with him about the mode of moving. McCall's division has nearly or quite reached you by now. This, with what you get from General Wool's old command, and the new regiments sent you, must give you an increase since the late battles of over twenty thousand. Doubtless the battles and other causes have decreased you half as much in the same time; but then the enemy have lost as many in the same way. I believe I would come and see you were it not that I fear my presence might divert you and the army from more important matters. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 15, 1862.

**M**Y DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 12th by Colonel Zagonyi is just received. In answer to the principal part of it, I repeat the substance of an order of the 8th and one or two telegraphic despatches sent you since.

We have no indefinite power of sending reinforcements; so that we are compelled rather to consider the proper disposal of the forces we have than of those we could wish to have. We may be able to send you some dribs by degrees, but I do not believe we can do more. As you alone beat Jackson last Sunday, I argue that you are stronger than he is to-day, unless he has been reinforced; and that he cannot have been materially reinforced, because such reinforcement could only have come from Richmond, and he is much more likely to go to Richmond than Richmond is to come to him. Neither is very likely. I think Jackson's game—his assigned work—now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his

own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond three or four times as much as if he were there. Our game is not to allow this. Accordingly, by the order of the 8th, I directed you to halt at Harrisonburg, rest your force, and get it well in hand, the objects being to guard against Jackson's returning by the same route to the upper Potomac, over which you have just driven him out, and at the same time give some protection against a raid into West Virginia. Already I have given you discretion to occupy Mount Jackson instead, if, on full consideration, you think best. I do not believe Jackson will attack you, but certainly he cannot attack you by surprise; and if he comes upon you in superior force, you have but to notify us, fall back cautiously, and Banks will join you in due time. But while we know not whether Jackson will move at all, or by what route, we cannot safely put you and Banks both on the Strasburg line, and leave no force on the Front Royal line—the very line upon which he prosecuted his late raid. The true policy is to place one of you on one line and the other on the other, in such positions that you can unite once you actually find Jackson moving upon it. And this is precisely what we are doing. This protects that part of our frontier, so to speak, and liberates McDowell to go to the assistance of McClellan.

I have arranged this, and am very unwilling to have it deranged. While you have only asked for Sigel, I have spoken only of Banks, and this because Sigel's force is now the principal part of Banks's force. About transferring General Schenck's command, the purchase of supplies, and the promotion and appointment of officers, mentioned in your letter, I will consult with the Secretary of War to-morrow. A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont, Mount Jackson, Va.:*

Your despatch of yesterday, reminding me of a supposed understanding that I would furnish you a corps of 35,000 men, and asking of me the "fulfilment of this understanding," is received. I am ready to come to a fair settlement of accounts with you on the fulfilment of understandings.

Early in March last, when I assigned you to the command of the Mountain Department, I did tell you I would give you all the force I could, and that I hoped to make it reach 35,000. You at the same time told me that within a reasonable time you would seize the railroad at or east of Knoxville, Tenn., if you could. There was then in the department a force supposed to be 25,000, the exact number as well known to

you as to me. After looking about two or three days, you called and distinctly told me that if I would add the Blenker division to the force already in the department, you would undertake the job. The Blenker division contained 10,000, and at the expense of great dissatisfaction to General McClellan I took it from his army and gave it to you. My promise was literally fulfilled. I have given you all I could, and I have given you very nearly, if not quite, 35,000.

Now for yours. On the 23d of May, largely over two months afterward, you were at Franklin, Va., not within 300 miles of Knoxville, nor within 80 miles of any part of the railroad east of it, and not moving forward, but telegraphing here that you could not move for lack of everything. Now, do not misunderstand me. I do not say you have not done all you could. I presume you met unexpected difficulties; and I beg you to believe that as surely as you have done your best, so have I. I have not the power now to fill up your corps to 35,000. I am not demanding of you to do the work of 35,000. I am only asking of you to stand cautiously on the defensive, get your force in order, and give such protection as you can to the valley of the Shenandoah and to western Virginia. Have you received orders, and will you act upon them?

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GENERAL C. SCHURZ

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862.

*Brigadier-General Schurz, Mount Jackson, Va.:*

Your long letter is received. The information you give is valuable. You say it is fortunate that Frémont did not intercept Jackson; that Jackson had the superior force, and would have overwhelmed him. If this is so, how happened it that Frémont fairly fought and routed him on the 8th? Or is the account that he did fight and route him false and fabricated? Both General Frémont and you speak of Jackson having beaten Shields. By our accounts he did not beat Shields. He had no engagement with Shields. He did meet and drive back with disaster about 2,000 of Shields's advance till they were met by an additional brigade of Shields's, when Jackson himself turned and retreated. Shields himself and more than half his force were not nearer than twenty miles to any of it.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
June 17, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* The resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, asking whether any legislation is necessary in order to give effect to the provisions

of the Act of April 16, 1862, providing for the reorganization of the medical department of the army, was referred to the Secretary of War, whose report thereon is hereby communicated.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL F. SIGEL

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1862.

*General Sigel, Winchester:* The forces at Front Royal are there by order of the President. When he desires their position to be changed, the order will be given by him.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL J. C. FRÉMONT

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1862.

*Major-General Frémont, Mount Jackson:* It is reported here that you understand the President's order to you as requiring you to remain at Mount Jackson. The President directs me to say that he does wish you to hold your position at Mount Jackson if you can safely do so; but, if pressed beyond your strength, that you will then fall back toward Strasburg, for support from General Banks. General Banks is now here, and will see you immediately upon his return to his command.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Miss.:*

It would be of both interest and value to us here to know how the expedition toward East Tennessee is progressing, if in your judgment you can give us the information with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 18, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been reinforced by about 10,000 from Richmond, is corroborated by a despatch from General King at Fredericksburg, saying a Frenchman, just arrived from Richmond, by way of Gordonsville, met 10,000 to 15,000 passing through the latter place to join Jackson.

If this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you think you can inform me with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Yours of last night just received, and for which I thank you.

If large reinforcements are going from Richmond to Jackson, it proves one of two things: either that they are very strong at Richmond, or do not mean to defend the place desperately.

On reflection, I do not see how reinforcements from Richmond to Jackson could be in Gordonsville, as reported by the Frenchman and your deserters. Have not all been sent to deceive?

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON CITY, June 20, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* We have this morning sent you a despatch of General Sigel corroborative of the proposition that Jackson is being reinforced from Richmond. This may be reality, and yet may only be contrivance for deception, and to determine which is perplexing. If we knew it was not true, we could send you some more force; but as the case stands we do not think we safely can. Still, we will watch the signs and do so if possible.

In regard to a contemplated execution of Captains Spriggs and Triplett the government has no information whatever, but will inquire and advise you.

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862. 6 P. M.

*Major-General George B. McClellan:* Your despatch of yesterday (2 P. M.) was received this morning. If it would not divert too much

of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I cannot well leave here.

A. LINCOLN, President.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1862.

*Major-General Banks, Middletown:* I am very glad you are looking well to the west for a movement of the enemy in that direction. You know my anxiety on that point. All was quiet at General McClellan's headquarters at two o'clock to-day.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, June 23, 1862

*To the Senate of the United States:* The bill

which has passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal that part of an Act of Congress which prohibits the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination than five dollars in the District of Columbia," has received my attentive consideration, and I now return it to the Senate, in which it originated, with the following objections:

1. The bill proposes to repeal the existing legislation prohibiting the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination than five dollars within the District of Columbia, without permitting the issuing of such bills by banks not now legally authorized to issue them. In my judgment, it will be found impracticable, in the present condition of the currency, to make such a discrimination. The banks have generally suspended specie payments; and a legal sanction given to the circulation of the irredeemable notes of one class of them will almost certainly be so extended, in practical operation, as to include those of all classes, whether authorized or unauthorized. If this view be correct, the currency of the District, should this act become a law, will certainly and greatly deteriorate, to the serious injury of honest trade and honest labor.

2. This bill seems to contemplate no end which cannot be otherwise more certainly and

beneficially attained. During the existing war it is peculiarly the duty of the National Government to secure to the people a sound circulating medium. This duty has been, under existing circumstances, satisfactorily performed, in part at least, by authorizing the issue of United States notes, receivable for all government dues except customs, and made a legal tender for all debts, public and private, except interest on public debt. The object of the bill submitted to me—namely, that of providing a small note currency during the present suspension—can be fully accomplished by authorizing the issue—as part of any new emission of United States notes made necessary by the circumstances of the country—of notes of a similar character, but of less denomination, than five dollars. Such an issue would answer all the beneficial purposes of the bill, would save a considerable amount to the treasury in interest, would greatly facilitate payments to soldiers and other creditors of small sums, and would furnish to the people a currency as safe as their own government.

Entertaining these objections to the bill, I feel myself constrained to withhold from it my approval, and return it for the further consideration and action of Congress.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## LETTER FROM GENERAL SCOTT TO THE PRESIDENT

WEST POINT, June 24, 1862.

The President, having stated to me, orally, the present numbers and positions of our forces in front of the rebel armies south and southwest of the Potomac, has done me the honor to ask my views in writing as to the further dispositions now to be made of the former, and particularly of the army under McDowell, toward the suppression of the rebellion.

Premising that, although the statements of the President were quite full and most distinct and lucid, yet from my distance from the scenes of operations, and not having recently followed them up with closeness, many details are still wanting to give professional value to my suggestions, I shall, nevertheless, with great deference proceed to offer such as most readily occur to me, each of which has been anticipated by the President.

I consider the numbers and positions of Frémont and Banks adequate to the protection of Washington against any force the enemy can bring by the way of the upper Potomac, and the troops at Manassas Junction, with the garrisons of the forts on the Potomac and of Washington, equally adequate to its protection on the south.

The force at Fredericksburg seems entirely out of position, and it cannot be called up directly and in time by McClellan, from the want of railroad transportation, or an adequate supply train moved by animals. If, however, there be a sufficient number of vessels at hand, that force might reach the head of York River, by water, in time to aid in the operations against Richmond; or, in the very improbable case of disaster there, to serve as a valuable reinforcement to McClellan. The defeat of the rebels at Richmond, or their forced retreat thence, combined with our previous victories, would be a virtual end of the rebellion, and soon restore entire Virginia to the Union.

The remaining important points to be occupied by us are Mobile, Charleston, Chattanooga. These must soon come into our hands.

McDowell's force at Manassas might be ordered to Richmond by the Potomac and York rivers, and be replaced at Manassas by King's brigade, if there be adequate transports at or near Alexandria. Most respectfully submitted,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair,

ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying. The later one of 6.15 P. M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better toward York River than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

#### ORDER CONSTITUTING THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 26, 1862.

Ordered—1st. The forces under Major-Generals Frémont, Banks, and McDowell, including the troops now under Brigadier-General Sturgis at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the Army of Virginia.

2d. The command of the Army of Virginia

is specially assigned to Major-General John Pope, as commanding general. The troops of the Mountain Department, heretofore under command of General Frémont, shall constitute the First Army Corps, under the command of General Frémont; the troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under General Banks, shall constitute the Second Army Corps, and be commanded by him; the troops under the command of General McDowell, except those within the fortifications and city of Washington, shall form the Third Army Corps, and be under his command.

3d. The Army of Virginia shall operate in such manner as, while protecting western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond.

4th. When the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia shall be in position to communicate and directly coöperate at or before Richmond, the chief command, while so operating together, shall be governed, as in like cases, by the Rules and Articles of War.

A. LINCOLN.



# Fold-out Placeholder

This fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date.



# Fold-out Placeholder

This fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at  
future date.

## LETTER TO JOHN W. CRISFIELD

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

**M**Y DEAR SIR: I have been considering the appeal made by yourself and Senator Pearce in behalf of Judge Carmichael. His charge to the Grand Jury was left with me by the senator, and on reading it I must confess I was not very favorably impressed toward the judge. The object of the charge, I understand, was to procure prosecution and punishment of some men for arresting or doing violence to some secessionists—that is, the judge was trying to help a little by giving the protection of law to those who were endeavoring to overthrow the supreme law—trying if he could find a safe place for certain men to stand on the Constitution, whilst they should stab it in another place.

But possibly I am mistaken.

The Secretary of War and I have agreed that if the judge will take the oath of allegiance usually taken in such cases, he may be discharged. Please ascertain and inform me whether he will do it. Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO  
GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck:* The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you immediately to detach 25,000 of your force and forward it by the nearest and quickest route by way of Baltimore and Washington to Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio River. But in detaching your force the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are left to your own judgment. The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday, the full extent of which is not yet known. You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch, stating the day and hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so that we may take measures to aid in river and railroad transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.

*General Burnside:* I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to General McClellan.

A. LINCOLN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.

*Major-General Burnside, Newbern:* We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in large force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We are not advised of his exact condition, but the President directs that you shall send him all the reinforcements from your command to the James River that you can safely do without abandoning your own position. Let it be infantry entirely, as he said yesterday that he had cavalry enough.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN<sup>1</sup>

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast

<sup>1</sup> McClellan had planned to make an advance June 26th, but on that day was attacked by Lee. McDowell had been detained to defend Washington, and Banks had been driven out of the Shenandoah. McClellan was thus cut off from his base on York River. He set out to establish a new one on the James River and after six days' hard fighting won the victory of Malvern Hill, July 1st. Military critics agree that McClellan's retreat from Richmond was brilliant in the extreme.

as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things.

A. LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO SECRETARY SEWARD

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows:

The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In

fact there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly. Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.

*General Dix:* Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you can. Report to me.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1862.

*Flag-Officer Goldsborough, Fort Monroe:* Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House, and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or near that place. McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there.

A. LINCOLN.

## \*TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR MORTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.

*Governor O. P. Morton, Indianapolis, Ind.:* Your dispatch of to-day is just received. I have no recollection of either John R. Cravens, or Cyrus M. Allen, having been named to me for appointment under the tax law. The latter par-

ticularly has been my friend, and I am sorry to learn that he is not yours. No appointment has been or will be made by me for the purpose of stabbing you.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 29, 1862. 6 P. M.

*Hon. William H. Seward, Astor House, N. Y.:*

Not much more than when you left. Fulton of "Baltimore American" is now with us. He left White House at 11 A. M. yesterday. He conversed fully with a paymaster who was with Porter's force during the fight of Friday and fell back to nearer McClellan's quarters just a little sooner than Porter did, seeing the whole of it; stayed on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy over night, and left for White House at 5 A. M. Saturday. He says Porter retired in perfect order under protection of the guns arranged for the purpose, under orders and not from necessity; and with all other of our forces, except what was left on purpose to go to White House, was safely in pontoons over the Chickahominy before morning, and that there was heavy firing on the Richmond side, begun at five and ceased at 7 A. M. Saturday. On the whole, I think we have had the better of it up to that point of time. What has happened since we still know not, as we have no communication

with General McClellan. A despatch from Colonel Ingalls shows that he thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at Richmond to-day, and will be to-morrow. We have no means of knowing upon what Colonel Ingalls founds his opinion. All confirmed about saving all property. Not a single unwounded straggler came back to White House from the field, and the number of wounded reaching there up to 11 A. M. Saturday was not large.

A. LINCOLN.

To what the President has above stated I will only add one or two points that may be satisfactory for you to know.

First. All the sick and wounded were safely removed from White House; not a man left behind.

Second. A despatch from Burnside shows that he is in condition to afford efficient support, and is probably doing so.

Third. The despatch from Colonel Ingalls impresses me with the conviction that the movement was made by General McClellan to concentrate on Richmond, and was successful to the latest point of which we have any information.

Fourth. Mr. Fulton says that on Friday night, between twelve and one o'clock, General McClellan telegraphed Commodore Goldsborough that the result of the movement was satisfactory to him.

Fifth. From these and the facts stated by the

President, my inference is that General McClellan will probably be in Richmond within two days.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

### TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 30, 1862.

*Hon. Wm. H. Seward, New York:* We are yet without communication with General McClellan, and this absence of news is our point of anxiety. Up to the latest point to which we are posted, he effected everything in such exact accordance with his plan, contingently announced to us before the battle began, that we feel justified to hope that he has not failed since. He had a severe engagement in getting the part of his army on this side of the Chickahominy over to the other side, in which the enemy lost certainly as much as we did. We are not dissatisfied with this, only that the loss of enemies does not compensate for the loss of friends. The enemy cannot come below White House; certainly is not there now, and probably has abandoned the whole line. Dix's pickets are at New Kent Court House.

A. LINCOLN.

### CALL FOR TROOPS

NEW YORK, June 30, 1862.

*To the Governors of the several States:* The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth

by the national forces has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and about Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible delay; in fact, there will soon be no formidable insurgent force except at Richmond. With so large an army there, the enemy can threaten us on the Potomac and elsewhere. Until we have reëstablished the national authority, all these places must be held, and we must keep a respectable force in front of Washington. But this, from the diminished strength of our army by sickness and casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with energy and success. Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object stated, we require, without delay, 150,000 men, including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus reinforced, our gallant army will be enabled to realize the hopes and expectations of the government and the people.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 30, 1862.

*Major-General Dix, Fort Monroe:* Is it not

probable the enemy have abandoned the line between White House and McClellan's rear? He could have but little object to maintain it, and nothing to subsist upon. Would not Stoneman better move up and see about it? I think a telegraphic communication can at once be opened to White House from Williamsburg. The wires must be up still.           A. LINCOLN.

### TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

June 30, 1862. 3 P. M.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth:* Your telegram of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition must not on any account be given up. The President regards that and the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important movements of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the capture of Richmond. He is not pleased with the tardiness of the movement toward Chattanooga, and directs that no force be sent here if you cannot do it without breaking up the operations against that point and East Tennessee. Infantry only are needed; our cavalry and artillery are strong enough. The first reports from Richmond were more discouraging than the truth warranted. If the advantage is not on our side, it is balanced. General McClellan has moved his whole force

on the line of the James River, and is supported there by our gunboats; but he must be largely strengthened before advancing, and hence the call on you, which I am glad you answered so promptly. Let me know to what point on the river you will send your forces, so as to provide immediately for transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

June 30, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Miss.:*  
 Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry; no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.

A. LINCOLN.

July 1, 1862.—CALL FOR 300,000 VOLUNTEERS

June 28, 1862.

The undersigned, governors of States of the Union, impressed with the belief that the citizens of the States which they respectively represent are of one accord in the hearty desire that the recent successes of the Federal arms may be followed up by measures which must insure the speedy restoration of the

Union, and believing that, in view of the present state of the important military movements now in progress, and the reduced condition of our effective forces in the field, resulting from the usual and unavoidable casualties in the service, the time has arrived for prompt and vigorous measures to be adopted by the people in support of the great interests committed to your charge, respectfully request, if it meets with your entire approval, that you at once call upon the several States for such number of men as may be required to fill up all military organizations now in the field, and add to the armies heretofore organized such additional number of men as may, in your judgment, be necessary to garrison and hold all the numerous cities and military positions that have been captured by our armies, and to speedily crush the rebellion that still exists in several of the Southern States, thus practically restoring to the civilized world our great and good government. All believe that the decisive moment is near at hand, and to that end the people of the United States are desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all reinforcements that you may deem needful to sustain our government.

ISRAEL WASHBURN, JR., Governor of Maine.

H. S. BERRY, Governor of New Hampshire.

FREDERICK HOLBROOK, Governor of Vermont.

WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, Governor of Connecticut.

E. D. MORGAN, Governor of New York.

CHARLES S. OLDEN, Governor of New Jersey.

A. G. CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania.

A. W. BRADFORD, Governor of Maryland.

F. H. PIERPOINT, Governor of Virginia.

AUSTIN BLAIR, Governor of Michigan.

J. B. TEMPLE, President Military Board of Kentucky.

ANDREW JOHNSON, Governor of Tennessee.

H. R. GAMBLE, Governor of Missouri.

O. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana.

DAVID TODD, Governor of Ohio.

ALEXANDER RAMSEY, Governor of Minnesota.

RICHARD YATES, Governor of Illinois.

EDWARD SALOMON, Governor of Wisconsin.

#### THE PRESIDENT.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862.

*Gentlemen:* Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by you, in the communication of the twenty-eighth day of June, I have decided to call into the service an additional force of 300,000 men. I suggest and recommend that the troops should be chiefly of infantry. The quota of your State would be ——. I trust that they may be enrolled without delay, so as to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. An order fixing the quotas of the respective States will be issued by the War Department tomorrow.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING TAXES IN REBEL-  
LIUS STATES, July 1, 1862.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA:

**W**HEREAS, in and by the second section of an act of Congress passed on the seventh day of June, A. D. 1862, entitled "An act for the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts within the United States, and for other purposes," it is made the duty of the President to declare, on or before the first day of July then next following, by his proclamation, in what States and parts of States insurrection exists:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that the States of South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and the State of Virginia (except the following counties: Hancock, Brooke, Ohio, Marshall, Wetzel, Marion, Monongalia, Preston, Taylor, Pleasants, Tyler, Ritchie, Doddridge, Harrison, Wood, Jackson, Wirt, Roane, Calhoun, Gilmer,

Barbour, Tucker, Lewis, Braxton, Upshur, Randolph, Mason, Putnam, Kanawha, Clay, Nicholas, Cabell, Wayne, Boone, Logan, Wyoming, Webster, Fayette, and Raleigh), are now in insurrection and rebellion, and by reason thereof the civil authority of the United States is obstructed so that the provisions of the "Act to provide increased revenue from imports, to pay the interest on the public debt, and for other purposes," approved August fifth, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, cannot be peaceably executed; and that the taxes legally chargeable upon real estate, under the act last aforesaid, lying within the States and parts of States as aforesaid, together with a penalty of fifty per centum of said taxes, shall be a lien upon the tracts or lots of the same, severally charged, till paid.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this first day of July, in the year of our [L. S.] Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-sixth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President: F. W. SEWARD, Acting Secretary of State.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, July 1, 1862

*To the Senate and House of Representatives:*

I most cordially recommend that Captain Andrew H. Foote, of the United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his eminent services in organizing the flotilla on the western waters, and for his gallantry at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, and at various other places, whilst in command of the naval forces, embracing a period of nearly ten months.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862.

3:30 P. M.

*Major-General George B. McClellan:* It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR MORGAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 2, 1862.

*Governor E. D. Morgan, Albany, New York:*

It was thought safest to mark high enough.  
It is 300,000. A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

July 2, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* Your despatch of Tuesday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now, please be assured I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Frémont's in the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other consid-

able force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 2, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi:*

Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad for some reinforcements from you. Still do not send a man if in your judgment it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or will force you to give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga expedition.

Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation without endangering the service in your department.

A. LINCOLN.

## MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, July 2, 1862

*Fellow Citizens of the Senate of the United States:* I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, an act entitled "An act to provide for additional medical officers of the volunteer service," without my approval.

My reason for so doing is that I have approved an act of the same title passed by Congress after the passage of the one first mentioned, for the express purpose of correcting errors in and superseding the same, as I am informed.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS

*(Private and Confidential.)*

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

July 3, 1862. 10.30 A. M.

*Governor Washburn, Maine [and other governors]:*

I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month, I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send,

the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything. Please act in view of this. The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

### LETTER TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

July 3, 1862.

*Major-General George B. McClellan:*

Yours of 5:30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it.

On the 28th we sent General Burnside an order to send all the force he could spare to you. We then learned that you had requested him to go to Goldsborough; upon which we said to him our order was intended for your benefit, and we did not wish to be in conflict with your views.

We hope you will have help from him soon. To-day we have ordered General Hunter to send you all he can spare. At last advices General Halleck thinks he cannot send reinforcements without endangering all he has gained.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN, President.

## SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL BUTLER

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY,  
July 3, 1862.*Major-General B. F. Butler, New Orleans:*

I wrote you last under date of the 29th ultimo, and have now to say that your despatch of the 18th ultimo, with the accompanying report of General Phelps concerning certain fugitive negroes that have come to his pickets, has been considered by the President.

He is of opinion that under the law of Congress they cannot be sent back to their masters; that in common humanity they must not be permitted to suffer for want of food, shelter, or other necessaries of life; that to this end they should be provided for by the quartermaster's and commissary's departments; and that those who are capable of labor should be set to work and paid reasonable wages.

In directing this to be done, the President does not mean, at present, to settle any general rule in respect to slaves or slavery, but simply to provide for the particular case under the circumstances in which it is now presented.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
Secretary of War.

## LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,  
July 4, 1862.*Major-General McClellan:*

I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I suppose, and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5000 from Hunter a little later), I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army — first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion that with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position — provided, and so long as, you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to

the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN.

P. S. If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so.

A. L.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 4, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi:*

You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even 10,000 infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army.

A. LINCOLN.

#### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX

WASHINGTON CITY, July 4, 1862.

*Major-General Dix, Fort Monroe:*

Send forward the despatch to Colonel Hawkins and this also. Our order and General McClellan's to General Burnside being the same, of course we wish it executed as promptly as possible.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1862. 9 A. M.

*Major-General George B. McClellan:*

A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 P. M. yesterday gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated.

If you can hold your present position, we shall hibe the enemy yet.

A. LINCOLN,

## LETTER TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,

July 6, 1862.

*My Dear Sir:* This introduces Governor William Sprague, of Rhode Island. He is now governor for the third time, and senator-elect of the United States.

I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if, in your judgment, it could be without endangering positions and operations in the southwest; and I now repeat what I have more than once said by telegraph, "Do not come or send a man if, in your judgment, it will endanger any point you

deem important to hold, or endangers or delays the Chattanooga expedition.”

Still, please give my friend, Governor Sprague, a full and fair hearing.

Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN.

MEMORANDUM OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN INTERVIEWS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL McCLELLAN AND OTHER OFFICERS DURING A VISIT TO THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT HARRISON'S LANDING, VIRGINIA, July 9, 1862.

MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS, July 9, 1862

GENERAL McCLELLAN, July 8, 1862.

What amount of force have you now?

About 80,000. Can't vary much; certainly 75,000.

What is likely to be your condition as to health in this camp?

Better than in any encampment since landing at Fort Monroe.

Where is the enemy now?

From four to five miles from us, on all the roads — I think nearly the whole army — both Hills, Longstreet, Jackson, Magruder, Huger.

If you desired, could you remove the army safely?

It would be a delicate and very difficult matter, Cavalry about 5000.

GENERAL SUMNER, July 9, 1862

What is the whole amount of your corps with you now?

About 16,000.

What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?

1175.

In your present encampment what is the present and prospective condition as to health?

As good as any part of eastern Virginia.

Where and in what condition do you believe the enemy to be now?

I think they have retired from our front. Were much damaged, specially in their best troops, in the late action from the superiority of our arms.

If it were desired to get the army away, could it be safely effected?

I think we could, but I think we give up the cause if we do it.

Is the army secure in its present position?

Perfectly so, in my judgment.

GENERAL HEINTZELMAN, July 9, 1862.

What is the whole amount of your corps now with you?

15,000 for duty.

What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and

missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?

Not large. 745.

In your present encampment what is the present and prospective condition as to health?

Excellent for health, and present health improving.

Where and in what condition do you believe the enemy to now be?

Don't think they are in force in our vicinity.

If it were desired to get the army away from here, could it be safely effected?

Perhaps we could; but think it would be ruinous to the country.

Is the army secure in its present position?

I think it is safe.

GENERAL KEYES, July 9, 1862.

What is the whole amount of your corps with you now?

About 12,500.

What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and missing, from the attack on the 26th till now?

Less than 500.

In your present encampment what is the present and prospective condition as to health?

A little improved, but think camp is getting worse.

Where, and in what condition, do you believe the enemy to now be?

Think he has withdrawn, and think preparing to go to Washington.

If it were desired to get the army away, could it be safely effected?

I think it could, if done quickly.

Is the army in its present position secure?

With help of gunboats can hold position.

GENERAL PORTER.

What is the amount of your corps now with you?

About 23,000. Fully 20,000 fit for duty.

What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo until now?

Over 5000.

In your present encampment what is the present and prospective condition as to health?

Very good.

Where and in what condition do you believe the enemy now to be?

Believe he is mainly near Richmond. He feels he dare not attack us here.

If it were desired to get the army away from here, could it be safely effected?

Impossible. Move the army and ruin the country.

Is the army secure in its present position?

Perfectly so. Not only, but we are ready to begin moving forward.

GENERAL FRANKLIN.

What is the whole amount of your corps now with you?

About 15,000.

What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and missing, from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?

Don't think whole will exceed 3,000 men.

In your present encampment what is the present and prospective condition as to health?

Not good.

Where and in what condition do you believe the enemy now to be?

I learn he has withdrawn from our front, and think that is probable.

If it were desired to get the army away from here, could it be safely effected?

I think we could, and think we better — think Rappahannock true line.

Is the army secure in its present position?

Unless we can be closer, it is.

General Sumner . . . . .	1,175
General Heintzelman . . . . .	745
General Keyes . . . . .	500
Fitz-J. Porter . . . . .	5,000
Franklin . . . . .	3,000

---

10,420

ORDER MAKING HALLECK GENERAL-IN-CHIEF  
EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1862.

Ordered, That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole

land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department now under his charge.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, July 11, 1862

*Fellow Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:* I recommend that the thanks of Congress be given to the following officers of the United States Navy:

Captain John L. Lardner, for meritorious conduct at the battle of Port Royal, and distinguished services on the coast of the United States against the enemy.

Captain Charles Henry Davis, for distinguished services in conflict with the enemy at Fort Pillow, at Memphis, and for successful operations at other points in the waters of the Mississippi River.

Commander John A. Dahlgren, for distinguished services in the line of his profession, improvements in ordnance, and zealous and efficient labors in the ordnance branch of the service.

Commander Stephen C. Rowan, for distinguished services in the waters of North Carolina, and particularly in the capture of Newbern, being in chief command of the naval forces.

Commander David D. Porter, for distinguished services in the conception and preparation of the means used for the capture of the forts below New Orleans, and for highly meritorious conduct in the management of the mortar flotilla during the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

Captain Silas H. Stringham, now on the retired list, for distinguished services in the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clark.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

July 11, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Yours of yesterday is received. Do you not, my good friend, perceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in the West? I do not suppose you desire this.

You only wish to control in your own localities; but this you must know may derange all other posts. Can you not, and will you not, have a full conference with General Halleck?

Telegraph him, and meet him at such place as he and you agree upon. I telegraph him to meet you and confer fully with you.

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth:*

Governor Johnson, at Nashville, is in great trouble and anxiety about a raid into Kentucky. The governor is a true and a valuable man—indispensable to us in Tennessee. Will you please get in communication with him, and have a full conference with him before you leave for here? I have telegraphed him on the subject.

A. LINCOLN.

APPEAL TO FAVOR COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION, READ BY THE PRESIDENT TO BORDER-STATE REPRESENTATIVES, July 12, 1862<sup>1</sup>

**G**ENTLEMEN: After the adjournment of Congress, now very near, I shall have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that you of the border States hold more power for good than any other equal number of members, I feel it a duty which I cannot justifiably waive to make this appeal to you. I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual-emancipation message of last March, the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the con-

<sup>1</sup>This was the last attempt made by Lincoln to effect his cherished project of freeing slaves without ruining their owners. The result was that two-thirds of the Border-State representatives thought the scheme impracticable, while one-third promised to submit it to their constituents.

test. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration, and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own, when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask, Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge? Discarding punctilio and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in any possible event? You prefer that the constitutional relation of the States to the nation shall be practically restored without disturbance of the institution; and if this were done, my whole duty in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war cannot be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere

friction and abrasion—by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event! How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in the war! How much better to do it while we can, lest the war ere long render us pecuniarily unable to do it! How much better for you as seller, and the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the things to be sold and the price of it in cutting one another's throats? I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go.

I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned—one which threatens division among those who, united, are none too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is,

my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be free. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offense, to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask, you can relieve me, and, much more, can relieve the country, in this important point. Upon these considerations I have again begged your attention to the message of March last. Before leaving the capital, consider and discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you consider this proposition, and at the least commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I beseech you that you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring it speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy fu-

ture fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
July 12, 1862

*To the House of Representatives:* I transmit the report of the Secretary of State upon the subject of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th ultimo, requesting information in regard to the relations between the United States and foreign powers.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. Not more than 5,000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or two thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any

more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi:*

They are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL BOYLE

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862.

*General J. T. Boyle, Louisville, Kentucky:*

Your several despatches received. You should call on General Halleck. Telegraph him at once. I have telegraphed him that you are in trouble.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL BOYLE

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862.

*General J. T. Boyle, Louisville, Kentucky:*

We cannot venture to order troops from General Buell. We know not what condition he is in. He may be attacked himself. You must call on General Halleck, who commands, and whose business it is to understand and care for

the whole field. If you cannot telegraph to him, send a messenger to him. A despatch has this moment come from Halleck at Tuscumbia, Alabama.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, July 14, 1862

*Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:* Herewith is a draft of a bill to compensate any State which may abolish slavery within its limits, the passage of which, substantially as presented, I respectfully and earnestly recommend.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that any State shall have lawfully abolished slavery within and throughout such State, either immediately or gradually, it shall be the duty of the President, assisted by the Secretary of the Treasury, to prepare and deliver to such State an amount of six per cent. interest-bearing bonds of the United States equal to aggregate value, at ——— dollars per head, of all the slaves within such State as reported by the census of the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty; the whole amount for any one State to be delivered at once if the abolishment be

immediate, or in equal annual instalments if it be gradual, interest to begin running on each bond at the time of its delivery, and not before.

And be it further enacted, That if any State, having so received any such bonds, shall at any time afterward by law reintroduce or tolerate slavery within its limits, contrary to the act of abolishment upon which such bonds shall have been received, said bonds so received by said State shall at once be null and void, in whose-soever hands they may be, and such State shall refund to the United States all interest which may have been paid on such bonds.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

July 14, 1862.

*Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi:*

I am very anxious—almost impatient—to have you here. Have due regard to what you leave behind. When can you reach here?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY,

July 14, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* General Burnside's force is at Newport News, ready to move, on short notice, one way or the other, when ordered.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO J. W. WHITE AND OTHERS

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

JULY 14, 1862.

JAMES W. WHITE, ROBERT H. MCCURDY and  
F. S. WINSTON, Committee.

*Gentlemen:* Your letter conveying to me the invitation of several loyal and patriotic bodies in New York to attend a mass-meeting in that city on Tuesday, the 15th instant, is received. While it would be very agreeable to me to thus meet the friends of the country, I am sure I could add nothing to the purpose or the wisdom with which they will perform their duty; and the near adjournment of Congress makes it indispensable for me to remain here. Thanking you and those you represent for the invitation and the kind terms in which you have communicated it, I remain

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

## NOTE TO SECRETARY CHASE

July 14, 1862.

*Hon. Secretary of the Treasury:* Might not Mr. Boulogny be appointed surveyor of the port of New Orleans? If there be no objections, please send nomination.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO SOLOMON FOOT

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1862.

*Sir:* Please inform the Senate that I shall be obliged if they will postpone the adjournment at least one day beyond the time which I understand to be now fixed for it

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GALUSHA A. GROW

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 15, 1862.

*Sir:* Please inform the House of Representatives that I shall be obliged if they will postpone the adjournment at least one day beyond the time which I understand to be now fixed for it.

Your obedient servant,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

## MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, July 17, 1862

*Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:* I have inadvertently omitted so long to inform you that, in March last, Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, of New York, gratuitously presented to the United States the ocean-steamer *Vanderbilt*, by many considered the finest steamer in the world. She has ever since been, and still is, doing valuable service to the

government. For the patriotic act in making this magnificent and valuable present to the country, I recommend that some suitable acknowledgment be made.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, July 17, 1862

*Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:* Considering the bill for "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," and the joint resolution explanatory of said act, as being substantially one, I have approved and signed both.

Before I was informed of the passage of the resolution, I had prepared the draft of a message stating objections to the bill becoming a law, a copy of which draft is herewith transmitted.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

(*Copy.*)

*Fellow-citizens of the House of Representatives:* I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, the bill for an act entitled "An act to suppress treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," together with my objections to its becoming a law.

There is much in the bill to which I perceive no objection. It is wholly prospective; and it touches neither person nor property of any loyal citizen, in which particulars it is just and proper.

The first and second sections provide for the conviction and punishment of persons who shall be guilty of treason, and persons who shall "incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid and comfort thereto, or shall engage in or give aid and comfort to any such existing rebellion or insurrection." By fair construction, persons within these sections are not to be punished without regular trials in duly constituted courts under the forms and all the substantial provisions of law and of the Constitution applicable to their several cases. To this I perceive no objection, especially as such persons would be within the general pardoning power, and also the special provision for pardon and amnesty contained in this act.

It is also provided that the slaves of persons convicted under these sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of expression, rather than a substantial objection, in this. It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were said the

ownership of the slave had first been transferred to the nation, and that Congress had then liberated him, the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. The traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as justly as he does any other property; and he forfeits both to the government against which he offends. The government, so far as there can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the question for Congress in regard to them is, "Shall they be made free or be sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she has been the owner of some slaves by escheat, and she sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed, I do not believe it would be physically possible for the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill. Another matter involved in these two sections and running through other parts of the act will be noticed hereafter.

I perceive no objection to the third and fourth sections.

So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do no injustice to the persons embraced within them is clear. That those who make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it is too obviously just to be called in question. To give governmental protection to the property of persons who have abandoned it, and gone on a crusade to overthrow that same government, is absurd, if considered in the mere light of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best policy. The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the persons embraced within these sections is certainly not very objectionable; but a justly discriminating application of it would be very difficult, and to a great extent impossible. And would it not be wise to place a power of remission somewhere, so that these persons may know they have something to lose by persisting, and something to save by desisting? I am not sure whether such power of remission is or is not within section thirteen.

Without any special act of Congress, I think our military commanders, when, in military phrase, "they are within the enemy's country," should, in an orderly manner, seize and use whatever of real or personal property may be

necessary or convenient for their commands; at the same time preserving in some way the evidence of what they do.

What I have said in regard to slaves while commenting on the first and second sections, is applicable to the ninth, with the difference that no provision is made in the whole act for determining whether a particular individual slave does or does not fall within the classes defined in that section. He is to be free upon certain conditions; but whether those conditions do or do not pertain to him, no mode of ascertaining is provided. This could be easily supplied.

To the tenth section I make no objection. The oath therein required seems to be proper, and the remainder of the section is substantially identical with a law already existing.

The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary powers upon the Executive. Without this law I have no hesitation to go as far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient. And I am ready to say now, I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ as laborers as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.

The twelfth and thirteenth sections are something better than unobjectionable; and the fourteenth is entirely proper if all other parts of the act shall stand.

That to which I chiefly object pervades most parts of the act, but more distinctly appears in the first, second, seventh, and eighth sections. It is the sum of those provisions which results in the divesting of title forever.

For the causes of treason and the ingredients of treason not amounting to the full crime, it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives of the guilty parties; whereas the Constitution of the United States declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the persons attainted." True, there seems to be no formal attainder in this case; still, I think the greater punishment cannot be constitutionally inflicted in a different form for the same offense.

With great respect I am constrained to say I think this feature of the act is unconstitutional. It would not be difficult to modify it.

I may remark that this provision of the Constitution, put in language borrowed from Great Britain, applies only in this country, as I understand, to real or landed estate.

Again, this act, by proceedings *in rem*, forfeits property for the ingredients of treason, without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given him in any proceeding. That we may not touch property lying within our reach because we cannot give per-

sonal notice to an owner who is absent endeavoring to destroy the government is certainly not very satisfactory. Still, the owner may not be thus engaged; and I think a reasonable time should be provided for such parties to appear and have personal hearings. Similar provisions are not uncommon in connection with proceedings *in rem*.

For the reasons stated I return the bill to the House in which it originated.

LETTER TO SECRETARY CHASE  
EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Mr. Senator Doolittle informs me that the Wisconsin delegation have unanimously recommended persons for assessors and collectors throughout their State, and that the paper showing this is filed with you. If so, I am in favor of adopting their "slate" at once, and so disposing of one State.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,

July 21, 1862.

*Major-General McClellan:* This is Monday. I hope to be able to tell you on Thursday what is to be done with Burnside.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 22, 1862.

*Sir:* I think it will be better to do nothing now which can be construed into a demand for troops in addition to the three hundred thousand for which we have recently called. We do not need more, nor, indeed, so many, if we could have the smaller number very soon. It is a very important consideration, too, that one recruited into an old regiment is nearly or quite equal in value to two in a new one. We can scarcely afford to forego any plan within our power which may facilitate the filling of the old regiments with recruits. If, on consideration, you are of opinion that this object can be advanced by causing the militia of the several States to be enrolled, and by drafts therefrom, you are at liberty to take the proper steps and do so, provided that any number of recruits so obtained from any State within the next three months shall, if practicable, be an abatement of the quota of volunteers from such State under the recent call. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

ORDER AUTHORIZING EMPLOYMENT OF  
"CONTRABANDS"

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, July 22, 1862.

*First:* Ordered that military commanders within the States of Virginia, North Carolina,

Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, for supplies, or for other military purposes; and that while property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice.

*Second:* That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.

*Third:* That, as to both property and persons of African descent, accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases; and the several departments of this government shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts toward the execution of these orders.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

## EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AS FIRST SUBMITTED TO THE CABINET, July 22, 1862

**I**N PURSUANCE of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint resolution explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion, against the Government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection of any and all States which may then be recognizing and practically sus-

taining the authority of the United States, and which may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, gradual abolishment of slavery within such State or States; that the object is to practically restore, thenceforward to be maintained, the constitutional relation between the General Government and each and all the States wherein that relation is now suspended or disturbed; and that for this object the war, as it has been, will be prosecuted. And as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object, I, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever be free.

#### LETTER TO JAMES DIXON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 24, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* The bearer of this, Mr. Bronson Murray, now resident in the fourth district of Connecticut, wishes to be collector for that district. He is my acquaintance and friend of some years' standing, whom I would like to

oblige, but I should not like to appoint him against the wish of yourself and other Union friends there.

Please give the case such attention as you reasonably can, and write me. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

PROCLAMATION, July 25, 1862

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA:

*A Proclamation.*

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which act, and the joint resolution explanatory thereof, are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion, against the Government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and by said sixth section provided.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred [L. S.] and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

#### LETTER TO REVERDY JOHNSON

(*Private.*)

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 26, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Yours of the 16th, by the hand of Governor Shepley, is received. It seems the Union feeling in Louisiana is being crushed out by the course of General Phelps. Please pardon me for believing that is a false pretense. The people of Louisiana—all intelligent people everywhere—know full well that I never had a wish to touch the foundations of their society, or any right of theirs. With perfect knowledge of this they forced a necessity upon me to send armies among them, and it is their own fault, not mine, that they are annoyed by the presence of General Phelps. They also know the remedy—know how to be cured of General Phelps.

Remove the necessity of his presence. And might it not be well for them to consider whether they have not already had time enough to do this? If they can conceive of anything worse than General Phelps within my power, would they not better be looking out for it? They very well know the way to avert all this is simply to take their place in the Union upon the old terms. If they will not do this, should they not receive harder blows rather than lighter ones? You are ready to say I apply to friends what is due only to enemies. I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends who would hold my hands while my enemies stab me. This appeal of professed friends has paralyzed me more in this struggle than any other one thing. You remember telling me, the day after the Baltimore mob in April, 1861, that it would crush all Union feeling in Maryland for me to attempt bringing troops over Maryland soil to Washington. I brought the troops notwithstanding, and yet there was Union feeling enough left to elect a legislature the next autumn, which in turn elected a very excellent Union United States senator! I am a patient man—always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I must save this government, if possible. What I cannot do, of course

I will not do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO CUTHBERT BULLITT<sup>1</sup>

(*Private.*)

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 28, 1862.

*Sir:* The copy of a letter addressed to yourself by Mr. Thomas J. Durant has been shown to me. The writer appears to be an able, a dispassionate, and an entirely sincere man. The first part of the letter is devoted to an effort to show that the secession ordinance of Louisiana was adopted against the will of a majority of the people. This is probably true, and in that fact may be found some instruction. Why did they allow the ordinance to go into effect? Why did they not assert themselves? Why stand passive and allow themselves to be trodden down by a minority? Why did they not hold popular meetings and have a convention of their own to express and enforce the true

<sup>1</sup> Three months before this letter was written Farragut and Butler had together taken New Orleans—a victory which opened the Mississippi River. Lincoln in vain then urged the military governors of Louisiana, Tennessee and Arkansas to help their people to elect delegates to the national Congress, thereby ceasing as rebels and escaping the penalty declared in the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

sentiment of the State? If preorganization was against them then, why not do this now that the United States army is present to protect them? The paralysis—the dead palsy—of the government in this whole struggle is, that this class of men will do nothing for the government, nothing for themselves, except demanding that the government shall not strike its open enemies lest they be struck by accident!

Mr. Durant complains that in various ways the relation of master and slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an act of Congress, while constitutional guaranties are suspended on the plea of military necessity. The truth is, that what is done and omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither in sufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or drive from our lines slaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be ignorant of the pressure in this direction, nor of my efforts to hold it within bounds till he and such as he shall have time to help themselves.

I am not posted to speak understandingly on all the police regulations of which Mr. Durant complains. If experience shows any one of them to be wrong, let them be set right. I think

I can perceive in the freedom of trade which Mr. Durant urges that he would relieve both friends and enemies from the pressure of the blockade. By this he would serve the enemy more effectively than the enemy is able to serve himself. I do not say or believe that to serve the enemy is the purpose of Mr. Durant, or that he is conscious of any purpose other than national and patriotic ones. Still, if there were a class of men who, having no choice of sides in the contest, were anxious only to have quiet and comfort for themselves while it rages, and to fall in with the victorious side at the end of it without loss to themselves, their advice as to the mode of conducting the contest would be precisely such as his is. He speaks of no duty—apparently thinks of none—resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and passage without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers—deadheads at that—to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm, and safely landed right side up. Nay, more: even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound. Of course the rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to do it nor permit the government

to do it without their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. The people of Louisiana who wish protection to person and property have but to reach forth their hands and take it. Let them in good faith re-inaugurate the national authority, and set up a State government conforming thereto under the Constitution. They know how to do it, and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army will be withdrawn so soon as such State government can dispense with its presence; and the people of the State can then, upon the old constitutional terms, govern themselves to their own liking. This is very simple and easy.

If they will not do this—if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the government, it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose-water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones?

Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can, to save the government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing.

Yours truly,           A. LINCOLN.

\*DESPATCH TO GOVERNORS OF UNION STATES.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

July 28, 1862.

*Governors of all Loyal States:* It would be of great service here for us to know, as fully as you can tell, what progress is made and making in recruiting for old regiments in your State. Also about what day the first regiment can move with you, what the second, what the third, and so on? This information is important to us in making calculations. Please give it as promptly and accurately as you can.           A. LINCOLN.

LETTER TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 30, 1862.

*Sir:* These gentlemen desire some order to facilitate recruiting in the city of New York. I think you may safely give them such as they desire, making it subject to the approval of the governor of the State.

Yours truly,           A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO AUGUST BELMONT

July 31, 1862.

*Dear Sir:* You send to Mr. W—— an extract from a letter written at New Orleans the 9th instant, which is shown to me. You do not give the writer's name; but plainly he is a man of ability, and probably of some note. He says: "The time has arrived when Mr. Lincoln must take a decisive course. Trying to please everybody, he will satisfy nobody. A vacillating policy in matters of importance is the very worst. Now is the time, if ever, for honest men who love their country to rally to its support. Why will not the North say officially that it wishes for the restoration of the Union as it was?"

And so, it seems, this is the point on which the writer thinks I have no policy. Why will he not read and understand what I have said?

The substance of the very declaration he desires is in the inaugural, in each of the two regular messages to Congress, and in many, if not all, the minor documents issued by the Executive since the inauguration.

Broken eggs cannot be mended; but Louisiana has nothing to do now but to take her place in the Union as it was, barring the already broken eggs. The sooner she does so, the smaller will be the amount of that which will be past

mending. This government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy the government, and if they fail still come back into the Union unhurt. If they expect in any contingency to ever have the Union as it was, I join with the writer in saying, "Now is the time."

How much better it would have been for the writer to have gone at this, under the protection of the army at New Orleans, than to have sat down in a closet writing complaining letters northward! Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO JOSEPH A. WRIGHT

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* Our mutual friend R. W. Thompson and John P. Usher assure me that they believe you, more certainly than any other man, can carry the Terre Haute district for the Union cause. Please try. The effort shall not go unappreciated so far as I am concerned.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO COUNT A. DE GASPARIN

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1862.

*Dear Sir:* Your very acceptable letter, dated Orbe, Canton de Vaud, Switzerland, 18th of July, 1862, is received. The moral effect was the worst of the affair before Richmond, and that has run its course downward. We are now at a stand, and shall soon be rising again, as we hope. I believe it is true that, in men and material, the enemy suffered more than we in that series of conflicts, while it is certain he is less able to bear it.

With us every soldier is a man of character, and must be treated with more consideration than is customary in Europe. Hence our great army, for slighter causes than could have prevailed there, has dwindled rapidly, bringing the necessity for a new call earlier than was anticipated. We shall easily obtain the new levy, however. Be not alarmed if you shall learn that we shall have resorted to a draft for part of this. It seems strange even to me, but it is true, that the government is now pressed to this course by a popular demand. Thousands who wish not to personally enter the service, are nevertheless anxious to pay and send substitutes, provided they can have assurance that unwilling

persons, similarly situated, will be compelled to do likewise. Besides this, volunteers mostly choose to enter newly forming regiments, while drafted men can be sent to fill up the old ones, wherein man for man they are quite doubly as valuable.

You ask, "Why is it that the North with her great armies so often is found with inferiority of numbers face to face with the armies of the South?" While I painfully know the fact, a military man—which I am not—would better answer the question. The fact, I know, has not been overlooked; and I suppose the cause of its continuance lies mainly in the other facts that the enemy holds the interior and we the exterior lines; and that we operate where the people convey information to the enemy, while he operates where they convey none to us.

I have received the volume and letter which you did me the honor of addressing to me, and for which please accept my sincere thanks. You are much admired in America for the ability of your writings, and much loved for your generosity to us and your devotion to liberal principles generally.

You are quite right as to the importance to us, for its bearing upon Europe, that we should achieve military successes, and the same is true for us at home as well as abroad. Yet it seems

unreasonable that a series of successes, extending through half a year, and clearing more than 100,000 square miles of country, should help us so little, while a single half defeat should hurt us so much. But let us be patient.

I am very happy to know that my course has not conflicted with your judgment of propriety and policy. I can only say that I have acted upon my best convictions, without selfishness or malice, and that by the help of God I shall continue to do so.

Please be assured of my highest respect and esteem.

A. LINCOLN.

ADDRESS AT A UNION MEETING IN WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862

**F**ELLOW-CITIZENS: I believe there is no precedent for my appearing before you on this occasion, but it is also true that there is no precedent for your being here yourselves; and I offer, in justification of myself and of you, that upon examination I have found nothing in the Constitution against it. I, however, have an impression that there are younger gentlemen who will entertain you better, and better address your understanding, than I will or could; and therefore I propose to detain you but a moment longer.

I am very little inclined on any occasion to say anything unless I hope to produce some good by it. The only thing I think of just now not likely to be better said by some one else, is a matter in which we have heard some other persons blamed for what I did myself. There has been a very wide-spread attempt to have a quarrel between General McClellan and the Secretary of War. Now, I occupy a position that enables me to observe that these two gentlemen are not nearly so deep in the quarrel as some

pretending to be their friends. General McClellan's attitude is such that, in the very selfishness of his nature, he cannot but wish to be successful, and I hope he will; and the Secretary of War is in precisely the same situation. If the military commanders in the field cannot be successful, not only the Secretary of War, but myself—for the time being the master of them both—cannot but be failures. I know General McClellan wishes to be successful, and I know he does not wish it any more than the Secretary of War for him, and both of them together no more than I wish it. Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men General McClellan has had, and those who would disparage him say that he has had a very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War insist that General McClellan has had a very small number. The basis for this is, there is always a wide difference, and on this occasion perhaps a wider one than usual, between the grand total on McClellan's rolls and the men actually fit for duty; and those who would disparage him talk of the grand total on paper, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War talk of those at present fit for duty. General McClellan has sometimes asked for things that the Secretary of War did not give him. General McClellan is not to blame for asking

for what he wanted and needed, and the Secretary of War is not to blame for not giving when he had none to give. And I say here, as far as I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one thing at any time in my power to give him. I have no accusation against him. I believe he is a brave and able man, and I stand here, as justice requires me to do, to take upon myself what has been charged on the Secretary of War, as withholding from him.

I have talked longer than I expected to do, and now I avail myself of my privilege of saying no more.

#### LETTER TO SECRETARY CHASE

EXECUTIVE MANSION, August 7, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I have signed and herewith [return] the papers sent yesterday for Vermont, New Hampshire, and Michigan, except in the three cases of departure from the congressional recommendations, which, with the brief, I hold to examine a little.

Yours truly,           A. LINCOLN.

#### LETTER TO SECRETARY CHASE

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 8, 1862.

*Sir:* I have signed the paper forming the districts for Rhode Island and Connecticut, and herewith return it. Also two of the commis-

sions for Connecticut; the others are fiercely contested.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

### LETTER TO JOHN M. CLAY

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 9, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* The snuff-box you sent, with the accompanying note, was received yesterday. Thanks for this memento of your great and patriotic father. Thanks also for the assurance that, in these days of dereliction, you remain true to his principles. In the concurrent sentiment of your venerable mother, so long the partner of his bosom and his honors, and lingering now where he was but for the call to rejoin him where he is, I recognize his voice, speaking, as it ever spoke, for the Union, the Constitution, and the freedom of mankind.

Your obedient servant,  
A. LINCOLN.

### TELEGRAM TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1862.

*Major-General Burnside:* Has King's division, in part or in whole, joined Pope yet?

A. LINCOLN.

## TELEGRAM TO GENERAL S. R. CURTIS

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 12, 1862.

*Major-General Curtis, St. Louis, Missouri:*

Would the completion of the railroad some distance farther in the direction of Springfield, Mo., be of any military advantage to you? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* It seems that several young lieutenants, of whom Charles L. Noggle and George A. Rowley are two, have been cashiered by court martial for misconduct at the battle of June 27th. The records in the cases of the two named are now before me. I suppose that the law and the nature of the service required it; but these cases seem hard. I enclose the copy of an informal letter by the judge-advocate in regard to them generally. I shall be obliged if you and the regimental officers can, consistently with your sense of duty to the service, act upon the suggestions of the judge-advocate's letter. I am very unwilling for these young men to be ruined for so slight causes. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

## LETTER TO CASSIUS M. CLAY

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1862.

*My dear Sir:* I learn that you would not dislike returning to Russia as minister plenipotentiary. You were not recalled for any fault of yours, but, as I understood, it was done at your own request. Of course there is no personal objection to your reappointment. Still, General Cameron cannot be recalled except at his request.

Some conversation passing between him and myself renders it due that he should not resign without full notice of my intention to appoint you. If he resign with such full knowledge and understanding, I shall be quite willing, and even gratified, to again send you to Russia. Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN,

## LETTER TO SECRETARY STANTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1862.

*Hon. Secretary of War:* Mrs. Baird tells me that she is a widow; that her two sons and only support joined the army, where one of them still is; that her other son, Isaac P. Baird, is a private in the Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers—Baxter's Fire Zouaves, Company K; that he

is now under guard with his regiment on a charge of desertion; that he was under arrest for desertion, so that he could not take the benefit of returning under the proclamation on that subject. Please have it ascertained if this is correct, and if it is, let him be discharged from arrest and go to duty. I think, too, he should have his pay for duty actually performed. Loss of pay falls so hard upon poor families.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

\*TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR CURTIN

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 12, 1862.

*Governor Curtin, Harrisburg, Penn.:* It is very important for some regiments to arrive here at once. What lack you from us? What can we do to expedite matters? Answer.

A. LINCOLN.












LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 012 026 231 2